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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“The surest way to be deceived is to consider oneself cleverer than others.” 
- Francois, Duc de la Rochefoucauld. Maxim #127. 
Businesspeople encounter myriad situations that break their routines . . . that violate their 
expectations . . . that surprise them (Weick, 1979& 1993).  Such moments of equivocality 
occasion sensemaking, which at its best entails testing alternative interpretations of the situation 
through enactment of those interpretations with other people, whose reactions in turn will 
confirm or disconfirm the sensemaker’s assessment (Weick, 1979).  Situations of moral1 
equivocality (Sonenshein, 2007), in which the problem at hand is one of uncertainty about the 
ethical implications of an action, also require sensemaking; the following quotations illustrate the 
importance that many businesspeople, in this case bank tellers, place upon consulting with others 
under such circumstances. 
 “There's consequences in every job, but in this job particularly. People always say it's 
better to ask, but in this job more than anything, I would say it's way better to ask than 
anything.” 
 “You learn how to read people, you learn how to make a decision whether I go over and 
tell [Name] on the corner „hey, you need to be careful with that customer, just watch 
what you‟re doing‟ because you learn to read their reactions.  When they‟re like „I don‟t 
know if I‟m supposed to be doing this or not.‟” 
  “How do you learn if you don't ask somebody?  I don't understand how you go from day 
to day without asking somebody and teaching them something new every day. Do you?” 
  “I feel like if I don't have an answer to a question I have a duty to ask somebody and find 
out the answer to that question.  I'm doing myself a disservice if I don't find out the 
answer to that question.  So I'm going to ask and ask and ask until I find out the answer.” 
                                                 
1
 In this document I use the terms instrumental, ethical, and moral following Habermas (1993), pertaining 
respectively to discussions of technique and action pursuant to given ends, to the choice of ends that are appropriate 
to a shared form of life, and to the justification of norms across people whose visions of the good life diverge. 
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 “Here, I think that things are really done right.  We try to work as a team, and we try to 
make sure everybody gets to say what they want to say, and I think that if you were to 
interview any other teller, that they would say „we might not know the answer to 
something, but [name] might know, and we make sure that it gets done right.‟” 
 
Despite the importance to many businesspeople of these consultations, which I call moral 
discourses (and which Habermas (1984: 19) called “practical discourse[s]”), the management 
literature is itself equivocal about their prevalence and meaning.  Forester (2003) insisted that 
they are a regular occurrence; Sonenshein (2006) found that the ethical content of issue-selling 
messages was replaced by arguments for self-interested rationality in upward appeals; Bird and 
Waters (1989) called their finding that businesspeople self-censored their ethical concerns 
“moral muteness.”  Jackall (1988), in an ethnography of large bureaucracies, incorporated a 
telling quotation that illustrated both the reality and the deviance of moral discourse: 
[If an employee were to object to working on nuclear power or weaponry], we’d 
go along with his request but we’d always wonder about the guy.  And in the back 
of our minds, we’d be thinking that he’ll soon object to working in the soda ash 
division because he doesn’t like glass. . .If you meet a guy who hates red-haired 
persons, well, you’re going to wonder about whether that person has other weird 
perceptions as well.  You’ve got to have a degree of interchangeability in 
business.  To me, a person can have any beliefs they want as long as they leave 
them at home. (54) 
 
It seems that moral discourses do occur in organizations, but that they are often restricted 
in their scope and duration.  I have attempted to characterize the climate for moral discourse in 
organizations, and describe its variation along a continuum that I call “moral openness.”  I have 
also attempted to explore its relationships to other constructs.  I believe that just as the form of 
non-moral discourse matters for sensemaking, leading to accounts of the problem at hand that 
vary in their richness and sharedness (Maitlis, 2005), the openness of moral discourse also 
matters for moral decision-making, both in terms of the acceptability of the decisions made to the 
parties to them, and the intent of those parties to follow through on those decisions.  My findings 
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have implications for the literatures on organizational silence (Morrison & Milliken, 2000), 
sensemaking (Maitlis, 2005; Weick, 1979), moral psychology (Arnaud, 2006; Rest, 1986), and 
discourse ethics (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Smith, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). 
 
Overview of Theory 
The a-priori basis for my theory of moral openness in organizations is drawn from 
discourse theory, most especially the work of Robert Alexy (1989 & 1990), but also the work of 
Apel (1990), Benhabib (1992), Gunther (1993), and Habermas (1970, 1979, 1984, 1987, 1990, 
1993, & 1996).  Habermas (1984: 19) defined ethically rational people as those who can justify 
their actions with reference to normative grounds external to themselves, rather than with 
reference to the assertion of their own subjective wills, or to some non-moral objective fact.  
When some question arises as to the justifiability of an action, rational people will engage in a 
practical discourse to reach a reasoned agreement with the other affected parties on whether or 
not a given action is ethical (Habermas, 1984); anything else amounts to manipulation rather 
than argumentation. But, even the attempt to reach such an agreement presumes a certain set of 
rules for the discourse, without which it cannot reliably lead to valid conclusions (Alexy, 1989).  
Robert Alexy defined these rules reconstructively, that is, he identified the presuppositions about 
the terms of discourse itself that must be true for the conclusions of a given moral discourse to be 
valid.  These rules are not completely true in any conversation; one rule states that every word 
and term used in the discourse must have the same meaning for all participants, which as 
Wittgenstein (1953) pointed out is problematic.  However, these rules are typically assumed to 
be true by participants in practical discourse: joining the discourse while knowingly flouting one 
of the rules, for instance by assigning an idiosyncratic meaning to a term to which others ascribe 
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a standard usage, means that one is not attempting to reach a shared and reasoned understanding 
with other participants.  Whatever else one may be doing, be it joking or dissembling or simply 
wasting time, by definition it does not qualify as participating in moral discourse.  Therefore, it 
seems valuable to investigate the extent to which actual moral discourses adhere to these ideals. 
 
Moral openness 
Five concepts that are helpful for understanding the moral openness of a discourse are 
participation, closure, power, logic, and procedural equity (Alexy, 1989).  Participation pertains 
to the openness of the discourse to all affected parties; if some people are left out, then the 
discourse is less open, and its conclusions are less valid because they have neither been accepted 
nor rejected by a relevant party.  Closure refers to the point in the discourse at which conclusions 
are drawn and action is taken; sometimes, a decision is made before agreement has been reached 
among participants, or even before all participants have expressed their interests.  Premature 
closure diminishes the openness of discourse, and its conclusions too are less valid because some 
of them have neither been accepted nor rejected by the participants.   Power entails manipulation 
of the discourse, whether through deception or through attacking another participant’s status; the 
use of power reduces a discourse’s openness and the validity of that discourse’s conclusions, 
because it realizes apparent agreement on the basis of deception or status rather than actual 
agreement on the basis of reasoned assent.  Logic incorporates the prevalence of consistent 
argument, reason-giving, orderly progression of topics, and criticism of the weaknesses of 
arguments; a lack of logic in the discourse implies inconsistency in the conclusions 
reached.Procedural equity describes measures taken to prevent the forfeiture of discourse to 
participants who have more time, energy, or debating skill than their opponents (Alexy, 1989). 
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Of course, the foregoing characterization of decision-makers and their moral discourses is 
idealized.  Discourse theorists (Alexy, 1989 & 1990; Habermas, 1993) concede that actual 
discourse cannot fulfill all the stipulations of their ideal models.  This concession would be 
unremarkable to practicing managers, who would likely note the many problems associated with 
the inclusion of employees being scheduled for termination in a candid conversation about the 
morality of the pending action, let alone the difficulty of including homeless people being 
considered for exclusion from a restaurant.  These potential participants may not be available to 
join the discussion, may not be able to support their arguments with reasons, may not be able to 
adhere to a logical order of argument, and may not refrain from using the information they 
receive for their own strategic gain.  The same criticisms may conversely also be leveled against 
managers and staff in the organization making the decision, and it is worth noting that even the 
decision to problematize an ethical issue, let alone open a discourse about it, is an exercise of 
power.  Many participants may join a discourse not to reach a reasoned agreement, but rather to 
take advantage of other participants (Habermas, 1990), or buy time while waiting for a change in 
their bargaining power (Badaracco, 2002); others may decline to seek reasoned agreement at all 
(Welcomer, Gioia, & Kilduff, 2000).  Therefore, I expect that the degree of moral openness of 
various discourses will vary considerably, according to the variation in the will and ability of 
participants to seek reasoned agreement. 
Although it would be conceptually and empirically interesting to study moral openness 
across and even within individual conversations, I believe that it is more important to study 
moral openness as a climate construct.  Within an established work group, participants already 
have a set of expectations about how conversations are to be held, ranging from whether it is 
okay to interrupt peers to whether it is safe to contradict the assertions of higher-status 
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individuals.  These expectations are activated at the start of a given conversation, not necessarily 
as inviolable rules, but rather as cognitive scripts (Gioia& Poole, 1984) that guide enactment of 
the ensuing conversation.  Participants select scripts to enact based on cues noticed at the start of 
the conversation, and retain those scripts that serve them well enough and regularly enough that 
they are neither discarded nor forgotten (Weick, 1979).  Therefore, I expect that the consistency 
between moral conversations within a work group is likely to be more important than the 
differences between them, because of the shared expectations formed by experience (Ashforth, 
1985; Schneider & Reichers, 1983) and by sensegiving mechanisms (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; 
Maitlis, 2005) like codes of conduct or employee discipline (Trevino, 1992).  Past research has 
found that ethical climates exist within organizations (Victor & Cullen, 1988), and that 
procedural justice climate varies across branches of the same bank (Mossholder, Bennett, & 
Martin, 1998; Naumann & Bennett, 2000), so it seems reasonable to suppose that shared 
expectations form within work groups around moral discourse specifically.  
A key reason why moral openness is compelling as a climate construct is because it 
addresses an aspect of ethical decision-making at the group level, in a way that existing theories 
do not.  While ethical climate (Victor & Cullen, 1988) describes the shared norms that prevail in 
decision-making, it does not describe the patterns of discourse that create and sustain those 
norms.  While moral muteness (Bird & Waters, 1989) highlights the reluctance of managers to 
cite moral reasons for their decisions, it details the prospective reasons for not giving moral 
accounts for decisions, rather than the actual difficulties faced in attempting to formulate or 
promote a moral decision.  Organizational silence (Morrison & Milliken, 2000) similarly 
describes the reasons that voice is withheld, but not the limitations of tenuous voice.  
Empowerment (Conger & Kanungo, 1989; Spreitzer, 1996) focuses on the experience of self-
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efficacy as a motivator for employees to take control of their tasks, which though valuable for 
moral decision-making is hardly sufficient.  Moral openness climate therefore captures aspects of 
ethical decision-making at the group level that other existing constructs do not.  A robust 
conception and measurement of moral openness climate can describe the strengths and 
limitations of actual moral discourse in organizations, and relate it to other constructs.   
 
Related Constructs 
In order to establish construct validity, it is important to test the relationship between 
moral openness climate and other constructs that should theoretically be related to it.  Constructs 
that should be theoretically related to moral openness climate are respectful interaction (Vogus, 
2004), participative decision-making (Arnold, Arad, Rhoades, & Drasgow, 2000), and 
machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970).    Respectful interaction is the degree to which 
individuals are willing to avoid self-censoring their own contributions to discourse and to refrain 
from critiquing others; I expected moral openness climate and respectful interaction to be highly 
correlated but distinct, particularly because moral openness climate incorporates an assessment 
of the logic of the discourse, while respectful interaction does not.  Similarly, participative 
decision-making is employees’ perception that their manager accepts their participation (Arnold, 
Arad, Rhoades, & Drasgow, 2000); because moral opennessclimate measures employees’ 
perception that their entire work group accepts their participation, eschews premature closure, 
refrains from the manipulative use of power, and discusses the matter at hand in a logical 
manner, I expected moral openness climate and participative decision-making to be correlated 
but distinct.  Because managers have a disproportionate influence upon the ethical context in a 
work group (Brown, Trevino, & Harrison, 2005) and because a high incidence of strategic action 
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depresses moral openness, I expected that work groups managed by individuals who score highly 
on machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) will have low moral openness climate.   
Moreover, Habermas argues that valid moral discourse creates concrete social 
agreements that have motivating power superior to that of mere normative ideals (Habermas, 
1993).  This philosophical argument aligns with the finding in the organizational behavior 
literature that empowerment increases the intentions of the empowered to persist in 
accomplishing task objectives (Conger & Kanungo, 1988; Spreitzer, 1995), so it seems 
reasonable to expectmoral openness climate to positively predict both collective moral 
motivation (i.e. the propensity of group members to follow through on ethical decisions) and 
collective moral character (i.e. the propensity of group members to persist in ethical actions 
despite resistance) (Arnaud, 2006). 
In addition to measuring some existing constructs using validated scales, and relating 
them to moral openness climate, I have developed a unidimensional construct that I call moral 
satisfaction, a judgment by an individual group member of the acceptability of moral decisions 
made by the group.  Moral satisfaction is conceptually related to Habermas’ principle of 
universalization, which states that ideally all participants in a moral discourse should be able to 
agree to the decision (Habermas, 1990).  Low moral satisfaction would indicate that issues at 
hand have not been consensually resolved.  I would ideally expect a stronger moral openness 
climate to lead to higher moral satisfaction, because more thorough and reasonable discourses 
should lead all participants to conclude that the decisions reached are acceptable.  However, a 
high degree of moral satisfaction does not necessarily imply that a decision is morally excellent; 
rather, a given consensus must always be provisional, contingent upon the depth of insight of the 
parties to it.  It is always possible that a group that realizes high moral satisfaction as a matter of 
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perception does not recognize some important moral shortcoming (Rorty, 2006), perhaps all the 
more so if that satisfaction stymies further discourse.  Moreover, discourse ethics has been 
criticized for facilitating the domination of parties that lack the resources to rationally argue their 
positions (Lyotard, 1984), a problem that will be all the more severe if it is impossible to fully 
elaborate a unified conception of the human goods that ethics is intended to protect (Scott, 1996).  
Therefore, because moral discourse may often suppress rather than elicit moral expression, it is 
possible that moral openness climate will be negatively related to moral satisfaction. 
Accordingly, I also theorized another related construct that I called contention. 
Contention is a climate perception of the moral intensity (Jones, 1991) that a group encounters in 
its decisions, despite the premise controls (Perrow, 1986) that limit perceptions of moral 
intensity for some decisions.  For example, employees of a collections agency may experience 
high contention because of the obvious financial hardships experienced by both the debtors they 
target and the creditors whom they serve, while employees of a hair salon may experience little 
contention because of the generally good-natured demeanor of their customers and the dearth of 
moral issues presented to them, and employees of a liquor store may also experience little 
contention because they have disengaged (Bandura, 1999) from the harms that their products 
inflict upon some of their most loyal customers.  Some groups engage in activities that have a 
powerful, concentrated, certain, and meaningful impact on many people that they know, while 
others have no such influence; some fail to recognize the impact they have, either because they 
have not considered their influence, or because they intentionally ignore their impacts.  
Higher contention problematizes the experience of moral equivocality and highlights the 
need for some rational resolution.  I therefore expected that contention would moderate the 
impact of moral openness climate on moral satisfaction.  That is, low moral openness climate 
10 
 
with low contention would result in high moral satisfaction, because participants recognize little 
to be dissatisfied with.  High moral openness climate with high contention would also result in 
high moral satisfaction, because participants recognize that difficult moral problems are being 
resolved openly.  But high moral openness climate with low contention would result in low 
satisfaction, because the effort and abstraction of moral discourse would be disproportionate to 
the problems at hand; similarly, high contention with low moral openness climate would also 
result in low satisfaction, because the problems at hand would be treated without reasoned 
agreement.   
 
Overview of Methods 
 
I have conducted a scale development and validation project that has defined a survey 
measure for moral openness climate, using four studies to examine the qualitative experience of 
moral openness among front-line personnel and first-line managers, to pre-test the survey items 
that have been derived from Alexy’s rules (1989 & 1990), establish a reliable scale, and test the 
construct validity of moral openness climate, respectively.   
The project began with ten semistructured interviews (Legard, Keegan, & Ward, 2003), 
in order to determine whether various aspects of moral openness described businesspeople’s 
experiences of moral discourse, or represented a degree of theoretical abstraction alien to actual 
reasoned agreement.  The interviews were conducted among tellers, desk staff, and branch 
managers in retail banks in the Southeastern United States.These interviews probed experiences 
with decision-making in the face of ethical uncertainty, and explored aspects of moral openness 
including participation, closure, and power, as well as domination of the discourse by 
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participants skilled in argument, failures of logical reasoning, contention or the lack thereof over 
current or typical ethical issues in the workplace, and moral satisfaction.  
The second study tested the substantive validity of the proposed survey items on 
successive small samples of participants (between twenty and thirty respondents each) from the 
Vanderbilt eLab’s survey panel.  These respondents were asked to match survey items to the 
written definition of whichever of five prospective dimensions of moral openness climate 
seemed most appropriate (Anderson & Gerbing, 1991).  Through this iterative process, items that 
did not match consistently with a single dimension were eliminated and replaced with simpler 
and more promising items. 
The third study employed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to confirm the 
dimensionality of the moral openness climate construct, and eliminate survey items that did not 
load significantly on any factor (Hinkin, 1998).  A sample of 604 participants was surveyed 
using the Vanderbilt eLab.  This data set was subsequently used to select a combination of 
survey items that together have more than adequate reliability, as measured by a Cronbach’s 
Alpha of no less than 0.70 (DeVellis, 2003; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994; Spector, 1992) for each 
scale dimension.   
The fourth and final study collected a new data set to support several tests for construct 
validity.  Construct validity requires that the constructs measured by the scales be empirically 
shown to be related to other known constructs in a manner consistent with their theoretical 
definition (DeVellis, 2003; Hinkin, 1998), as discussed above.  Survey data were gathered from 
work groups in twenty-four for-profit organizations in seven states, from New Jersey to 
California and Georgia to Michigan.  Responding firms came from industries as varied as dental 
care, retail banking, tax accounting, software development, automotive aftermarket parts 
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manufacturing, and roofing.  Usable individual responses totalled 97, for a response rate of 21%. 
I expected to find discriminant validity between moral openness climate and respectful 
interaction (Vogus, 2004), and between moral openness climate and the participative decision-
making subscale of the empowering leadership questionnaire (Arnold, Arad, Rhoades, & 
Drasgow, 2000); an EFA would confirm discriminant validity if moral openness climate loaded 
on a separate factor from these other constructs.  Regression analyses would also confirm 
discriminant validity if these other scales differentially predicted the outcomes that I expected to 
be associated with moral openness climate.  I also expected to find that higher moral openness 
climate predicted higher collective moral motivation and higher collective moral character 
(Arnaud, 2006); regression analysis would confirm that prediction by revealing significant 
coefficients for the predictor in the regression equations.  I expected to find that higher manager 
measures of machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) predicted lower moral openness climate, 
again through regression analysis.  Finally, I expected to find a relationship between moral 
openness climate and moral satisfaction, moderated by contention, also through regression 
analysis and factorial ANOVA. 
 
Overview of Results 
 
In the first study, the interviews indicated that moments of ethical uncertainty arose with 
some frequency in the interviewees’ workplaces, and that discussion of those issues was 
generally open along all of the theorized dimensions, as a result of a climate of empowerment 
assiduously cultivated by the bank.  However, branch managers generally closed the discourse at 
13 
 
that point at which they were satisfied with the reasonableness of its conclusions, with little 
opposition from their employees. 
In the second study, the set of survey items for moral openness climate was culled from 
54 to 24 over three iterations.  Importantly, the prospective dimension of “procedural equity” 
(i.e. the lack of domination of a discourse by participants skilled in argument or endowed with 
time) was eliminated when none of its items were consistently matched with its construct 
definition. 
In the third study, a seven-item moral openness climate scale comprised of items 
measuring participation, closure, and power was found to be unidimensional and have a high 
Alpha reliability.  Three survey items for logic loaded on a separate factor which had an 
inadequate Alpha reliability.  Therefore, two moral openness climate scales were used in the 
subsequent study: a ten-item scale that incorporated logic items due to their theoretical value, 
and a seven-item scale that incorporated only participation, closure, and power items.  
Contention, the climate property that was intended to assess the degree of moral intensity and 
disagreement generally experienced within the work group, also did not load on a factor of its 
own and experienced high cross-loadings on other factors, resulting in its exclusion from further 
analyses. 
In the fourth study, response rates to my requests for access and subsequently my survey 
were disappointing, due in part to the onset of the worst recession in the United States since the 
1930s and widespread vilification of the ethics of businesses and capitalism in general.  Results 
revealed that moral openness climate did not have discriminant validity from respectful 
interaction; results for discriminant validity from participatory decision-making were mixed.  
Moral openness climate did not remain unifactorial in a test-retest EFA.  The machiavellianism 
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of managers did not predict mean moral openness climate in their work groups, nor did moral 
openness climate or its standard deviation (a proxy for contention in lieu of a reliable survey 
scale) predict moral satisfaction.  However, moral openness climate did predict collective moral 
motivation and collective moral character, which in turn predicted moral satisfaction.  All tests 
were run for both the moral openness climate scale incorporating items for logic and the one 
excluding them, and results were the same for both. 
 
Discussion 
 
The empirical studies reported above imply three substantive findings. 
First, the interview study revealed that moral discourse exists among front-line and line-
management personnel in the American workplace.  Even in the heavily regulated and rule-
bound industry of retail banking, situations of moral equivocality were common, and personnel 
routinely inquired of each other and their managers to determine the proper course of action.  
However, participants reported being satisfied with allowing their managers to decide difficult 
issues; managers’ opinions were routinely given additional and even decisive weight. 
Second, the eLab studies revealed that moral openness climate did not exist as a nuanced 
and multidimensional construct as expected, nor did contention exist at all.  Rather, a single 
unidimensional seven-item scale for moral openness climate emerged, and it was comprised of 
items representing participation, closure, and power; procedural equity and logic could not be 
reliably measured, and did not load consistently upon the same factor as other moral openness 
climate items.  It appears that these latter two aspects of moral openness do not matter to 
businesspeople as much as they matter to discourse ethicists.  Moreover and surprisingly, 
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contention did not emerge as a psychometrically stable construct, making it impossible to 
condition the influence of moral openness climate upon moral satisfaction upon it. 
Third, the field study revealed that moral openness climate does not clearly have 
discriminant validity from participatory decision-making (Arnold et al., 2000) or respectful 
interaction (Vogus, 2004); that individual perceptions of moral openness climate positively 
correlate with individual perceptions of the group’s intentions to follow through on its decisions; 
and that moral openness climate does not predict moral satisfaction.  All of these findings can be 
understood in terms of empowerment, or more specifically, participatory management.  If moral 
openness climate does not incorporate aspects of procedural equity or logic, as found in the eLab 
studies, then it unsurprising that it would not have discriminant validity from participatory 
decision-making or respectful interaction: both alternative constructs are concerned with 
employees having adequate voice, which the remaining aspects of moral openness (i.e. 
participation, closure, and power) address.  Moreover, if moral openness climate is simply a form 
of empowerment extended to ethical decision-making, then it is similarly not surprising that 
employees to whom that participatory empowerment is extended would be more likely to intend 
to follow through on the decisions made, since empowerment has already been found to increase 
follow-through intentions for other decisions (Conger & Kanungo, 1988; Spreitzer, 1995).  
Finally, if moral openness climate implies a sharing of responsibility as well as authority, it is not 
surprising that it would not have an effect on moral satisfaction; Barker (1993) found that a 
particular form of empowerment (i.e. self-managing teams) did not lead to higher satisfaction 
with management decisions in one workplace, but simply familiarized employees with the 
difficulties of decision-making. 
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Implications of Moral Openness Climate 
 
These findings suggest contributions to the literatures on voice and silence, moral 
psychology, sensemaking, and discourse ethics in business. 
This dissertation contributes to the literatures on voice and silence (Bird & Waters, 1989; 
Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003;Morrison & Milliken, 2000).  Moral muteness has been 
shown to be related to a desire to appear decisive and a desire to keep others’ focus on the non-
moral aspects of the problem at hand (Bird & Waters, 1989), while silence has been shown to be 
predicted by beliefs that management knows best, and predictive of reduced communication 
(Morrison & Milliken, 2000).  Moral openness describes and measures a range of restrictions of 
voice, like excluding certain participants or ending the conversation before a conclusion has been 
reached, rather than a binary dichotomy between voice and silence.Importantly, it appears from 
my empirical findings that this range does not incorporate considerations of logic or procedural 
equity, making it similar to participatory decision-making (Arnold et al., 2000) and respectful 
interaction (Vogus, 2004); therefore, moral openness climate may well be similar or even 
effectively interchangeable with aspects of empowerment that encourage employee voice. 
This dissertation has implications for the literature on moral psychology.  Rest (1986) 
distinguished moral judgment from moral motivation or moral character, and Arnaud (2006) 
theorized an extension of Rest’s four-part model to the level of work-group climate.  I have 
found that moral openness positively predicts collective moral motivation and collective moral 
character, which are the latter two stages of Arnaud’s model.  It appears that a group’s moral 
openness in deliberative discourse does enhance the willingness of parties to it to follow through 
on the decisions made, and to persist in the face of setbacks. 
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This dissertation has implications for sensemaking.  My findings that many of the rational 
nuances of reasoned agreement are unimportant to most businesspeople (i.e. that they do not 
readily discriminate between moral openness climate and respectful interaction or participatory 
decision-making; that they neither reliably recognize separate dimensions for theoretically 
important aspects of moral openness climate like logic, nor incorporate those into a single factor 
for moral openness climate; and that participants in the qualitative study readily accede to 
managerial authority) supports the assertion in sensemaking theory that decision-making is more 
narrative (Weick, 1979; Weick et al., 2005) and intuitive (Sonenshein, 2007) than rational.  
However, these findings also suggest a more nuanced view of social anchoring, that is, “having 
interlocutors who help an actor test his or her interpretation of social stimuli” (Sonenshein, 2007: 
1030).  My findings descriptively suggest that perceptions of moral openness in engaging social 
anchors enhance perceptions of motivation to follow through, perhaps through more robust 
constructions of the issue at hand that are easier to subsequently justify.  Greater moral openness 
may contribute to more influential social anchoring.  Moreover, it is plausible that moral 
openness best describes not deliberation over what ought to be done, but rather bounded 
deliberation over the construction of moral issues (Sonenshein, 2007).  Once those issues have 
been constructed, the adequacy of those constructions for encompassing salient features of the 
situation and guiding subsequent action may influence collective moral motivation and collective 
moral character, and only distally influence satisfaction with the eventual outcomes of the 
decision.  Understood in this way, the rationality of moral openness can be placed within a 
broader descriptive decision-making framework that encompasses non-rational processes. 
This research has provided evidence that moral discourse does occur within 
organizations, and it has described moral openness as a construct that characterizes the degree to 
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which a group of interdependent workers’ shared perceptions of moral discourse approximate the 
terms of ideal speech.  Importantly, my empirical investigation has examined whether or not 
those perceptions meaningfully encompass the principles of reasoned agreement, and I have 
found that some of those principles are not reliably related to the others.  Logic appears to be a 
separate and distinct construct, though one that is difficult to reliably measure.  These results 
seem to indicate that most people do not have a particularly nuanced conception of moral 
openness, and therefore that they may not object when important principles of discourse ethics 
are violated in the course of reaching a (somewhat) reasoned agreement. 
The literature on discourse ethics in business (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007; Smith, 2004) comprehends the impossibility of adhering to the principles of ideal 
speech that ought to structure reasoned agreement at its best (Habermas, 1979 & 1984); however, 
it does so by shifting the locus of analysis from reasoned agreement between individuals 
(Forester, 2003) to deliberative democracy, which mediates among representative institutions 
(Habermas, 1996).  As important as reasoned agreement is between organizations and their 
institutional stakeholders, I believe that it is also important to study the possibility and actuality 
of reasoned agreement among individuals who work in organizations.  Describing the form and 
variation of moral discourse at the level of work groups rather than at the level of industries 
enables subsequent normative inquiry into the implications of that discourse.  In particular, my 
findings have normative implications for the validity of reasoned agreement as it actually occurs 
within organizations.  Logic and procedural equity are not important to businesspeople who 
attempt to reach reasoned agreements over ethical issues.  Therefore, there is potential for 
reasoned agreements to be systematically distorted by inconsistent or fallacious argumentation, 
skilled rhetoric, or voluminous but flawed or irrelevant evidence. 
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Limitations 
The small sample size of the fourth study is the primary limitation of this research.  The 
timing of the survey was unfortunate, coming at a time when businesspeople at every level were 
likely more distracted and fearful than usual; an outsider wanting to ask questions about business 
ethics is not well-received in a crisis.  Were the data collected at a time of economic normalcy, 
they might also have incorporated greater between-group variation on several of the variables, 
had a broader sample of organizations agreed to participate; as it stands, participating 
organizations were likely those that already had strong climates for ethics and openness. 
The lack of discriminant validity for moral openness is another limitation.  These results 
suggest that businesspeople may not distinguish morally valid discourse from being treated with 
respect or being given the opportunity to add their input to decisions. 
 
Future Research 
One possibility for future research addresses the embeddedness of moral discourse within 
broader non-rational processes of moral reasoning.  A qualitative study, perhaps even a 
conversation analysis (Rapley, 2007) that quantifies and analyzes relationships among coded 
speech acts identified in transcripts of actual conversations between research participants, could 
help to better understand the elements of reasoned agreement that are important to 
businesspeople.  By better understanding the aspects of openness that are salient to 
businesspeople in particular moral discourses, conversation analysis studies could enable a more 
accurate theory of the climate for moral openness in work groups.  Such a study could also assess 
whether moral openness perceptions are formed with respect to issue construction, with respect 
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to the subsequent justification of the constructed issues, or both, and thereby contribute to the 
sensemaking-intuition model (Sonenshein, 2007) of moral decision-making. 
It may be valuable to further examine the discriminant validity, antecedents, and 
consequences of moral openness climate, using a field survey with larger sample sizes.  The 
entire empowering leadership questionnaire (Arnold et al., 2000) may be useful for studying the 
discriminant validity of moral openness climate from empowerment; other potential antecedents 
of moral openness climate might include the elements of an effective ethics and compliance 
program (Harned, Seligson, & Baviskar, 2005); other outcomes may include an attenuation of 
moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999) or perceptions of distributive, procedural, or interpersonal 
justice (Niehoff & Moorman, 1993). 
Moral openness may have implications for ethical leadership.  Reasoned agreement may 
require leaders to bear the burdens of judgment (Rawls, 1993), and by authoritative actions 
create the circumstances under which discourse is possible (Habermas, 1996).  These actions 
may include raising an issue and framing the problem in a way that allows relevant parties to 
recognize it and discuss it, rather than in a way that alienates or privileges some participants; 
recognizing impasses that cannot be resolved because of a lack of information or will, and 
making a decision (with a concomitant acceptance of responsibility) that breaks the impasse and 
allows the discourse to resume; and sometimes even hurrying a discourse along in order to leave 
a point intentionally vague, whether to prevent unproductive conflict in the present or leave 
leeway for interpretation in the future.  All of these may facilitate greater moral openness in 
actual organizations, and therefore better adaptation to emergent moral problems in a changing 
and pluralistic world. 
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Finally, it will be important to examine the normative weaknesses of actual reasoned 
agreement.  Moral openness may be an expression of the ethea of ethical rationality (Habermas, 
1984), employee empowerment (Potterfield, 1999), or both.  These ethea have limitations of 
their own, whether in their reduction of the set of admissible considerations (Lyotard, 1984; 
Scott, 1996), in their constraint of the scope of issues which employees are empowered to decide 
(Potterfield, 1999), or in the displacement of responsibility from some decision-makers to others 
(Jackall, 1988; Potterfield, 1999).  Even if those limitations cannot yet be overcome so long as 
decision-makers must reach some reasoned agreement, it will be important for those decision-
makers to recognize and accept responsibility for those limitations. 
Altogether, it appears that moral openness climate is valuable for facilitating greater 
reasoned agreement in the face of moral equivocality in organizations, and thereby for garnering 
increased intentions to follow through on those agreements.  However, it has a number of 
important limitations that merit further exploration. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature in organization studies includes a number of important constructs that are 
relevant to moral openness.  Several authors have already developed models of voice and silence 
in organizations, some of which explicitly pertain to ethics; I will explain why these models 
point toward moral openness but do not define or duplicate it.  Similarly, models of 
empowerment also resemble moral openness but are not theoretically congruent with it.  Other 
theorists have examined the ways in which members of organizations make sense of the 
uncertain social meanings that can attach to their actions, and pointed out that sensemaking has 
important narrative and affective content that cannot be assimilated as a matter of course into 
rational models of argumentation and decision-making.  That insight will be important for 
developing a model of moral openness that is appropriate for organizational contexts in which 
the time, attention, patience, and rationality of human decision makers is constrained.  Finally, 
climate is a class of constructs that have been developed to account for consistency in 
organizational behavior without relying on instrumental and individual theories of motivation. 
The philosophical literature on discourse ethics, including criticism thereof, is also 
relevant to this project.  Most importantly, it offers a rich characterization of the a priori 
foundations of reasoned agreement, without which such agreement is more apparent than real.  
Critically, it also identifies a set of limitations to the normative validity of reasoned agreement, 
both in its ideal form, and in its actual forms.  These are important to review, because they 
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highlight both the promise and the peril of moral openness for more ethical decision-making in 
organizations. 
 
Organizational Thought Informing Moral Openness Climate 
 
Theories of silence and voice including whistle-blowing and empowerment 
Several authors have discussed employees’ reluctance to deliver troubling observations to 
their coworkers or superiors, while others have studied empowerment and participative 
management.  However, none of the existing theories of voice have been formulated in terms of 
discourse theory.  I will argue later that such a formulation permits a more nuanced view of less-
than-ideal discourse. 
Bird & Waters (1989) used interviews with managers to study what they called moral 
muteness: the reluctance of managers to provide ethical justification for their actions, especially 
when those same actions could be explained in economic or strategic terms despite their moral 
acceptability.  They characterized the causes of moral muteness as a lack of perceived safety, or 
what Edmondson would later call psychological safety (1999), an avoidance of conflict, an 
avoidance of precedent-setting, a desire to appear decisive, and a practical desire to keep their 
audience’s focus on the non-moral aspects of the problem at hand.  They also observed that 
moral muteness had consequences including reinforcement of a stereotype of management as an 
amoral activity, avoidance or neglect of moral issues, experience of role conflict and role 
ambiguity for the mute managers, and weakening of the authority of moral standards.  Badaracco 
(2002), in a book for practicing managers, recommended moral muteness to his readers under the 
label “leading quietly,” for exactly the causes of moral muteness outlined above, but with the 
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benefit of enabling quiet leaders to achieve moral outcomes without the cost of martyrdom.  
Moral muteness and quiet leadership seem to be concerned with the avoidance of moral 
discourse in favor of non-moral discourse or direct action, but do not address the formation of 
moral norms. 
Morrison & Milliken (2000) studied organizational silence, pertaining not only to ethical 
issues but also to any negative information not delivered to supervisors, as an organization-level 
phenomenon.  They described what they called a “climate of silence” (2000: 708) characterized 
by a fear and avoidance of negative feedback among top managers, and implicit beliefs that 
employees are untrustworthy, that management knows best, and that dissent is at least 
symptomatic and possibly constituent of organizational dysfunction.  Such a climate was thought 
to be exacerbated by homogeneity among top managers, especially if they all share a background 
in economics or finance that imbues them with the view that employees are self-interested and 
untrustworthy.  It produces perceptions among employees that speaking up about problems is not 
worth it, and may in fact be dangerous to oneself; these perceptions in turn suppress 
communication, bias decision-making, damage trust, induce stress, and may eventually elicit 
withdrawal or deviant behaviors (Morrison & Milliken, 2000).  A subsequent interview study 
among executive MBAs found that many employees were reluctant to raise issues to their 
supervisors, and that the most frequent reason for remaining silent was a fear of being viewed 
negatively and thereby damaging a valuable relationship (Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003).  
Twenty percent of their interviewees felt that they could not raise ethical issues with their 
supervisors, which made ethics less controversial than concerns about colleagues’ or supervisors’ 
performance (which 37.5% would not raise) and problems with organizational processes or 
performance (35%) but more likely to be kept silent than conflict with a coworker (15%).  
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Expectations of futility, fear of retaliation, and reluctance to negatively impact others were 
frequently-mentioned reasons for remaining silent, as were a lack of seniority, poor relations 
with the supervisor, and an unreceptive culture (Milliken et al., 2003).  Morrison and Milliken’s 
work on silence suggests that organizations do in fact create climates for discourse that 
discourage communication of some information, though silence is not the dominant response for 
ethics or any other issue.  Similarly, Sonenshein (2006) studied individuals’ propensities to 
engage in “issue crafting” by recasting ethical issues in economic terms when raising those 
issues to powerful parties in organizations, and found that participants’ public representations of 
issues were more economic and less normative than their private representations when those 
individuals worked in organizations whose values conflicted with participants’ private normative 
reasons.  Van Dyne, Ang, and Botero (2003) suggest conceptually dividing both voice and 
silence into acquiescent, defensive, and prosocial categories.  The nuances of voice are an area of 
continuing research interest. 
 
Whistle-blowing and error reporting 
Whistle-blowing and error reporting are both forms of voice within organizations, and the 
former is used to challenge unethical behavior in particular.  They are therefore topically relevant 
to any theory of moral openness. 
Whistle-blowing is typically defined as “the disclosure by organization members (former 
or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to 
persons or organizations that may be able to effect action.” (Near & Miceli, 1985: 4).  Near and 
Miceli classified the antecedents of whistle-blowing that effects action against the wrongdoer 
into individual characteristics (i.e. the credibility, power, and anonymity of the whistle-blower, 
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complaint recipient, and perpetrator), organizational characteristics (climate for whistle-blowing, 
including support for the whistle-blower) and characteristics of the wrongdoing (evidence of its 
occurrence, its legality, and the organization’s dependence on its continuation) (Near & Miceli, 
1995).  Their analysis is thus based in part on discursive factors like the evidence and legality of 
the transgression and the climate for whistle-blowing, but is fundamentally a matter of the 
balance of power between the whistle-blower and the transgressor.   
It is possible for people who work together to agree on the ethical rightness of an action, 
but still harbor substantial misgivings about whether they find it acceptable.  Treviño and Victor 
(1992) found, in two separate survey studies of undergraduate students’ inclination to report 
peers who cheat on a test and who steal inventory from an employer, that they are more likely to 
report when doing so is explicitly defined as a role responsibility, and when the misconduct has a 
direct effect on them.  However, they also found that students who report misconduct are seen as 
both more ethical and less likeable by their peers.  This finding is interesting because it contrasts 
a social evaluation of the morality of whistle-blowing with a consensus on the subjective 
emotional responses to it, illustrating that in the absence of discourse their participants did not 
reach a complete conclusion about the acceptability of the action. 
Edmondson (1999) introduced the concept of team psychological safety, a “climate 
characterized by interpersonal trust and mutual respect in which people are comfortable being 
themselves” (Edmondson, 1999: 354) that reduces self-censoring of observations or errors and 
enhances the group’s understanding of its processes and shortcomings.  A recurring embodiment 
of trust and respect is a lack of blame or condemnation for mistakes.  Interviews, observations, 
and surveys of teams at an office-equipment manufacturer revealed that teams with greater 
psychological safety engaged in more feedback, more helping behaviors, and more 
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experimentation and change, leading to more group learning and improved performance 
(Edmondson, 1999).   A closely-related construct drawn from the literature on high-reliability 
organizations is respectful interaction, which is a willingness to incorporate others’ reports into 
one’s own decision-making, to honestly report one’s own perceptions for others to incorporate 
into their decision-making, and to integrate one’s own perceptions with those of others without 
deprecation of either, in order to form a socially shared perception (Campbell, 1990).  Vogus 
created and validated a climate measure of respectful interaction in a study of hospital nursing 
units (Vogus, 2004). 
Zhao & Olivera (2006) describe a framework for understanding error reporting in 
organizations.  They state that error reporting entails three stages: error detection, situation 
assessment, and behavioral response, each of which can take several forms.  Importantly, 
different kinds of errors that are detected in different ways may elicit different assessments of the 
situation: for instance, an application of an inappropriate procedure detected through an outcome 
may elicit shame, while one detected as it occurs may rather result in embarrassment.  The 
emotions and cost-benefit assessments for the self, the group, and others that result from error 
detection in turn influence reporting or non-reporting behaviors ranging from factual recording to 
blaming to covering up to fixing the problem oneself (Zhao & Olivera, 2006).  Although the 
model is basically rational in form, it does incorporate affect into the situation assessment, and 
explicitly refers to psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999) as a factor.  It models the range of 
reporting or non-reporting behaviors as a joint function of the situation assessment and of 
individual attributes, and the situation assessment incorporates estimates of the learning that may 
result from reporting (Zhao & Olivera, 2006).  Although the authors explicitly exclude willful 
violations of policy from their study of errors, and do not frame the situation assessment in 
28 
 
discourse terms, their article does conceive of a range of one-way communicative acts that are 
affected by an assessment of how those acts will be received. 
 
Empowerment 
Management that leverages communication with and among employees and places 
decision power with employees provides a context for moral openness, while the experience of 
disempowerment seems likely to depress moral openness. 
Conger & Kanungo (1989:474) defined empowerment as “a process of enhancing 
feelings of self-efficacy among organizational members through the identification of conditions 
that foster powerlessness and through their removal by both formal organizational practices and 
informal techniques of providing efficacy information.”  Empowerment is not simply delegation 
of the authority to make decisions, but also entails creating the conditions under which the 
delegated decisions can be successfully made and executed.   
Spreitzer (1995: 1444) defined psychological empowerment as “a motivational construct 
manifested in four cognitions: meaning, competence, self-determination, and impact . . . an 
orientation in which an individual wishes and feels able to shape his or her work role and 
context”; these four dimensions were empirically confirmed through confirmatory factor analysis 
(Spreitzer, 1995).  In a subsequent study, Spreitzer (1996) also related six aspects of the work 
environment to psychological empowerment: low role ambiguity, working for a boss with a wide 
span of control, sociopolitical support, access to information, access to resources, and a 
participative unit climate.  Survey data revealed all six dimensions in an exploratory factor 
analysis, and multiple regression found all but access to resources to be significantly related to 
psychological empowerment (Spreitzer, 1996).  Seibert, Silver, and Randolph (2004) found 
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using survey data that empowerment climate, characterized by information sharing, autonomy 
preserved by boundaries, and locus of accountability at the team level, was distinct from 
psychological empowerment, and that psychological empowerment mediated the relationship 
between empowerment climate and individual performance and job satisfaction.  They also 
found a direct effect of empowerment climate on work-unit performance (Seibert et al., 2004).  
Arnold, Arad, Rhoades, and Drasgow (2000) developed and validated a survey scale measuring 
empowering leader behavior, and found five dimensions: leading by example, participative 
decision-making, coaching, informing, and showing concern / interacting with the team. 
The foregoing review of literature from silence to voice, including whistle-blowing and 
empowerment, illustrates the variety of perspectives that have been taken on employees’ ability 
or inability to communicate concerns upward.  Although some of those perspectives have been 
premised on a rational theory of motivation, others are based on perceptions of the social 
environment that might be called climate.  All suggest the beginning of discourse with an initial 
courageous communication. 
 
Sensemaking 
Attempts to come to a reasoned understanding of an equivocal environment, and of the 
actions that are required to operate within it, are familiar to scholars of sensemaking; some have 
studied ethics in that light (e.g. Sonenshein, 2006 &2007).  I hope to both situate my project 
alongside the sensemaking literature as a description of the discursive reduction of the 
equivocality of specifically ethical problems, and distinguish my project from that literature on 
the basis of my use of discourse theory to characterize specifically ethical discourse.  
Sensemaking is a descriptive theory ofthe adaptation or maladaptation of organizations to their 
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environment and of individuals to each other, while discourse ethics is a normative theory of the 
conditions of discussion that must hold in order for a reasoned agreement about some ethical 
issue to be normatively valid.  Sensemaking incorporates informal social psychological processes 
such as narrative and even affect while discourse ethics focuses on formal linguistic expression 
and critique. Moreover, the formal precision of discourse ethics lends itself to the establishment 
of normative validity while the results of sensemaking are not so much morally right as socially 
functional . . . and sometimes not even that (Weick, 1979).  Therefore, the literature on moral 
discourse may provide a useful framework for better structuring a theory of specifically ethical 
sensemaking, and for normatively and descriptively analyzing the implications of actual moral 
discourse that falls short of the theoretical ideal. 
The second edition of Karl Weick’s The Social Psychology of Organizing (1979) is a 
seminal work in sensemaking.  Weick’s perspective on organizing parallels sociological work on 
the social construction of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) and structuration (Giddens, 1984), 
both of which describe social structures as mutable and contingent products of the behavior of 
individuals but nonetheless may seem quite permanent.  Weick argued that the study of 
organizations as stable structures, for which typologies and generalized theories could be 
developed, was futile because the innumerable, multiply contingent, and mutable forms that 
emerged were too diverse, and even homologous structures may exist for very different reasons.  
Instead of a theory of organization, which would have to be quite intricate in order to encompass 
the complexity of actual organizations, Weick constructed a social psychological theory of the 
ongoing social process of organizing, from which organizations and their structures were 
continuously emergent.  Organizing occurs through multiple loops of enactment, selection, and 
retention of cognitive schemas, which are mental models of the environment and the individual’s 
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place within it.  Scripts are schemas that prescribe actions, especially a sequence of actions, and 
individuals enact scripts that fit their perception of the environment.  Feedback from the 
environment may cause different scripts or schemas to be selected, especially if the one enacted 
produces results that are senseless to it; over time, those schemas are retained that provide the 
most adequate interpretive frame for the individual’s interactions with the environment.  
Schemas that are once or repeatedly selected against, or simply seldom used, may be forgotten 
(i.e. not retained), creating an opportunity for the learning or creation of a new schema (Weick, 
1979).   
The entire enactment-selection-retention process exists to structure interaction with the 
physical and social environment, and works by reducing equivocality (Weick, 1979).  The 
predictive power of cues from the physical environment and the meaning of cues from the social 
environment generally have multiple possible interpretations, so schemas connect and order 
these interpretations to make understanding and action possible; however, these schemas cannot 
simultaneously attain a high degree of accuracy, parsimony, and generality, but must trade these 
qualities off against each other.  Moreover, actual equivocality reduction requires multiple cycles 
of enactment of more-general schemas, in which the information collected helps to select the 
less-general schema for enactment in the following cycle.  Because multiple cycles consume 
time and attention, relatively specific schemas are often enacted despite the existence, 
acknowledged or not, of substantial equivocality as to whether it is an appropriate choice for the 
environment.  Overall, in light of the observations that organization is a enacted social 
construction, and that the individuals within organizations may not be reading from the same 
script, Weick recommends that in order to effectively manage organizing and its adaptation to a 
changing physical and social environment, managers complicate themselves by broadening their 
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library of schemas and using shorter, faster cycles of enactment, selection, and retention to make 
sense of their work (Weick, 1979). 
Importantly, sensemaking is costly in time and effort.  Attempts to reduce the 
equivocality of problems presented by the environment,  whether those problems entail ethical 
implications or not, are sometimes more perfunctory than persistent, and more expedient than 
effective. 
 
Sensegiving 
Sensegiving is the term given to the communication of a schema or script to other parties 
involved in sensemaking.  It highlights the role of social engagement with other parties to a 
decision about the content of the schemas or scripts that structure that decision; sensemaking 
without sensegiving is a unitary exercise that leads to inconsistent schemas or scripts among 
members of an organization (Maitlis, 2005).  The necessity of sensegiving for effective 
sensemaking parallels the insistence of Benhabib (1992) in the discourse ethics literature that 
there is no substitute for engagement with the actual others who are affected by a decision, lest 
the reasoned agreement reached about that decision be more imaginary than real.  Moreover, 
sensegiving highlights the importance of leaders in structuring the discourse (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia & Thomas, 1996), just as Habermas (1996) notes the practical 
importance of some structuring of the terms of moral discourse for making any agreement 
possible. 
Sensegiving is reminiscent of Barnard’s early treatise on organization theory, where he 
described the functions of the executive as securing the cooperation of parties that we would now 
call stakeholders in order to produce the organization’s outputs (Barnard, 1938).  To Barnard, the 
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organization was also an entity that emerged from the social cooperation of its members, whose 
operations could change as its membership and their activities changed.  In addition to managing 
the exchange of inducements to cooperation like pay and prestige, the executive was to focus a 
belief in a common purpose (Barnard, 1938).  Thus, Barnard’s organization theory incorporated 
not only an emergent conception of organizing, but also an insistence on the importance of 
sensegiving. 
Important insights into the impact of sensegiving on the enactment-selection-retention 
cycle have emerged from ethnographic studies.  In a case study of strategic change at a major 
university, researchers found that the university president who led attempts to become a “Top 10 
Public University” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991: 436) engaged in alternate phases of sensemaking 
and sensegiving, first collecting information and applying various frames to equivocal 
information, then both explaining his vision for the university and taking actions that 
demonstrated his commitment to that vision.  Other constituents also engaged in this process, 
expressing their desires and concerns and then interpreting and reacting to the schema that the 
president promoted; the strategic change process was therefore a set of iterative cycles of 
sensemaking and sensegiving that achieved equivocality reduction, as the university moved from 
uncertainty about its development to a common vision that fit its strengths and ambitions (Gioia 
& Chittipeddi, 1991).  Similarly, Maitlis (2005) found in an ethnographic study of British 
symphony orchestras that both leaders and stakeholders could engage in sensegiving to the other 
party, as well as sensemaking of their own.  A foursquare matrix describes the interactive results 
of high or low sensegiving engagement on the part of leaders and stakeholders, such that active 
sensegiving on the part of both parties resulted in a single rich account of the symphony’s 
purpose and progress, while weak sensegiving on the part of the leader led to fragmented and 
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inconsistent accounts, weak sensegiving on the part of stakeholders led to a single account weak 
in content, and no sensegiving led to an account in name only (Maitlis, 2005).  Thus, sensegiving 
is a very important part of the enactment-selection-retention cycle for making sense of social 
environments; without intentional feedback, schema selection is able to accomplish little 
equivocality reduction.  Weick called these sending and receiving cycles “double interacts” 
(Weick, 1979: 115). 
 
Identity, Image, Narrative, and Control 
The subjects of sensemaking are not necessarily objective facts, but may also be more 
nebulous identities and images that nonetheless are important for activating and motivating the 
enactment of schemas and scripts.  Moreover, sensemaking and sensegiving may themselves 
incorporate substantial and even intentional vagueness and equivocality, particularly as they 
engage not propositional truths but rather narratives that are laden with multiple equivocal 
meanings.  The fact that sensemaking and sensegiving encompass subjects and methods that are 
not necessarily rational but may also be intuitive is important, because while discourse theory in 
its ideal form requires utter propositional precision in the definition and treatment of the issues at 
hand, actual moral discourse is likely to be laden with narrative identities and images that are 
both vague and powerful. 
Identity and image are very important foci of sensemaking.  Gioia and Thomas (1996) 
published a second study on the same strategic change at the same university, where they 
described how the sensemaking process was anchored by perceptions of the university’s identity 
that should be retained and the image of a top-ten public university that was its official goal.  
Importantly, both identity and image retained sufficient equivocality to avoid alienating key 
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constituents and to preserve flexibility to adapt specific goals to future demands; for instance, the 
“top ten” universities for comparison actually numbered between fifteen and twenty, because of 
the equivocality of ordering the criteria upon which public universities should be ranked (Gioia 
& Thomas, 1996).  Similarly, Dutton and Dukerich (1991) studied the response of the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey to a proliferation of homeless people occupying their 
facilities, especially the 42
nd
 Street bus terminal; they found that the Port Authority’s responses 
to the homeless problem changed in phases, each of which corresponded to a change in the Port 
Authority’s public image and its interpretation of its mission to support the image and wellbeing 
of New York.  Changes in the organization’s public image, especially after media reports 
criticized it for cruelty to the homeless and for being unsafe for patrons, caused it to reconsider 
its identity as a public service entity, including questioning the morality of evicting homeless 
people from its facilities on a fifteen-degree night, and interpreting its role in maintaining the 
image of New York as dictating the construction and maintenance of drop-in centers for the 
homeless near but not in its stations, and building the capacity of other social-service 
organizations to absorb homeless men (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991).  Again, cycles of enactment, 
selection, and retention of schemas for dealing with the homeless modified the organization’s 
social roles and eventually physical infrastructure, especially as interaction with the environment 
through the homeless themselves, customers, the police union, and the media influenced the 
selection and retention of the schemas enacted.  Weick (1993), in his case study of the Mann 
Gulch firefighting disaster, concluded that in the face of an equivocal and rapidly changing 
physical environment, the firefighting team lost its ability to make sense of the social situation 
when they were ordered to drop their tools and run: that act had the unfortunate sensegiving 
36 
 
consequence of denying their identity as firefighters or as members of a team, and without such 
an identity they did not heed orders from their crew chief which might have saved them.   
Weick and Browning (1986) contrasted the communicative forms of argumentation and 
narration, noting that argumentation complements formal organizational rationality, while 
narration supports the social construction of meaning.  Organization members often understand 
their social roles and environments in narrative terms, that is, as a series of actions that define the 
identity and intentions of the actors.  Members evaluate the narratives that are presented to them 
by others in terms of those narratives’ self-coherence and coherence with other relevant 
narratives, and in terms of their fidelity, that is, whether a given narrative “contains not just 
reasons, but good reasons which are grounded in history, biography, and culture” (Weick & 
Browning, 1986: 249).  Importantly, the implications of a narrative are equivocal, which 
facilitates brevity compared with formal argumentation, and enables not only the adaptation and 
application of narrative to a variety of problems, but also the preservation of diverse values and 
intentions among individuals who share the same narrative (Weick & Browning, 1986).  Thus, 
sensemaking encompasses but is not encompassed by formal argumentation, incorporates 
narrative rationality that focuses on the social creation of meaning, and hinges on equivocal and 
mutable interpretations of identity and image that can be reinterpreted as needed. 
 
Ethics and Sensemaking 
Sensemaking has been applied to organizational ethics by several authors, although the 
intent has generally been descriptive and instrumentally prescriptive rather than normative, and 
none of the applications have incorporated discourse theory.   
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Gioia (1992) used a case study of his own work as a safety recall engineer at Ford Motor 
Company in the context of the Pinto scandal to illustrate the role of cognitive schemas in moral 
awareness. The Ford Pinto was a compact car that, due to a minor flaw in the design of the 
gasoline tank, had an elevated risk of catching fire when hit in a rear-end collision.  Gioia noted 
with irony that both before and after working at Ford, his immediate reaction to a safety problem 
like that of the Pinto would be to condemn the failure to order a recall, but while at Ford despite 
several reviews of the Pinto fires neither he nor the other engineers perceived even a significant 
safety risk, let alone a moral crisis.  He and the other engineers learned schemas that framed 
quality problems and accidents as a normal part of the manufacturing and use of complex 
engineered products; Ford’s system of financial controls emphasized data-driven and cost-
justified decisions, and the data did not justify a recall.  The schemas in use discouraged 
empathetic engagement or idealistic moral thought regarding Ford’s responsibilities to its 
customers, but rather focused on the efficient remediation of a subset of safety problems that 
were quantifiably important (Gioia, 1992).   
Jones (1991) introduced the construct of moral intensity to account for the influence of 
situational variables in moral decision-making, arguing that decisions whose implications have 
high moral intensity are more likely to be recognized as moral issues than those with low moral 
intensity.  Moral intensity is comprised of both physical and social dimensions: it increases with 
the magnitude of the impact on individuals, the number of individuals impacted, the probability 
of the impact, the diffusion of the impact among members of a community, the physical and 
social distance of the impact from the decision-maker, and the degree of social consensus on the 
immorality of the impact (Jones, 1991).  Moral intensity can be understood in sensemaking terms 
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as an environmental signal of varying strength influencing the selection of schemas for 
enactment.   
Other scholars have written of the social and political processes through which 
organizations comprehend and address moral issues that their operations raise.  Nielsen (1996) 
built upon the work of Argyris and Schoen (1978) in action learning to propose models of ethical 
change within organizations.  He discussed single-loop actions intended to correct deviations 
from unquestioned values, double-loop actions intended to examine the values that govern 
action, and triple-loop learning that entailed collective critical reflection on the traditions within 
which organizations’ values are embedded.   Both double-loop and triple-loop forms depend on 
discourse for criticism and change, but Nielsen’s approach is not necessarily formal and rational: 
he often recommends establishing some grounds of common identity, or at least positive affect, 
with the party whose values or traditions are being criticized.  Neither are his philosophical bases 
formal and rational: the inspiration for triple-loop dialog comes from Kierkegaard, Gadamer, 
Derrida, and Rorty (Nielsen, 1996) all of whom are concerned not with moral universals but 
rather with the triangulation of pragmatic social agreement within the horizons of ethical 
traditions.  Nielsen’s approach to moral change in organizations is therefore highly compatible 
with the literature on sensemaking, and compatible but not congruent with discourse ethics.   
Sonenshein (2005) proposed a model of discursive ethical change that he called internal 
social criticism.  Based on the political philosophy of Michael Walzer, he observed that criticism 
of an organization’s ethics that originates from a value system that is external to the organization 
may introduce insights that are truly novel, but is more likely to be an abstract reproduction of 
values that already exist within the organization’s culture . . . without the benefit of contextual 
interpretation.  Even internal dissidents who criticize from the standpoint of value systems 
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external to the organization experience this abstraction; though their observations are internal to 
the organization, the framework with which to understand the reasons for their criticism is not.  
Conversely, criticism that is rooted within the organization’s existing culture can call on jointly-
held notions of identity and call out practices that are inconsistent with a shared interpretation of 
that identity.  Calling the relationship between practices and principles into question may lead to 
the revision of either one.  Such criticism can be leveled by members of the organization or by 
outsiders who are nonetheless familiar with its culture and moral standards, thereby constituting 
internal and external social criticism, respectively (Sonenshein, 2005).  This view is consistent 
with that of Nielsen (1996) and other portions of the sensemaking literature in its focus on 
discourse, shared identity, and iterative change based on existing schemas. 
Sonenshein (2007) has also proposed a model of ethical decision-making that he calls the 
“sensemaking intuition model.”  This model begins with a process of issue construction on the 
basis of recognized schemas that have ethical content; if cues from the environment are 
constructed into a schema that has a negative ethical valence, the decision-maker’s response to it 
is intuitive and instantaneous.  Only after that response does rational ethical deliberation begin, 
and that deliberation is performed to justify the initial response rather than to determine whether 
the decision at hand is ethical or not (Sonenshein, 2007). This model encompasses recent 
findings that actual ethical decision-making is partially intuitive as well as partially rational 
(Reynolds, 2006), and socialized as well as individual (Trevino, 1986).  
 
Climate as a Useful Class of Construct for This Project 
Climate describes a socially shared perception of the way things are done in a group, and 
represents an alternative to instrumental theories of motivation for explaining why people behave 
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the way they do in organizations (Schneider & Reichers, 1983).  Moral openness climateis 
conceptualized as the climate for moral discourse in a work group, consistently describing the 
form of all moral discourses that occur within that group while differing across groups. 
Climate is distinct from an attitude, in that it focuses on group members’ assessment of 
what the prevailing norms and patterns are (Glick, 1985), that is, on what they believe that others 
believe.In this sense it is very similar to organizational culture, and Denison (1996) has 
suggested that climate and culture are two methodologically and epistemically distinct ways of 
describing the same phenomenon: whereas culture studies tend to be qualitative and focus on the 
changes in perception of group identity and norms over time, climate studies tend to be 
quantitative and focus on the existence and impact of shared perceptions on behavior.  Trevino, 
Butterfield, and McCabe (1998) suggest that ethical climate is a broad characterization of the 
prevailing ethical values within an organization, and is therefore indirectly associated with 
attitudes, while culture more concretely characterizes the organizations control systems that 
influence behavior.  The two approaches have blurred over time: Schneider & Reichers (1983) 
proposed a model of climate change rooted in symbolic interactionism, and Weick & Browning 
(1986) have suggested that climate represents a product of structuration that is in part a product 
of discourse. 
Importantly, climate studies typically incorporate aspects of the structure of the work 
environment that shape shared perceptions (Denison, 1996).  Structure is itself insufficient to 
account for the shared perceptions that comprise climate (Schneider & Reichers, 1983); rather, 
climate emerges from the interaction of social and structural factors (Ashforth, 1985).  These 
factors are together interpreted to make sense of psychologically related events (Schneider & 
Reichers, 1983).  However, neither social nor structural factors comprise climate per se; rather, 
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climate is the aggregation of the individual psychological perceptions of the interaction of those 
factors (Ashforth, 1985). 
There has been disagreement as to whether climate is most appropriately measured at the 
workgroup level (Ashforth, 1985), or at whatever level of theory is appropriate, ranging from the 
subunit to the whole organization (Glick, 1985).  The construct of psychological climate was 
long used to describe individual-level perceptions, with organizational climate defined as the 
aggregation of measures of psychological climate (Ashforth, 1985; Glick, 1985).  Glick (1985) 
argued that aggregation of psychological perceptions was inappropriate because for 
organizations in which aggregation of some climate perceptions were weak, climate would not 
exist at all. Schneider, Salvaggio, and Subirats (2002) argued instead that climate strength can be 
measured as the degree of agreement between individuals on a measure of perception (i.e. the 
variance across the sample), meaning that in organizations where aggregation is poor, a given 
climate construct is weak to nonexistent, and that to argue that a climate for some phenomenon 
does not exist in a given group is not unreasonable (assuming that the instrument with which a 
climate is being measured has already in prior studies been shown to be reliable).  This 
conception of climate weakness creates a distinction between weak climate and negative climate: 
a negative climate is one in which the group members’ shared perceptions are antithetical to the 
focal behavior, while a weak climate is one in which there is little sharedness of perceptions 
(Schneider, Salvaggio, & Subirats, 2002).  The relationship between the positive and negative 
and the strong and weak dimensions of climate was empirically demonstrated with a survey of 
customer service climate and customer service outcomes in a retail bank (Schneider, Salvaggio, 
& Subirats, 2002). 
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Climate has been conceptualized as pertaining to a particular referent like safety or ethics 
(Schneider & Reichers, 1983; Ashforth, 1985; Carr, Schmidt, Ford, & DeShon, 2003) and as 
being a molar construct that refers to perceptions of the whole organization’s goals and means to 
their attainment (Carr et al., 2003).  The former formulation has been empirically explored in 
numerous subliteratures; ethical climate and procedural justice climate will be discussed below.  
The latter formulation was the subject of a meta-analysis that found affective, cognitive, and 
instrumental dimensions of molar climate to be significantly related to the cognitive and 
affective states of job satisfaction and organizational commitment; job satisfaction was in turn 
significantly related to job performance, psychological wellbeing, and withdrawal, while 
organizational commitment was related to withdrawal (Carr et al., 2003).  Instrumental molar 
climate was directly and negatively related to withdrawal (Carr et al., 2003).  Thus, at the most 
general level climate seems to be an empirically useful construct for explaining the cognitive and 
affective states of organization members, as well as individual-level outcomes. 
Climate has also been used more specifically to examine patterns and expectations of 
ethical behavior.  Victor & Cullen (1987 & 1988) conceptualized a theory of ethical climate as 
being an interaction between dimensions of the type of criteria used for evaluating an ethical 
decision, and the level of analysis for that evaluation.  These dimensions were derived from 
Kohlberg’s staged model of moral development (Kohlberg, 1981): the first ranges from egoistic 
through utilitarian to principled, and the second from individual to local to cosmopolitan (Victor 
& Cullen, 1987).  These two dimensions together produce nine possible forms of ethical climate, 
ranging from self-interest at the intersection of egoistic criteria and individual level of analysis, 
to compliance with legal and professional codes at the intersection of principled criteria and 
cosmopolitan level of analysis.  In one study, surveys of ethical climate were drawn from 
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samples in a part-time MBA program, a military-sponsored MBA program, university faculty, 
and a trucking firm; these were analyzed using principal components analysis to reveal six 
subclimates that roughly corresponded to cells in the two-dimensional matrix.  Instrumental 
climate subsumed the cells that combined egoistic criteria with individual or local analysis, 
professional climate subsumed the cells that combined cosmopolitan analysis with utilitarian or 
principled criteria, and caring climate subsumed the cells that combined utilitarian analysis with 
individual or local criteria.   ANOVA revealed that five of the six empirically-derived ethical 
subclimates did vary across organizations, but that although organizations had dominant climate 
types, none had a single climate type (Victor & Cullen, 1987).  In a subsequent study using a 
larger sample drawn from four firms in different industries, principal components analysis 
revealed slightly different climates (Victor & Cullen, 1988).  ANOVA revealed strong climates 
that differed between firms and sometimes between locations in the same firm, but did not differ 
across departments (Victor & Cullen, 1988).  These pioneering studies on ethical climate 
demonstrated that climate was a class of theoretical construct that could be grounded in 
normative categories and applied to actual organizations to describe ethics.  Subsequent research 
has demonstrated that ethical climate has a significant impact on ethical misbehavior (Vardi, 
2001), and Arnaud has recently extended ethical climate beyond moral judgment into the three 
other schemas of Rest’s four-component model (Narvaez, Bebeau, Thoma, & Rest, 1999): moral 
awareness, moral motivation, and moral character (Arnaud, 2006).   
Climate has also been used to characterize the context for procedural justice in 
organizations.  Mossholder, Bennett, and Martin (1998) argued that aggregate perceptions of 
procedural justice emerge in organizations as employees observe procedures impacting others as 
well as themselves. In an empirical study they found that procedural justice climate varied across 
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branches of a savings and loan, and correlated significantly with job satisfaction (Mossholder et 
al., 1998).  Naumann and Bennett (2000) found in a survey of employees at a retail bank that 
procedural justice climate was strengthened by cohesion within work groups and by supervisors 
whose actions managing the branch were visible, and that higher procedural justice climate 
predicted helping behaviors.  Colquitt, Noe, and Jackson (2002) found in a survey of 
manufacturing teams that procedural justice climate not only impacted team performance and 
absenteeism, but also had a larger effect as climate strength increased.     
The empirically-successful application of climate to ethical decision-making and 
procedural justice demonstrates that the climate construct can be used to understand group-level 
organizational phenomena with normative weight.  The fact that these studies have identified 
differences in climate across locations within the same firm also suggests that such normatively-
weighted phenomena vary significantly at the work-group level. 
The foregoing review of portions of the climate literature is intended to illustrate the 
usefulness of climate as a relatively stable and quantitatively operationalizable class of constructs 
for understanding behavior in groups without recourse to instrumental motivation.  Because it is 
based on socially shared perceptions, it is appropriate for studies of decision-making, and 
because it can be both focused on particular phenomena and informed by theories from moral 
psychology like Kohlberg’s (1981) cognitive moral development and Rest’s four-component 
model (Narvaez et al., 1999), it is particularly useful for studying moral openness climate.  It 
should be noted that although moral discourse pertains to the formation of norms, climate is 
generally treated as a stable construct for measurement purposes; my intention in creating moral 
openness climate as a climate construct is to examine the regularities in the way groups discuss 
and form moral norms. 
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Philosophical Foundations in Discourse Ethics 
 
 I have attempted to ground my theory of moral openness in the philosophical foundations 
of discourse ethics, for two reasons.  First, discourse ethics provides a detailed description of the 
ideal terms of any valid discourse about a topic with ethical implications.  That description 
provides the basis for my own theory of moral openness, because any conversation that is held 
with the intention of reaching a shared determination of what the participants ought to do must 
hold to those terms, at least to the extent that the intention is genuine.  Second, discourse ethics is 
addressed to the problem of justifying actions in a pluralistic milieu, which is a problem that 
businesspeople often face.  My hope is that a descriptive theory of moral openness can be a 
counterpart to a normative theory of discourse ethics within organizations, so that the former 
may describe how businesspeople talk with each other to reach a shared understanding of what 
they believe they ought to do, and the latter may prescribe how such conversations ought to be 
held in order to reach morally valid conclusions. 
 
Why Pluralism? 
Moral pluralism is an important premise of much contemporary moral philosophy.  
Premodern Western ethics were grounded in metaphysical theories about the underlying nature 
of reality, with which humans were thought well-advised to align themselves.  For example, 
Aristotle’s influential ethics were formulated for Athenian male citizens, based on Aristotle’s 
understanding of the order of nature from higher to lower (Aristotle, 1985); women and non-
Greeks were not of ethical interest to Aristotle.  Kant responded to earlier ethics that were 
grounded in explicitly- or quasi-religious metaphysics by grounding his ethics in the 
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transcendence of reason (Kant, 1959), but Hegel noted that even reason could not prescribe 
maxims for action without operating upon assumptions about human ends that are historically 
situated (Hegel, 1975).  That is, moral reasoning pertains to human problems in local 
circumstances that are determined by the history and traditions of the people involved, and a 
moral norm that addresses itself to such problems must incorporate not only knowledge about 
those circumstances, but also preferences regarding them.  Such preferences are themselves 
historically-contingent, and should not be smuggled into moral reasoning under the guise of pure 
reason (Benhabib, 1992). 
Hegel’s historicist critique of Kant presaged a number of subsequent critiques of the 
possibility of a non-historically-contingent ethics.  Nietzsche argued that not only the content but 
even the idea of morality was historically contingent, and in fact that it was an ideology 
contrived to confer social advantage upon its proponents (1996).  Dewey (1922: 31) argued that 
“reason pure of all influence from prior habit is a fiction”, and that morality is properly a matter 
of adapting one’s habits to the requirements of harmonious social life rather than adapting them 
to realize some transcendent good.  Rawls (1971) formulated his theory of justice in terms of the 
social impact of an action on the wellbeing of others, insisting that just actions must be 
acceptable to all affected behind a hypothetical “veil of ignorance” where they must consider the 
possibility that they would be the worst-off under the proposed distribution of goods.  Rawls then 
attempted to recover a set of universalistic moral criteria that all rational participants would 
necessarily agree to, stipulating that no action which would have a negative impact on the worst-
off of all participants could rationally be accepted by participants behind the veil of ignorance; 
neither would participants accept a situation which left anyone without a complement of the 
primary goods needed to live a life of moral autonomy.  However, the universalism of Rawls’ 
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criteria remained vulnerable to critique: Benhabib (1992) argued that the rationality behind these 
principles was itself a product of Western masculine thought, as was the premise that a single 
individual could in any meaningful way imagine himself or herself in the position of the worst-
off, who are not likely to share the rationality of the dominant class.  Taylor (1989) argued that 
humans seek a diverse set of moral goods, including personal integrity, charity, liberation, and 
rationality, all of which have venerable histories and cannot be reduced to a single index of 
utility, because they conflict in some cases. 
The above brief and stylized history of philosophical ethics illustrates a few important 
insights.  First, ethics now pertains to problems of human social relationships, rather than to the 
alignment of human action or human nature with the order of the universe; even religious sects 
that seek such an alignment face the social ethical problem of managing their relationships with 
nonbelievers.  Second, problems in ethics are unavoidably posed within a historically-situated 
context.  The content of social roles and relationships, and of substantive visions of the good, is 
formed in time, not for all time.  Without a universally-agreed-upon vision for the right order of 
the world, contemporary ethics must comprehend social situations in which multiple irreducible 
visions of the good are brought to a given problem by different participants.  Ethical pluralism 
seems likely to be with us for the foreseeable future. 
 
Communicative Action as a Source of Normative Criteria 
In light of the fact of pluralism in contemporary ethics, a key problem for ethics becomes 
“how can we choose a course of action when faced not only with many choices but also with 
many inconsistent criteria for evaluation?”  It is this problem that discourse ethics attempts to 
solve.  Rawls (1971) grounded his ethics in the principles of formal rationality, which he could 
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argue were normative for decision-making; this attempt to ground universal ethical principles in 
a form of social justification that seemed taken-for-granted illustrates the form of discourse 
ethics’ grounding in communicative action.  Rawls’ rationality is vulnerable to Taylor’s (1989) 
critique above, which notes that rationality is only one of many possible normative schemes, as 
well as to Benhabib (1992).  But, discourse ethics uses more generalized deontological criteria 
that lack the specific vulnerabilities of rationality per se.  These criteria derived from the 
principles of communicative action provide a framework for the normative evaluation of 
pluralistic claims raised around an ethical problem. 
Communicative action is a form of purposive-rational action: it attempts to rationally 
coordinate purposive action with others by coming to a reasoned agreement about the truth of a 
statement or of the rightness of a norm (Habermas, 1984: 285).  The contrasting form of 
purposive-rational action, strategic action, describes attempts by individuals to compel 
acquiescence to their will through coercion, manipulation, or self-interest;Machiavellianism 
(Christie & Geis, 1970) epitomizes an individual propensity for strategic action.  Both forms of 
action are social, in that they attempt to elicit the actions of others, rather than to simply 
manipulate the physical environment. 
Engagement in communicative action enables the discernment of the empirical or 
analytical truth of propositions, or the social normative rightness of a norm or a practice.  In 
communicative action, when participants assert the truth or rightness of a statement, they 
implicitly promise upon request to discursively redeem that statement, that is, provide reasons 
for believing it which are subject to critique.  For statements of propositional truth, these reasons 
are empirically verifiable facts: a claim that a house is yellow or a rod is bent can be redeemed 
with photographs or readings from measurement devices.  For statements of normative rightness, 
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these reasons are assertions of the social legitimacy of a practice.  Such assertions are not true in 
the same sense as an objective fact that may be observed, but rather in the analogous sense that 
they represent a relationship between the meaning of a practice and an agreed-upon normative 
value; a house will be yellow or a rod bent regardless of whether anyone asserts that they possess 
those properties, but a practice can only be right when it is so asserted, because rightness is a 
social evaluation of the legitimacy of a practice.  Note that the normative rightness of an 
assertion cannot be established solely with reference to the subjective experience of a speaker.  
Such a reference would be a disclosure of a subjective emotional state, the truthfulness of which 
could be redeemed only through observation of the speaker’s actions being consistent with the 
disclosed state.  Rather, assertions of normative rightness are redeemed with reference to other 
normative principles external to the speaker, that is, a norm or practice is right when it is 
consistent with other normative principles acknowledged by the participants (Habermas, 1990). 
Habermas’s (1970; 1979; 1984) conditions of the ideal speech state are based upon the 
speech act theories of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969).  They are concerned primarily with 
establishing the linguistic possibility of actual agreement, on the basis of not only a common 
understanding of the forms or classes of speech acts themselves and of the terms and pronouns in 
use, but also a “complete symmetry in the distribution of assertion and dispute, revelation and 
concealment, prescription and conformity, among the partners of communication” (Habermas, 
1970: 371).  That is, participants in a conversation must not only understand what each other 
mean when they make statements of intention, description, or prescription, but those participants 
must also be free to contribute those statements to the conversation without constraint, lest 
agreement be apparent rather than real.  Moreover, participants must comply with the norms of 
the classes of speech acts used so that their speech acts are accepted by their hearers; not only 
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must they speak truthfully or sincerely, but they must also assume the obligation to provide 
grounds for their assertions (Habermas, 1979: 65). 
Importantly, the fact that a norm is socially recognized does not necessarily imply that it 
is legitimate.  While induction joins particular observations with general principles in theoretical 
discourse, the non-empirical character of claims to normative rightness requires an analogous 
principle to establish the validity of a claimed relationship between the legitimacy of a norm or 
practice and the other principles given to support it.  Such a principle can be formulated by 
combining Kant’s insight that a proposed norm must be self-consistent, that is, not prone to self-
defeat if generally observed, with a grounding not in the supposed transcendence of pure reason 
but rather with pragmatic acceptability to the set of people who would be affected by the 
proposed norm.  This principle of universalization (U) for every valid norm is as follows: 
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests 
(and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities 
for regulation) (Habermas, 1990: 65). 
 
The above principle regulates the discursive justification of norms by requiring that they 
be acceptable, not to a single dominant intellect, but to the actual people affected.  Such a 
principle discriminates among the reasons offered as discursive justification by selecting out 
those that are self-inconsistent or that fail to establish the legitimacy of the norm in question to 
other participants.  It implies the related principle of discourse ethics (D): 
Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the 
approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse 
(Habermas, 1990: 66). 
 
Together, these two principles summarize the foundations of discourse ethics; (D) states 
that a norm is only valid when everyone affected by it can approve of it, and (U) states that a 
valid norm can be provisionally considered universal if and only if the abovementioned 
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agreement extends to the consequences and side effects of the norm in the event of its general 
observance.  These claims are themselves validated with reference to (U) and (D), so that the 
rightness of the norm or practice is rigorously established relative to both its internal consistency 
and its social normative legitimacy to all participants.  This form of justification, rooted in 
pragmatic agreement but formulated to transcend individuals, has been called transcendental-
pragmatic with reference to the latter property (Habermas, 1990), and universal-pragmatic (Apel, 
1990) with the hope of avoiding the unintended connotations of transcendentalism. 
Although (U) and (D) are criteria for determining whether a given norm is valid, they are 
not the only conditions that need to be met.  Alexy (1990) undertook to reconstruct a set of rules 
of practical discourse logically presupposed by normative communicative action, aided by 
linguistics and analytic moral philosophy.  This reconstruction entailed formalizing the rules 
without which the conclusions of a given practical moral discourse would be invalid; for 
instance, participants are not allowed to contradict themselves, nor are they allowed to use terms 
in a way that varies from other parties’ understanding of those same terms.  The former violation 
would defeat the systematic justification of a norm with reference to other norms; the latter 
would present the appearance of agreement without realizing its substance (Alexy, 1990).   
The rule set is divided into six sections, beginning with basic assumptions including the 
two examples above that are required for a discourse to address questions of correctness or truth.  
Alexy labels the second section rules of reason, when in fact they are not quite so broad but 
rather pertain to the justification of claims and the inclusion of all parties to the discourse.  The 
third section governs the burden of argumentation, so that progress toward discursive agreement 
is not thwarted by disorderly, arbitrary, or bad-faith procedural moves.  For instance, indefinite 
demands for more justifications, without discrediting those already offered, must eventually 
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terminate with the arbitrary “because!” familiar to the parents of young children, which is no 
substitute for reasoned agreement.  The fourth section summarizes several pure and conditional 
forms of rational argumentation, to demonstrate that the forms of argument are finite, and that 
any form of argument used to justify a given norm must presuppose other norms.  No form of 
argumentation can simultaneously justify all norms, just as no empirical test can dispense with 
all assumptions to simultaneously test an infinite set of hypotheses.  The fifth section defines the 
rules of justification, which are closely related to the principle of universalizability (U).  This 
section also incorporates a historical critical sensibility to require rejection of norms which were 
once considered justified but in light of new insights can no longer be so; for instance, norms 
about gender roles that once met with unanimous approval in many groups would be rejected 
because such approval depends on autonomy-denying socialization into those roles and cannot 
be justified.  This section finally incorporates a Pragmatic sensibility, requiring that “the 
factually given limits of realizability are to be observed” (Alexy, 1990: 175).  The sixth and final 
section explicitly permits transition to forms of discourse besides practical moral discourse, so 
that empirical questions of fact, linguistic problems of understanding, and conceptual or 
procedural problems with discourse itself may be addressed.  Alexy’s rules are listed in Table 
2.1. 
 
TABLE 2.1 
Rules for Practical Discourse 
1.1 No speaker may contradict himself [sic]. 
1.2 Each speaker may only assert what he himself believes. 
1.3 Each speaker who applies a predicate F to an object a, must also be prepared to apply F to 
any other object which is similar to a in all relevant respects. 
1.4 Different speakers may not use the same expression with different meanings. 
 
53 
 
2  Every speaker must justify what he or she asserts upon request, unless he or she can 
provide grounds which justify avoiding giving a justification. 
2.1  Anyone who can speak may take part in discourse. 
2.2a  Anyone may render any assertion problematic. 
2.2b  Anyone may introduce any assertion into the discourse. 
2.2c  Anyone may express his/her opinions, wishes and needs. 
2.3  No speaker may be prevented by constraint within or outside the discourse from making 
use of his/her rights established in 2.1 and 2.2. 
 
3.1  Whoever wishes to treat a person A differently from a person B [in terms of the parameters 
of their participation in the discourse] is obliged to justify this. 
3.2  Whoever attacks a statement or norm that is not the object of discussion must provide a 
reason for doing so. 
3.3  Whoever has put forward an argument is only committed to further arguments in the case 
of a counterargument. 
3.4  Whoever introduces an assertion or a statement concerning his opinions, wishes, or needs 
into the discourse, which as argument is not related to a previous statement, has to justify 
upon request why he/she has introduced this assertion or this statement. 
 
4 Norms are justified in arguments with the general form: 
 G[round] 
 R[ule] 
 - 
 N[orm] 
4.1- (These rules define several derivative pure and conditional forms of rational 
4.6 argumentation) 
 
5.1.1 Everyone must be able to accept the consequences of the rule – presupposed in his 
normative statements – regarding the satisfaction of the interests of each individual person 
even for the hypothetical case in which he finds himself in the situation of this person. 
5.1.2 The consequences of every rule for the satisfaction of the interests of each and every 
individual must be capable of being accepted by all. 
5.1.3 Every rule must be openly and universally teachable. 
5.2.1 The moral rules that form the basis of the moral conceptions of the speakers must be able to 
withstand scrutiny in a critical, historical genesis.  A moral rule does not withstand such 
scrutiny: 
 (a) if it was indeed originally justifiable rationally but in the meantime has lost its 
justification, or 
(b) if it was already originally not justifiable rationally and if no sufficient new reasons for 
it can be found. 
5.2.2 The moral rules that form the basis of the moral conceptions of the speakers must be able to 
withstand the scrutiny of their individual history of emergence.  A moral rule does not 
withstand such scrutiny if it is only accepted on the basis of conditions of socialization that 
are not acceptable [e.g. that do not permit some participants to join the discourse]. 
5.3 The factually given limits of realizability are to be observed. 
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6.1 It is possible at all times for any speaker to switch to a theoretical (empirical) discourse. 
6.2 It is possible at all times for any speaker to move to a linguistic-analytical discourse. 
6.3 It is possible at all times for any speaker to switch to a discourse on discourse theory. 
 
Excerpted from Robert Alexy’s A Theory of Legal Argumentation, pages 297-300. Used with 
the permission of Oxford University Press. 
 
 
Alexy and Habermas both acknowledge that their rules and principles are largely ideal, and 
that actual discourse not only fails to adhere to these principles (Alexy, 1990) but may even 
require procedural rules that conflict with (U) or (D) (Habermas, 1993).  Alexy noted that the 
rules of reason in the second section of his table “especially are only realizable incompletely” 
(1990: 176), and observed that time constraints and the disproportionate influence of skillful 
talkers also impinge on actual discourse, and may themselves call for restrictions on discourse in 
order to preserve the validity of its conclusions.  He therefore characterized his rules as an 
instrument of critique for normative arguments, a hypothetical criterion for the evaluation of 
normative statements against prospective agreeability, an explication of the claims to correctness 
or truth that may guide participants preparing for practical discourse, and an ideal to guide the 
institutionalization of discourses (Alexy, 1990: 179-180). 
Importantly, although many of the above rules of practical moral discourse are ideal, their 
wholesale and intentional violation is antisocial and pathological.  Communicative action is 
essential to social existence, especially in its normative mode: Moral categories are one aspect of 
the human experience, through which membership in a social community is made possible 
(Habermas, 1990).  If the self is defined in part by relationships with others (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Mead, 1934), then some protection for the integrity of the self from the strategic 
actions of others is necessary (Apel, 1990; Habermas, 1990).  Communicative action validates 
the acceptability of norms within a group, while identifying norms that cannot be justified and 
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that therefore pose a threat to the social integrity of the identities of others.  Although strategic 
action is undeniably part of social life, a social life that is exclusively strategic to the exclusion of 
communicative action lacks relationships that are anything other than instrumental and 
temporary, and permits little relational self-definition for its incumbents (Apel, 1990; Habermas, 
1990). 
 
Is reasoned moral agreement utopian? 
The above discussion of the premises for communicative action may seem so stringent as 
to raise the question whether discourse ethics in an organizational context may be utopian in a 
negative sense, in that it is unrealizable.  Normative justification on the basis of universal-
pragmatic agreement may suffer from a flaw that has been described by Rawls (1993) as that 
which imposes the burdens of judgment: Moral decision-making requires the ordering, weighing, 
and interpretation of normative goods, all three of which are highly equivocal activities that are 
done at least partially on the basis of tacit knowledge if not intuition.  Such tacit knowledge and 
intuition are developed over the course of participants’ lives, and are not amenable to formal 
expression.  Even if it is theoretically possible to realize discursive reconciliation of normative 
evaluations, the limits of human cognition, communication, and patience make such a result 
practically impossible.  Rawls accounts for some proportion of actual disagreement with the 
following statement: “Perhaps people are often irrational and not very bright, and this mixed 
with logical errors leads to conflicting opinions” (Rawls, 1993: 55), that is, normative 
evaluations that are in principle communicable are in practice tacit.  Therefore, parties to a moral 
decision must bear the burdens of judgment, and accept responsibility for making a moral 
decision in circumstances where differences of normative evaluation cannot be discursively 
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reconciled (Rawls, 1993).  Rawls’s argument effectively denies the linguistic expressibility of at 
least some of the reasons behind people’s moral judgments.   
Although the problem of the possibility of understanding one another through language is 
unsettled, other scholars have argued that it is not so daunting as it seems.  Habermas observed 
that the commonly-used example of the untranslatability of expressions between languages in 
fact illustrates the opposite point: while a given expression may have no direct equivalent in 
another language, especially given the history and culture within which the languages and 
expressions are embedded, it is possible to discuss that history and culture, provide analogous 
examples, and generally describe the ways in which the closest equivalent expression falls short 
(Habermas, 1993).  Although such a remedy is time-consuming and requires not only knowledge 
of both languages and cultures but also facility in explaining them, it is by no means 
conceptually impossible.  Werhane (1999) also notes the fact that languages are rule-based 
constructions that can be mastered by anyone who learns their grammar, vocabulary, and cultural 
connotations; she argues that languages are meta-conceptual schemes that can be not only used 
but also modified to express conceptual schemes like the ordering of values.  The conceptual 
scheme of a language is not closed to its native speakers, but is rather open to learning and even 
modification on the part of those who would acquire it.  Altogether, while perfect reasoned 
agreement is almost certainly impossible for all but the simplest moral problems, a modicum of 
reasoned agreement is also almost certainly possible for many moral problems. 
A different class of objection is that of utopianism in the positive sense, in which a 
laudable ideal becomes the justification and perhaps even the organizing principle for oppression 
(Apel, 1990).  This is the objection that any utopia is in fact a dystopia, because of the necessity 
of totalizing control and therefore the wholesale violation of autonomy for the maintenance of 
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the utopian condition.  One variation on this theme is the point that, because some set of 
institutional and procedural restrictions are necessary to realize the actual benefits of open 
discourse (Alexy, 1989; Habermas, 1990), the set of restrictions imposed in the name of 
discursive openness may betray that openness (Apel, 1990).  Examples of political correctness 
like the speech codes on many American campuses in the 1990s seem to exemplify this problem, 
although the vilification to which they have been exposed by the American Civil Liberties Union 
(1994) and others validates Apel’s observation that the principles of open discourse can be used 
to criticize as well as excuse violations of openness. 
There is another important variation on the theme of a discursive dystopia.  Scott writes 
that “the question [of ethics] arises from a limited ethos combined with its universalization, 
which transgresses its own limits, and its claim to authority over other ethea” (Scott, 1996: 46).  
Ethics necessarily justifies and pursues some set of norms or values, at the expense of norms or 
values that are unjustified or unjustifiable within an ethical system.  However, the 
universalization that justification entails risks a kind of tribalism, in which adherents of one 
ethical system pronounce anathema upon adherents of another system, so that opposition 
between the two groups becomes normatively grounded (Scott, 1996).  Consider Taylor’s (1989) 
aforementioned observation that there are at least four normative systems that are historically 
venerable and logically consistent, and cannot be reduced to one another: personal integrity, 
charity, liberation, and rationality.  These systems do not coexist easily, and in fact adherents of 
each of them have argued and sometimes acted against the others.  For instance, Marcuse (1964) 
argued strenuously for liberation and against rationality, noting that rational behavior traps 
people in collectively-destructive systems of production and consumption, while Friedman 
(1970) influentially attacked charity in favor of rationality as a wasteful violation of property 
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rights.  Discourse ethics in particular can be construed as a reification of the ethos of rational 
consensus, which besides excluding justifications that are constitutive of the narrative identities 
of some participants, also tends to reinforce the influence of the powerful, who are able to 
marshal more information and better-formed arguments than their less-informed, less-articulate, 
and less-credible opposition (Lyotard, 1984).   
The problem of a discursive dystopia, dominated by powerful parties ready to marshal 
reams of evidence in favor of their arguments, is relatively easy to answer from the ideal 
perspective of discourse ethics.  According to the principle of discourse ethics (D), a given norm 
is valid only if it is acceptable to all parties to it (Habermas, 1990).  This test of validity does not 
impose a requirement of adherence to a common ethical system, but rather admits to the 
discourse whatever systems are subscribed to by participants.  Because practical discourse 
implies intent to reach a reasoned agreement, differing ethical systems need not be completely 
harmonized, but do need to be either reconciled or disallowed in the limited scope of their 
interpretive application to the problem at hand (Gunther, 1993).  Such interpretive application 
occurs as participants give reasons for their moral positions, which in turn are critiqued by other 
participants, until no critiques can be leveled against a reason and that reason is thereby deemed 
acceptable (Alexy, 1989).  Even the rationality of discourse ethics itself may be critiqued (Alexy, 
1989).  In this way, adherents of a given ethical system grant application to aspects of other 
systems to which they can raise no objection, but can reject application of aspects of other 
systems that conflict with their own when there is sufficient interpretive continuity between their 
system and the offending proposal to ground the objection.  No ethos dominates another, except 
by mutual reasoned agreement. 
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However, when the limitations of actual discourse are considered, the objections of Scott 
and Lyotard become more telling.  Scott (1996) notes that ordinary language must sometimes be 
used in extraordinary ways, to comprehend extraordinary problems for which accepted language 
has not yet been devised, but differences in the understood usage of a given term threaten the 
analytical and normative validity of the conclusions of the discourse in which the problem of 
meaning arises (Alexy, 1989).  Though Habermas (1993) and Werhane (1999) have both argued 
that inexpressibility and untranslatability are overemphasized as conceptual problems, these 
problems become more urgent when participants in a discourse are not aware of a gap in 
understanding, or lack the patience, verbal skill, or time to make themselves understood (Alexy, 
1989).  For instance, when Robert Lund presented the objections of Morton-Thiokol’s solid-
rocket booster engineering staff to the upcoming launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger, his 
supervisor invited him to “put on your management hat” and rejustify his position (Presidential 
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 1986: 93).  It should have been possible 
to do so, but Lund was not able to translate his objections into cost-benefit terms, and he 
acquiesced. 
Scott’s (1996) objection that any ethos, including discourse ethics, which makes 
universal ethical claims may normalize and even demand opposition to other ethea (1996) can 
take a third form.  Discourse ethics is necessarily dismissive of positions that are not amenable to 
discursive formulation, and especially of insights that are predominantly affective and subjective.  
These positions and insights are cleanly defined as non-ethical by discourse ethics, leaving their 
adherents vulnerable to domination by another ethos to the extent that they cannot express their 
positions in terms of an intersubjective “ought” rather than a subjective “is.”  If that 
inexpressibility is a weakness of the participant rather than of their position, it falls under the 
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limitation described above.  However, if that inexpressibility is irresolvable, not for linguistic or 
temporal reasons but because the position is fundamentally subjective, then discourse ethics will 
not admit it as a justificatory reason for a normative position (Habermas, 1990).  The argument 
that one’s subjective state should compel another person to behave in a certain way can only 
analytically encompass another person with the tacit intersubjective argument that the other 
person should care about the subjective state of the first.  This distinction between objective 
truth, intersubjective rightness, and subjective truthfulness is foundational for discourse ethics: a 
norm can only be justified with reference to a reason external to the individual (Habermas, 
1990).  Such a clean distinction makes reasoned, intersubjective agreement possible through 
discourse, but may exclude important subjective and especially affective aspects of the human 
experience of ethics.  This is Scott’s objection (1996) applied to discourse ethics in the broadest 
sense: the limitation that makes the system of discourse ethics possible not only limits its 
potential to encompass the entirety of the human ethical experience, but also prevents it from 
transcending its own limitation. 
This third objection is no trivial limitation, because for most people actual ethical 
decision-making is intuitive rather than rational (Sonenshein, 2007).  Rational agreement may be 
profoundly unsatisfying to parties who are unable to verbally account for a strongly-held 
position, especially if that position is tied to a cherished identity while the agreement challenges 
that identity.  A grudging agreement to a distrusted conclusion is not the strong motivation that 
discourse ethicists hope for as an outcome of reasoned discourse, and highlights the fact that the 
whole of the human experience of ethics cannot be subsumed under rational deliberation. 
An example illustrates not only the potential for rationality to favor the known over the 
unknown and the concrete over the intangible, but also the drawbacks of the loss of reasoned 
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agreement.  When the citizens of Clarion County in rural Pennsylvania learned of a plan to build 
a hazardous-waste incinerator there, they steadfastly refused to engage Concord Resources 
Group (the developer) or the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources on the 
Public Participation Committee or in any other form of direct and ordered debate (Welcomer, 
Gioia, & Kilduff, 2000).  Realizing that the scientific evidence against the incinerator’s dangers 
and the economic evidence in favor of its benefits would be rhetorically overwhelming, 
regardless of the uncertainties or intangibles excluded from the discourse, local activists instead 
engaged in a campaign of intimidation: they met company representatives with angry and vocal 
mobs, sent salvos of emotional letters to the editors at local newspapers, insistently labeled 
Concord’s data as propaganda, publicly vilified Concord and anyone supporting a rational public 
discourse, and threatened violence against their opposition (Welcomer, Gioia, & Kilduff, 2000).  
Concord Resources Group eventually abandoned its plans, leaving economic development 
unrealized and a toxic-waste problem unsolved; whether the town and county of Clarion is better 
off is unknown. 
 
Discourse ethics in the management literature 
Discourse ethics has been used to critique the use of power to exclude interested parties 
from management discourse, and to highlight the need and possibility for open and rational 
discourse about the means and ends of business.  The managerialism of management as an 
academic discipline (Steffy & Grimes, 1986) and of strategy as a management practice 
(Alvesson & Willmott, 1995; Scherer & Dowling, 1995; Shrivastava, 1986) have drawn 
discourse ethicists’ attention on the basis of the power wielded to constrain discourse so as to 
preserve the legitimacy of both enterprises.  Deetz (1995) and Smith (2004) have proposed the 
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alteration of stakeholder engagement to facilitate more participatory discourse in strategic 
decision-making, and thereby to better realize the communicative dimension of business as a 
community of interdependent people.  Palazzo and Scherer (2006) and Scherer and Palazzo 
(2007) have outlined the possibility of organizational participation in deliberative democracy, 
such that strategic and competitive economic rationality is domesticated by the power of the law 
and of the state, and informed by the participation of all stakeholders; this does not assume the 
satisfaction of all the conditions of ideal speech.  In light of Habermas’ focus on deliberative 
democracy since publication of Between Facts and Norms (1996), the focus of discourse ethicists 
on problems of stakeholder management and of the organization’s place in a democratic society 
is unsurprising: discourse ethics is useful for highlighting the exclusion of affected parties from 
decisions, and for structuring deliberation between parties that subscribe to different values. 
However, the social coordination and validation of normative decisions at whatever level 
they occur, including that of the small group or the line manager, has not been a focus of prior 
research.  These decisions should be amenable to both conceptual and empirical evaluation 
according to the criteria of reasoned moral agreement, because small groups are communicative 
communities as well (Forester, 2003).   
 
Implications of the discourse ethics literature for moral openness 
The foregoing brief review of the discourse ethics literature illustrates a few points.  First, 
contemporary ethics pertains to the legitimacy of historically-situated social relationships, and 
must therefore come to terms with pluralism.  Second, communicative action provides a 
pragmatic model for evaluating the normative merit of maxims, rules, practices, or other 
formulations of moral norms that have been problematized.  Third, the moral discourse in which 
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communicative action occurs is subject to a set of ideal rules that are presupposed in order for 
the conclusions of the discourse (i.e. the norms that the participants agree upon) to be valid; 
although these rules are not completely realized in practice, greater realization of them lends 
greater validity to a discourse’s conclusions, while wholesale and intentional violation of them 
not only damages validity claims but reveals the antisociality of the violator.  Finally, although 
the possibility of reasoned moral agreement may seem utopian, especially in light of the 
stringency of the ideal rules of discourse, reasoned agreement is not conceptually impossible, nor 
is an ideal vision of it necessarily oppressive. 
Importantly, the ideal terms of moral discourse point the way toward a theoretical 
description of moral openness in work groups.  Quite aside from the normative validity of actual 
discourse, it is valuable to understand how actual people attempt to come to a reasoned 
agreement about a problem with some ethical content, and the conceptual resources of discourse 
ethics identify a number of aspects of discourse that may well be salient to participants’ own 
perceptions about the openness and therefore the validity of their conversation.  It is therefore 
interesting to systematically measure the openness of moral discourse, and relate it to other 
empirical consequences. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Business decision-makers face difficult ethical decisions, often in a pluralistic context 
where their choice must be threaded among competing values (Treviño & Brown, 2004).  
Moreover, attempts to control ethical behavior from above using technical or bureaucratic means 
may risk arousing resistance from employees, or damaging their adaptability to local problems 
(Stansbury & Barry, 2007).  The problem of reaching agreement about the right thing to do is a 
real one in business organizations, for front-line employees as well as top managers.  
Discourse ethics provides a set of principles for making such choices, together with the 
people who will be affected by the decision.  However, as noted in the foregoing literature 
review, the ideal discursive conditions for normative validity are not realizable in actual 
discourse.  I will first argue that all moral discourse can be ranged along a continuum of moral 
openness, from the slogans obediently mouthed in total institutions to the probing inquiries of 
ideal speech.  Moreover, moral openness climate can be characterized as the prevailing 
perceptions of work group members about the openness of moral discourses in their groups in 
general.  I will next argue that moral openness climate is likely to be negatively predicted by 
machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970), and is likely to have discriminant validity from 
participative decision-making (Arnold, Arad, Rhoades, & Drasgow, 2000) and respectful 
interaction (Vogus, 2004).  Moral openness climate is also likely to predict the mean moral 
satisfaction (a measure of the degree to which a group member’s concerns about a problem have 
been addressed) among members of a work group.  I will then argue that increasing moral 
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openness climate is difficult and costly for participants, and only results in greater mean 
satisfaction when contention over the decisions faced by the group is proportional to the moral 
openness climate.  I will finally argue that a work group climate favorable to open moral 
discourse will increase members’ perceptions of collective moral motivation and collective 
moral character, that is, perceptions of their shared propensity to follow through on the decisions 
made and persist in the face of resistance (Arnaud, 2006).  These in turn will result in higher 
mean moral satisfaction among members of a given work group. 
 
Moral Openness in Work Group Discourses 
 
Moral discourse in work groups may vary in its openness, to the extent that artificial 
limits are imposed on the comparison and criticism of proposed norms and the reasons for them.  
Artificial limits raise the possibility that agreement on a norm may be contrived, resulting from 
some procedural advantage held by a party to the conversation rather than from the robustness of 
the reasons given for that norm.  Discourse theorists have accordingly formulated a set of ideal 
principles of valid moral discourse, as described in the foregoing literature review.  Moral 
openness is the degree to which an actual discourse adheres to the ideal principles of a valid 
moral discourse. 
For this project, I am particularly interested in conceptualizing moral openness climate.  
A climate construct describes the shared perceptions of employees within a group about the 
behaviors that are typical to their group with regard to a certain domain.  Climate does not 
incorporate attitudes or affective evaluations, and in fact survey instruments intended to measure 
climate must be carefully designed to exclude such evaluations.  Rather, climate represents the 
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internalized expectations of the group that are accrued through socialization and vicarious 
learning; it describes the content of one section of the role system that the individual masters 
through acquisition of the generalized other (Ashforth, 1985; Schneider & Reichers, 1983).  
These roles are social facts that are in force whether or not participants evaluate them favorably. 
Why study moral openness climate instead of moral openness as a property of specific 
discourses?  Because within work groups, I expected to find continuity across moral discourses 
due to learned, shared assumptions about how such discourses are held.  Although there can be 
variation between discourses, ambiguous and meaning-laden social activities such as these are 
typically occasions for structuration (Giddens, 1984) where past patterns are reenacted with 
slight modifications rather than reinvented anew.  Whereas examining moral discourses 
individually for newly constituted groups may be a valid investigation, I would expect moral 
discourses in established groups to be instantiations of those groups’ moral openness climates.  
Therefore it is important to study those climates directly. 
I expected moral openness to be comprised of five conceptually distinct dimensions.  
These dimensions have been defined in order to reflect the validity of the group’s typical 
discourses for reaching discursively valid conclusions; their relationship to the rules of valid 
practical discourse in Table 2.1 will become clear in their descriptions below.  Operationalization 
of these dimensions is discussed in the following chapter on methods. 
The first dimension of moral openness climate is participation.  If a discourse does not 
include all affected parties, then the validity of its conclusions does not extend to those excluded 
parties (Alexy, 1990; Benhabib, 1992).  Moreover, some participation may be suppressed by the 
organization’s status hierarchy if employees fear the consequences of speaking up or believe that 
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their input is irrelevant to management’s better-informed decisions (Morrison & Milliken, 2000).  
If a group typically suppresses some participation, its moral openness climate will be lower. 
The second dimension of moral openness climate is agreed closure, which I later 
simplified to “closure” in the field studies.  Under temporal and cognitive constraints, discourse 
must be governed by procedural rules (Alexy, 1990; Habermas, 1993) that enable its closure, in 
order for conclusions to be reached and action to be taken.  However, the only closure that is 
internal to the logic of the discourse is that of collective agreement that the norms justified in the 
discourse can be agreed to by all participants (Benhabib, 1992; Habermas, 1990).  Because 
objections can conceivably be raised indefinitely, some discourses may have no logical end 
(Benhabib, 1992), although craven demands for additional justifications or off-topic digressions 
may be ruled out (Alexy, 1990: see Table 2.1).  Therefore, discourse must eventually be 
concluded according to the judgment of participants, which may be arbitrary and unacceptable to 
some.  Both premature closure and digressive elaboration detract from the validity of the 
discourse’s conclusions (see Table 2.1); if a group’s discourse is typified by either problem, it 
will experience lower moral openness climate. 
The third dimension of moral openness climate is commitment to understanding.  
Discourse theory assumes that participants are committed to pursuing collective agreement 
solely through the force of the best argument (Alexy, 1990; Habermas, 1990).  Unfortunately, 
status games and power plays are not uncommon in moral discourse (Badaracco, 2002; Bird & 
Waters, 1989).  When some participants engage in deception or status games, the validity of the 
discourse’s conclusions is biased, because agreement is reached on the basis of rewards or 
coercion rather than on the basis of reasoned assent to the reasons given in discussion.  If a 
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group’s discourse is typified by such strategic action, it will experience lower moral openness 
climate. 
The fourth dimension of moral openness climate is procedural equity.  Moral discourse is 
vulnerable to domination by parties who are skilled at argumentation (Alexy, 1990; Habermas, 
1993) at the expense of those who have difficulty expressing and arguing their points (Benhabib, 
1992).  It is also vulnerable to domination by parties who have the time and inclination to engage 
in the process (Alexy, 1990): some participants that neither forestall closure nor act strategically 
may simply be better able to bear the costs of the discourse than their opponents.  If these parties 
forge the discourse’s conclusions by default when their opponents forfeit their positions, those 
conclusions are analytically biased.  If this procedural dominance is typical for a group, it will 
experience lower moral openness climate. 
The final dimension of moral openness climate is logical reasoning, which I later 
simplified to “logic” in the field studies.  As discussed above, much organizational decision-
making is narrative in form, but discourse theory ideally assumes a form of discourse 
characterized by formal argumentation (Alexy, 1990).  Therefore, this dimension assesses the 
degree of narrativity versus argumentation that characterizes a group’s discourses.  I expected 
that some groups will be more experienced with and / or more comfortable with argumentative 
discourse, and because of the greater precision and consistency of the conclusions that such 
discourse affords, their moral openness climate will be higher. 
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Discriminant and Construct Validity 
 
Having described the dimensions of moral openness climate, I will now specify some 
hypotheses pertaining to its discriminant and construct validity.  Discriminant validity is 
determined by demonstrating that a construct is empirically distinguishable from another 
construct that it is conceptually distinct from (Hinkin, 1998).  Construct validity is supported 
when a construct relates in expected ways to other constructs (Hinkin, 1998).   
I attempt in this project to establish discriminant validity with respect to respectful 
interaction (Vogus, 2004) and participatory decision-making (Arnold et al., 2000).  Respectful 
interaction is the degree to which individuals are willing to avoid self-censoring their own 
contributions to discourse and to refrain from critiquing others (Vogus, 2004); I expected moral 
openness climate and respectful interaction to be highly correlated but distinct, particularly 
because moral openness climate incorporates an assessment of the logic of the discourse, while 
respectful interaction does not.  Similarly, participative decision-making is employees’ 
perception that their manager accepts their participation (Arnold, Arad, Rhoades, & Drasgow, 
2000); because moral openness climate measures employees’ perception that their entire work 
group accepts their participation, eschews premature closure, refrains from the manipulative use 
of power, and discusses the matter at hand in a logical manner, I expected moral openness 
climate and participative decision-making to be correlated but distinct.  Therefore, I propose the 
following hypotheses: 
H1a: Moral openness climate is distinct from respectful interaction. 
H1b: Moral openness climate is distinct from participatory decision making. 
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Valid moral discourse requires that group members give reasons for their proposed 
norms, or critique the reasons given for norms that they would reject.  High moral openness 
climate is characterized by open participation and logical reasoning.  However, individuals who 
score highly on Christie & Geis’ scale of Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) are likely to 
subvert these behaviors, especially through strategic action, and therefore to hinder moral 
discourse.  Moreover, because managers have a disproportionate influence upon the ethical 
context in a work group (Brown, Trevino, & Harrison, 2005), I expected that work groups 
managed by individuals who score highly on machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) would 
have low moral openness climate.  Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis to provide an 
initial test of the construct validity of moral openness climate. 
H1c: The machiavellianism of a group’s manager is negatively related to moral openness 
climate. 
 
Moral Satisfaction as a Consequence of Moral Openness and Contention 
 
In order to further test the construct validity of moral openness climate, I theorized 
another outcome that I have called moral satisfaction.  Moral satisfaction is an attitudinal 
measure of a given participant’s assessment of the acceptability of moral decisions made by the 
group.  It is closely related to Habermas’ principle of universalization (U): “All affected [by a 
given norm] can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be 
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are 
preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation)” (Habermas, 1990: 65).   
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Under ideal conditions, I would expect more rigorous adherence to the rules of practical 
discourse (i.e. higher moral openness climate) to lead to greater moral satisfaction with the 
outcomes, because unsatisfactory outcomes would be identified and discussed, and because more 
thorough and reasonable discourses should lead all participants to conclude that the decisions 
reached are acceptable.  Low mean moral satisfaction among members of a group would indicate 
that issues at hand have not been consensually resolved.   
However, a high degree of moral satisfaction does not necessarily imply that a decision is 
morally excellent; it is always possible that a group that realizes high moral satisfaction as a 
matter of perception does not recognize some important moral shortcoming (Rorty, 2006), 
perhaps all the more so if that satisfaction stymies further discourse.  Moral satisfaction is a 
perception, not necessarily an indicator of actual normative validity. 
Moreover, rigorousand open moral argumentation entails several of the costs noted in the 
literature review above:the time and effort required for open discourse, a loss of influence for 
participants who lack skill in formalizing their arguments, and the reduction of cherished values 
or senses of self to defensible propositions.  Moreover, some employees may fear that a more 
open moral discourse will entail more stringent controls on their own actions.  Therefore, it is 
plausible that in practice a higher moral openness climatewill have a negative effect on the mean 
moral satisfaction of group members.  Accordingly, I have formulated the following hypothesis: 
H2a: Moral openness climate will be negatively related to the mean moral satisfaction of 
group members. 
To better analyze this uncertain relationship between moral openness climate and moral 
satisfaction, I have also theorized a moderator, which I have called contention.  Contention is a 
climate perception of the moral intensity (Jones, 1991) that a group encounters in its decisions, 
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despite the premise controls (Perrow, 1986) or techniques of neutralization (Sykes & Matza, 
1957) that may limit the perceptions of moral intensity for some decisions.  More directly, it is 
the collective realization that the group’s activities are morally problematic.  Not all actions are 
subjects of moral contention.  For example, drinking coffee at one’s desk is unproblematic as 
long as the building manager enforces no prohibition against it, as long as the Fair Trade, 
organic, or shade grown origin of the beans is unimportant, and as long as no condemnation 
attaches to the use of a Styrofoam cup instead of a ceramic mug.  However, any of these aspects 
of routine coffee drinking can be made contentious: a rejected 2002 ballot initiative in Berkeley, 
California proposed prohibiting the sale of brewed coffee that had not been certified Fair Trade, 
organic, or shade grown (Burress, 2002).  As the Berkeley coffee initiative demonstrates, even 
relatively trivial matters can be made into subjects of moral contention, while the long history of 
Jim Crow laws prior to the Montgomery bus boycott demonstrates that morally nontrivial 
matters can also be the subjects of remarkably little contention.  Some groups engage in activities 
that have a powerful, concentrated, certain, and meaningful impact on many people that they 
know, while others have no such influence; some fail to recognize the impact they have, either 
because they have not considered their influence, or because they intentionally ignore their 
impacts.  In practice I would expect contention to have a negative effect on moral satisfaction.  
Accordingly, I have formulated the following hypothesis: 
H2b: Contention will be negatively related to the mean moral satisfaction of group 
members. 
However, the interaction between moral openness climate and contention is very 
important.  Greater contention will magnify participants’ senses of the scope of the problems at 
hand, and enhance their appreciation of greater moral openness climate for solving those 
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problems.  This appreciation should result in a higher degree of moral satisfaction for a given 
level of moral openness climate than would otherwise be the case.  That is, low moral openness 
climate with low contention would result in high moral satisfaction, because participants 
recognize little to be dissatisfied with.  High moral openness climate with high contention would 
also result in high moral satisfaction, because participants recognize that difficult moral 
problems are being resolved openly.  But high moral openness climate with low contention 
would result in low satisfaction, because the effort and abstraction of moral discourse would be 
disproportionate to the problems at hand; similarly, high contention with low moral openness 
climate would also result in low satisfaction, because the problems at hand would be treated 
without reasoned agreement.  Accordingly, I have formulated the following hypotheses: 
H2c: Contention will positively moderate the relationship of moral openness climate to 
the mean moral satisfaction of group members. 
 
Moral Motivation and Moral Character 
 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action does not merely ground discourse ethics in 
principles of reasoned agreement, but also entails a theory of moral motivation.  The theory of 
communicative action is defined as a social form of purposive rational action, that is, it is a way 
of coordinating actions with others, and works through reasoned agreement about the truth of 
propositions or the rightness of norms (Habermas, 1984).  Habermas subsequently argues that 
norms established through moral discourse have a social compulsive power that exceeds that of 
abstract ethical standards, because adherence to them has been shown to be consistent with one’s 
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identity as a member of the group (Habermas, 1990 & 1993); flouting them introduces 
inconsistency into one’s self-construction. 
The literature on dyadic influence is not inconsistent with Habermas’s theory.  Yukl and 
various co-authors have consistently found that consultation, (i.e. seeking and incorporating the 
participation of affected individuals in a decision), and rational persuasion, (i.e. using logical 
arguments and factual evidence to persuade the target of the viability and instrumentality of a 
request), are among the most-used and most-successful tactics for influencing managers, co-
workers, and subordinates (Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). 
Moreover, moral motivation is an existing construct in the moral psychology literature. 
Rest (1986; also Narvaez et al., 1999) characterized moral decision-making as entailing four 
separate schemas:  Moral sensitivity, in which the existence of a problem is noted; moral 
judgment, in which the parameters of the problem are evaluated against ethical principles; moral 
motivation, in which the decision-maker decides whether to follow through on the conclusions of 
moral judgment; and moral character, in which the decision-maker perseveres with the 
conclusions of moral judgment despite opposition or setbacks.  Recently, Arnaud has extended 
this model to describe moral decision-making at a group level, and both formulated and validated 
climate measures of collective moral sensitivity, collective moral judgment, collective moral 
motivation, and collective moral character that describe the group’s ability to execute the four 
schemas (Arnaud, 2006). 
I expect that increasing moral openness climate predicts both increasing collective moral 
motivation and increasing collective moral character, because of Habermas’ characterization of 
communicative action as an activity intended to rationally and purposefully coordinate social 
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action, and due to the similarity of communicative action to rational and consultative persuasion.  
Accordingly, I have formulated the following hypotheses: 
H3a: Moral openness climate will positively predict collective moral motivation. 
H3b: Moral openness climate will positively predict collective moral character. 
I also expect that collective moral motivation and collective moral character will 
positively predict a group’s mean moral satisfaction, because decisions for which motivation and 
follow-through are weak are likely to be unsatisfactory in retrospect.Note that because the 
outcome of interest is a group-level climate variable, it is necessary to aggregate individual 
measures of moral satisfaction to a group level as well. Accordingly, I have formulated the 
following hypotheses: 
H3c: Collective moral motivation will positively predict a group’s mean moral 
satisfaction. 
H3d: Collective moral character will positively predict a group’s mean moral satisfaction. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
I intended to develop and validate a multidimensional survey scale of moral openness 
climate, along with unidimensional survey scales of contention and moral satisfaction.  I began 
with a set of ten semi-structured interviews among bank tellers in Middle Tennessee, in order to 
qualitatively ascertain whether businesspeople in a line or line-management role perceived moral 
equivocality, moral discourse, or elements of moral openness.  Preliminary survey items were 
formulated based on the conceptual framework described above; note that this approach is 
recommended by both Hinkin (1998) and Spector (1992), although the former labels it 
“deductive” and the latter “inductive.”  The second study assessedthe substantive validity (i.e. 
how well a given measure reflects its construct of interest, using a small-sample item-sort pretest 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1991)) of three iterated versions of the survey instruments for moral 
openness climate, contention, and moral satisfaction.  The third study employed exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) to examine the dimensionality of the moral openness climate construct, 
and to eliminate survey items that did not load significantly on any factor (Hinkin, 1998).  This 
data set was subsequently used to select survey items that together had more than adequate 
reliability, as measured by a Cronbach’s Alpha of no less than 0.70 (DeVellis, 2003; Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994; Spector, 1992) for each scale dimension.  The fourth study entailedseveral tests 
for construct validity.  I expected to find discriminant validity between individual-level 
perceptions of moral openness climate and respectful interaction (Vogus, 2004), and between 
individual-level perceptions of moral openness climate and the participative decision-making 
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subscale of the empowering leadership questionnaire (Arnold, Arad, Rhoades, & Drasgow, 
2000).  I expected to find that higher manager measures of Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 
1970) predict lower moral openness climate at a group level.  I expected to find that a work 
group’s contention moderates the relationship between that group’s moral openness climate and 
that group’s average moral satisfaction.  Finally, I expected to find that a group’s higher moral 
openness climate predicts higher collective moral motivation and collective moral character 
(Arnaud, 2006) for the group, which in turn predicts higheraverage moral satisfaction for the 
same group.  
 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
In order to determine whether line and line-management businesspeople experience 
moral equivocality, moral discourse, or elements of moral openness at work, I conducted ten 
semi-structured interviews with bank tellers, “desk side” (i.e. non-teller) customer service 
specialists, and branch managers at a retail bank in Middle Tennessee.  This exploratory study 
was intended to determine whether the intended topics and constructs were problematic enough 
for potential participants to be worthy of study, but not to provide an inductive foundation for 
theory building.  Therefore, neither structured interviews nor unstructured interviews would have 
been appropriate; the former would have been too constrained by protocol to allow participants’ 
perceptions to emerge if those perceptions did not fit the terms of the protocol, while the latter 
would have been unwieldy to conduct and interpret, especially in light of the sensitive nature of 
the subject matter (Legard, Keegan, & Ward, 2003; Rapley, 2004).  Instead, I used semi-
structured interviews, which utilize a set of predefined questions that facilitate content mapping 
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(Legard, Keegan, & Ward, 2003) but allow the researcher to ask probing follow-up questions as 
appropriate to elicit additional detail, i.e. content mining (Legard, Keegan, & Ward, 2003).The 
interview instrument is in Appendix A. 
 
Item Development 
 
The preliminary set of survey items were written to substantially cover the constructs of 
contention, moral openness climate, and moral satisfaction, as described above.  Five separate 
dimensions of moral openness climate had preliminary subscale items written: participation, 
agreed closure, commitment to understanding, procedural equity, and logical reasoning.  Items 
were intended to represent the breadth of the definition of each construct or dimension (Hinkin, 
1998), and were intended to be redundant in order to facilitate standard measures of reliability 
(Spector, 1992).  Some items were worded so that disagreement is an indication of high levels of 
the construct, while others have been worded so that agreement is such an indication; this 
reverse-coding of some items was intended to counteract the tendency of some respondents to 
agree with all items (DeVellis, 2003).  However, introduction of negation (e.g. “not”) was 
intentionally avoided except where it was colloquially typical, in order to limit the potential for 
scale items to be misread (DeVellis, 2003).  Finally, more items were included than were likely 
to be incorporated into the actual survey scales, so that between half and two-thirds of the items 
could be eliminated in the item selection activity of study two.  This was expected to lead to 
scales and subscales that were between five and seven items long, although some relatively 
simple constructs or dimensions may be as short as three or four items (Hinkin, 1998).   
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Substantive Validity Pretest 
 
Many authors recommend validating survey items with experts on their content before 
administering them to subjects (DeVellis, 2003; Hinkin, 1998; Spector, 1992).  For clarity of 
wording, I obtained feedback on the preliminary survey questionnaire from another scholar at 
Vanderbilt who was knowledgeable about survey research, and from three managers at the 
Middle Tennessee bank that participated in my studies.  I also pre-tested the scale using the 
method recommended by Anderson & Gerbing (1991) and endorsed by Hinkin (1998).  
Participants from the Vanderbilt eLab were given definitions of constructs (or dimensions 
thereof) written in everyday language, and asked to assign each survey item to only one of the 
constructs.  This exercise assessed whether the items could be reasonably expected to load onto 
the intended dimensions when EFA was performed on a subsequent sample, and was intended to 
provide advance warning of constructs or items that lack clear definition, thereby reducing the 
risk that the larger second study would return inconclusive results.  The Vanderbilt eLab is an 
online panel of individuals who have volunteered to complete surveys and experiments on a 
variety of topics; the panel is comprised of over 20,000 demographically diverse individuals 
around the world, who typically participate in a given survey in exchange for entry into a 
drawing for $100 whose odds are 100-to-1.  I offered the typical inducement to participants who 
worked for North American organizations with at least five employees.  The demographic and 
geographic diversity of eLab panelists facilitates a broader test of item reliability than a sample 
of respondents drawn from any single organization. 
Anderson & Gerbing (1991) recommend pre-testing a given scale on a sample of no 
fewer than 20 participants who are similar to the population to be studied.  Anderson & Gerbing 
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first describe the Proportion of Substantive Agreement, or PSA, which is the proportion of 
respondents who assign a given item to the construct intended by the researcher, that is, PSA = 
Nc / N.  They next describe the Coefficient of Substantive Validity, or CSV, which incorporates 
the highest number of assignments to a non-intended construct, or No.  The formula for CSV is 
(Nc – No) / N.  Note that these are not simple measures of inter-rater agreement, which do not 
discriminate between factors, but rather are measures of whether raters assign a given survey 
item to the factor that I intended it to measure.  A critical value for CSV can be obtained through 
the technique described by Anderson & Gerbing (1991): first, the critical number of assignments 
M is found for which the probability of Nc exceeding M is less than .05 (using the binomial 
distribution), given a particular sample size.  Then, the critical CSV is equal to (2M/N)-1.  If 
CSV exceeds this critical value, then I can have 95% confidence that an EFA on a subsequent 
sample will load my survey items on the intended constructs or dimensions.  Items for which 
CSV does not exceed the critical value are excellent candidates for preliminary deletion.  
Subscales for which few items exceed the critical value may require either redevelopment of a 
new item set, or conceptual reconsideration as part of moral openness climate.  I intended to 
conduct this pre-test on a random sample of 100 employees from my sponsoring organization, so 
that an expected response rate of 20% would meet the 20-participant threshold.  However, that 
organization withdrew from the study in August of 2007.  Instead, I used participants from the 
Vanderbilt eLab who were employed in North American organizations. 
One important advantage of running a small-sample pretest of substantive validity is that 
revisions to the preliminary scales can be readily re-tested, while scales for which EFA does not 
result in clean (or intended) loadings require revision and re-testing on much larger samples.  I 
ran three pre-tests in October, November, and December of 2007 using separate eLab samples of 
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22, 30, and 26 participants each, and iteratively refined the survey items.  This iterative scale re-
development was more expedient and inexpensive than doing so with the sample sizes needed 
for EFA. 
 
Scale Development Study 
 
A third study conducted item selection and EFA on a sample of 604 eLab panelists, 
which exceeded the recommended minimum of 150 respondents needed for EFA (DeVellis, 
2003).  Because these studies are concerned with the reliability of the survey scales rather than 
with the interrelationship of climate constructs, they can be conducted on individual-level 
responses sampled from the population of interest (in this case, North Americans who work in 
organizations) without concern for aggregation.  In addition to the set of questionnaire items 
selected in the second study, the surveys in this study incorporated questions on a set of typical 
control variables: the respondent’s age, gender, occupation, and years of schooling completed.   
Several authors recommend conducting an EFA on an initial sample of survey 
respondents (e.g. DeVellis, 2003; Hinkin, 1998; Spector, 1992).  An EFA does not constrain the 
resulting factor model, but rather assumes that all items are related to all factors; therefore, if the 
EFA independently produces a factor structure that corresponds to the intended dimensionality of 
the survey scales confirmed in the substantive validity pretest, that result is a strong indication of 
the reliability of those dimensions.If the factor structure produced by EFA does not match the 
intended dimensionality of the survey scales, then either the item set or more likely the a priori 
factor structure will require redevelopment. 
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Item selection proceeded through multiple iterations of evaluation against Cronbach’s 
Alpha.  Cronbach’s Alpha is a common measure of the internal reliability of a scale, that is, how 
much the items in a scale covary (Spector, 1992).  Reliability analysis using the SPSS software 
package can show what Cronbach’s Alpha would be after the removal of each item; items can 
then be removed if their removal results in a higher Alpha than the scale currently shows.  Once 
a set of items is removed, the analysis is repeated, and the set of items again culled, until no 
further removals can increase the Alpha of the scale (Spector, 1992).  However, this process is 
not deterministic: some items may be retained because they represent an important aspect of the 
construct’s domain.  Acceptable internal reliabilities are higher than 0.70; however, it is 
advisable to develop scales that have higher reliability, so that if the scales’ reliability diminishes 
on other samples it is still acceptable (DeVellis, 2003). 
 
Construct Validity Study 
 
The final study was intended to assess the construct validity of contention, moral 
openness climate, and moral satisfaction.  Because construct validity requires that the constructs 
measured by the scales be empirically shown to be related to other known constructs in a manner 
consistent with their theoretical definition (DeVellis, 2003; Hinkin, 1998), it was important to 
sample work groups as such; this facilitated the testing of relationships between climate 
constructs.  Therefore, I surveyed work groups within actual organizations in seven states and a 
variety of industries. 
Testing these relationships between climate constructs, at a work group unit of analysis, 
requires testing the aggregation of each construct, that is, establishing that members of each 
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group report similar scores for a given measure, and that within-group variance is less than 
between-group variance.  Four tests are commonly used to assess aggregation: median 
rwg(j),which measures within-group agreement (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984); the F-statistic 
from a one-way ANOVA, which measures non-independence among observations at a group 
level (Kenny & Judd, 1986); and intraclass correlation coefficients ICC(1) and ICC(2), which 
measure between-group variability (Bliese, 2000).  Acceptable thresholds for the above measures 
are .70 for rwg(j) (James et al., 1984), a significant F-statistic, .05 and above for ICC(1) (Bliese, 
2000), and .70 for ICC(2).   
For assessing discriminant validity, the fourth study incorporated two survey scales that 
have been developed by other researchers: respectful interaction (Vogus, 2004) and participatory 
decision-making (Arnold, Arad, Rhoades, & Drasgow, 2000).  These scales measure constructs 
that are similar to moral openness climate, but are not congruent with it.  Therefore, according to 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b, I expected EFA run with these scales not to incorporate their items into 
the moral openness climate scales with significant loadings.  I also expected these scales to 
differentially predict the outcomes that I thought would be associated with moral openness. 
Construct validity was assessed through tests of the above hypotheses describing the 
expected relationships among constructs.  First, I tested the expected negative relationship 
between manager machiavellianism and moral opennessclimate described in Hypothesis 1c.  I 
incorporated Christie & Geis’ (1970) scale into the manager survey for Study Three, and then 
usedordinary least-squares regression to test for a negative and significant group-level 
relationship between machiavellianism and moral openness climate.  Confirmation of this 
relationship would lend further credence to the moral openness climate scale as characterizing a 
state of open moral discourse. 
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Next Iattempted to test the expected relationships between contention, moral openness 
climate, and moral satisfaction summarized in Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c.  Because moral 
satisfaction was measured in a temporally separate survey from moral openness climate to 
control for common method bias, and therefore individual-level correspondence was not 
available, it was necessary to test this relationship at the group level by averaging these variables 
within their groups and then conducting ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression on the 
relationships between them.  Significant and directionally correct regression coefficients would 
disconfirm the null hypotheses in each case, and provide evidence of a theoretically expected 
relationship between constructs. 
Last, I tested the relationship between moral openness climateand both collective moral 
motivation (CMM) and collective moral character(CMC), described in Hypotheses 3aand 3b, as 
well as the relationships between CMM and CMC and moral satisfaction described in 
Hypotheses 3c and 3d.  In his theorization of discourse ethics, Habermas (1993) has argued that 
valid moral discourse lends social force to the motivation to comply with the conclusions 
reached.  Confirmation of a positive relationship would lend credence to the claim that the scale 
measuring moral openness climate represents the discursive construct that Habermas theorized.  
Arnaud (2006) has developed climate survey scales that measure the four parts of Rest’s (1986) 
model of moral decision-making at a group level; I used her subscalesfor CMM and CMC from 
her Ethical Climate Index in Study 3.  An OLS regression should find a significant relationship 
between moral openness climateand bothCMM and CMC, while a differentregression should 
find a significant relationship between CMM and CMC andmean moral satisfaction, as 
previously hypothesized. 
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Altogether, if the scales for contention, moral openness climate, and moral satisfaction 
are found to be reliable through multiple quantitative tests on multiple data sets, and are also 
found to have discriminant validity relative to similar scales and construct validity with respect 
to the theoretically expected antecedent and consequence detailed above, as well as in their own 
interrelationships, then it is reasonable to argue that these constructs are useful for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
RESULTS 
 
Study One: Semi-Structured Interviews 
Beginning in February 2007, I contacted a Senior Vice President of Human Resources at 
a regional bank in the Southeastern United States, through three degrees of separation in my 
personal network, to ask permission to conduct research on moral openness.  I noted that bank 
branches are excellent places to study organizational climates of any type, because of their task 
interdependency, their relatively small size, and their geographic separation (Schneider, 
Salvaggio, & Subirats, 2002).  My topic coincided with an interest on the part of senior HR 
leadership there in the effectiveness of their own organizational development program, and that 
VP introduced me to a junior VP in metropolitan Nashville who arranged a set of interviews.  I 
agreed to provide a synopsis of my interview findings, cleansed of all personally-identifying 
information, to my study sponsors in the bank’s management, in return for access to ten 
employees at different branches throughout the metropolitan area. 
The study described below occurred in June, 2007 among bank branches in metropolitan 
Nashville.  Its purpose was to compare the actual experiences of front-line employees with a 
theoretical model of moral openness.  Ten employees answered questions about situations in 
which they were unsure about “the right thing to do,” and about the propensities of the staff of 
their respective branches to talk with each other to determine an appropriate course of action. 
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Findings 
Participants reported frequent and even daily situations in which they were uncertain of 
the right course of action, pertaining mostly to exceptional customer transactions, but sometimes 
to erratic or threatening customer behavior, and occasionally to the behavior of other employees.  
Typical incidents involved customers who wanted to cash checks with insufficient, improper, or 
expired identification, or who were unable to conduct their transaction at the indoor teller 
window because of a physical disability. 
 “Banking rules are always changing and so you‟re always trying to learn what‟s right, 
what‟s wrong, when can you do this, when can you do that, and a lot of things, believe it 
or not, depend on the relationship with the customer.” 
 “Here, there's a lot of gray areas. There's no real policies on a lot of stuff.  He bent the 
rules on this one, you bend the rules on that one.” 
 “When you're dealing with people, you just don't know what's going to happen from one 
moment to another.  And more so if you're dealing with people and money, that can be 
even trickier.” 
 “It happens every day.  And even the person who's been here 30 years, she's, even at 
times, she's had to ask „what do we do? How should we handle this situation?‟” 
 
Participants revealed varying degrees of moral awareness, from a rudimentary level 
informed primarily by rules and procedures, to advanced levels of empathy and perceptiveness 
that identified incipient issues and their resolutions.  For example, many customers who ask for 
exceptional transactions like wire transfers to an overseas account fall prey to mail fraud; some 
staff feel obligated to advise those customers of the risk that they are taking in responding to 
such solicitations.  Many staff were very attentive to the quality of the interpersonal connection 
that they made with customers, and took great pride in the unfailing tactfulness with which they 
treated even customers who pressured them to complete invalid transactions; these staff perceive 
both a personal virtue of their own and a competitive advantage for their employer in treating 
customers in a caring manner.  However, the need to demonstrate care existed in tension with the 
need to adhere to policies and controls, and some of the staff had developed elaborate and 
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nuanced techniques for firmly and tactfully detecting potential fraud, for resisting manipulation, 
and for tactfully turning down invalid customer requests.  Most staff described a refined 
perception of normality whose violation heightened their attention to “red flags” for potential 
fraud; staff were attuned to both their own feelings of discomfort and objective indicators of risk. 
 
 “If somebody truly is disabled, we have had some exceptions like that.  As a matter of 
fact, I think you should make those exceptions, because that's what's going to set you 
apart from someone who doesn't make those exceptions as far as customer service is 
concerned.” 
 “I would rather look at a customer and say „Sir, you know what, I‟m not sure I can take 
care of this problem for you today, but let me see what we can do to get it taken care of.  I 
want to help you.‟” 
 “A lot of elderly people happen to be victimized by a lot of scams that are going around, 
wanting to wire money to South Africa when you know they don‟t have any relationships 
in South Africa . . . you try to make sure that they're not trying to send their money out, 
and then it's gone, bye-bye.It's kind of a little bit going beyond, I guess, we shouldn't get 
involved with. But, on a personal level, you want to be sure that they're not getting ripped 
off. And some of them when they hear about it say „Take it away.  Shred it for me.‟” 
 “You learn how to read people, you learn how to make a decision whether I go over and 
tell [Name] on the corner „hey, you need to be careful with that customer, just watch 
what you‟re doing‟ because you learn to read their reactions.  When they‟re like „I don‟t 
know if I‟m supposed to be doing this or not.‟” 
 
Although there were occasional complaints about the treatment of staff, particularly 
disciplinary action or lack thereof for performance failures, the degree of uncertainty expressed 
around those issues was relatively small.  Rather, participants expressed confidence in their 
judgments of the adequacy of their own and others’ performance, and generally expressed an 
opinion that transgressions were dealt with swiftly and decisively.  Many also cited the swiftness 
with which employees are terminated for misconduct as evidence of [Bank’s] commitment to 
ethics, and made comments like “you hear stories about people losing their jobs.”  I would note 
that because discipline often entails termination, my sample would tend to exclude participants 
who felt that they had been treated with undue harshness for a performance failure or other 
transgression.  Some employees expressed both a strong sense that they were under constant 
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surveillance, and anxiety about whether an innocent mistake would be construed by the 
organization as a moral failure; feelings as to whether the rules were there to guide and protect 
employees or to control and punish them were mixed. 
 “There's consequences in every job, but in this job particularly. People always say it's 
better to ask, but in this job more than anything, I would say it's way better to ask than 
anything.” 
 “And you really do have to be in the mindset of what's right and what's wrong, because 
you don't want to make yourself look suspicious. And you don't want to do anything that's 
going to jeopardize your job, and have the customer come in there upset and everything.  
I've heard stories, you lose your job and you get prosecuted and all this good stuff.” 
 “[Bank] is a great company. When it comes down to ethics, I feel very comfortable, 
especially in the middle Tennessee environment, that they do address that.  And there 
have been people that failed, that didn't do the right thing, and it was addressed, and they 
were terminated. So I feel very confident in the direction of the company.” 
 “I personally feel like every rule is there for a reason.  They are there because previously 
something has happened, and there's a reason behind it.” 
 
All participants agreed, and most agreed strongly, that their workplaces prized open 
communication and encouraged employees to ask for advice if they were unsure what to do.  All 
participants firmly rejected the idea that someone may be reluctant to ask for advice because they 
don’t want to reveal their ignorance to others.  Many if not most voiced the opinion that their 
workplace was exceptionally open and collegial, and warned me that I would probably not find 
such a high degree of openness in my other interviews.  Some participants had worked in other 
banks, and drew strong distinctions between [Bank] and their former employers, both in terms of 
the openness of the workplace to advice-seeking and learning, and in terms of the ethical tone of 
the branch.  [Bank] compared favorably in every instance. 
 
 “I think that everybody is here to help everybody, and we get along real good. I don't 
think there's anybody here that has any trouble asking anybody to help them with 
anything. I don't think . . . how do you learn if you don't ask somebody?  I don't 
understand how you go from day to day without asking somebody and teaching them 
something new every day. Do you?” 
 “We talk a lot down here, and we know what's going on.” 
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 “Here they do care about you as an individual.  Upper management is very 
approachable.” 
 “I feel like if I don't have an answer to a question I have a duty to ask somebody and find 
out the answer to that question.  I'm doing myself a disservice if I don't find out the 
answer to that question.  So I'm going to ask and ask and ask until I find out the answer.” 
 
A few employees referred to a named empowerment program as creating an expectation 
that employees would use their own discretion to make, and take responsibility for, their own 
decisions.  Those who referred to it viewed it as a bestowal of legitimacy on their own judgment; 
a subset also viewed it as a way to keep employees from handing off all difficult decisions to 
their supervisors.  References to this program did not seem to exist in tension with advice-
seeking behavior, because advice-seeking consistently entailed learning, such that employees 
who asked questions did so in order that they could act correctly and autonomously upon the 
next occurrence of a similar circumstance.  A strong emphasis on learning was apparent in every 
interview, whether or not the participant referred to empowerment. 
 “We have what's called [Empowerment], which is huge.  [Name], if they've got a check, 
and they're not sure about if they should cash it, they can use their judgment, use 
[Empowerment], and say „you know what, this is good.  I'm taking responsibility. I've got 
a feeling, I know this customer well enough. It's not like I have to go to [name], who's the 
operations manager, or let me ask [name] on this.‟Instead of always asking your boss, 
you can make your own judgment, and you make the call.” 
 “They let us use our own judgment.  It's called [Empowerment] here.” 
 
Participants expressed a variety of positions on the direction of communications, with 
some stating that questions flowed upward to the operations manager or branch manager, whose 
judgment was then definitive, and others stating that the ops or branch managers would accept or 
even (but more rarely) seek input from other staff.  A few participants were reflective about the 
fact that managers’ judgments were themselves potentially fallible and open to evaluation, while 
some participants seemed to consider their managers’ judgments to be the final and absolute 
answer.  None of the participants who characterized questions as flowing upward and answers as 
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flowing downward expressed any desire for more staff input in decisions, but rather seemed to 
take comfort in the fact that their managers would take responsibility for difficult decisions.  
Generally, participants who reported that their branches held weekly staff meetings also reported 
a more bi-directional flow of questioning. 
 
 “Let‟s just say I had a problem, and I went to my supervisor, and I just say „hey I‟m just 
not sure what to do with this.  What can I do?‟ and Suzy Q down at the end comes over 
and says „I might be able to help you with that!‟  We try really hard to make it a team 
effort of how to solve a problem, but we have momma hen over here saying „well, you 
could do it that way, but I would do it this way because this is the way it should be done.‟  
And we do what momma hen says [Laughing].” 
 “We have to call the people that wrote the check, and we had to check with our 
managers, and if they don't okay it, typically I don't do it.  If it's not okay by one of the 
managers I don't do it because I don't want to take the chance of losing my job.  Who's 
going to pay my bills if I lose my job?  So I try not to do it unless it's okay by the main 
man in charge.” 
 “So within my group, definitely, we are always kind of talking with each other, peer-to-
peer, 2, 3, 4 times a day, asking advice.  Or bouncing ideas off.  Whatever the case might 
be.” 
 
Participants uniformly rejected the idea that some employees use moral conversations to 
discredit others or garner status for themselves.  They often noted that such behavior is common 
elsewhere, and as with their comments on openness, told me that their branch was probably 
exceptional in its lack of opportunistic people.  They also agreed that such opportunism was a 
personal characteristic rather than a group habit, and some credited the lack of opportunism to 
[Bank’s] unattractiveness to such employees. 
 “I don't see it so much now.  We used to have an employee who was kind of that way.  He 
was a great producer.  He did excellent at his job.  Now he's gone.  I don't think anyone 
thinks „let me put you down because you know nothing.‟  From what I gather, I think 
we're all pretty equal as far as that goes.” 
 “I know this is going to sound funny, but there's just not bull####  going on, at least not 
that I've experienced.  It's not about that kind of thing, it's all about working together as a 
team, and making the right decision.  The honest answer is that I just haven't experienced 
it here.  I'm not saying it doesn't go on, I just haven't experienced it.” 
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Participants characterized advice-seeking conversations, whether a short and informal 
“hallway conversation” or a larger discussion or formal meeting, as largely progressing along 
logical lines.  They characterized arguments as being supported by reasoned evidence, though 
reciprocal critique of the evidence offered in favor of other arguments seemed absent.  It did not 
seem that arguments were often supported with emotional appeals, with threats or references to 
social or hierarchical status, or with quid pro quo bargaining.  It did seem that participants were 
attuned to their own emotional states as indicators of risk; emotional discomfort would trigger 
advice-seeking, could cause them to refuse to process a transaction if no advice were readily 
available, and would often cause them to continue a discussion until its conclusion restored their 
affective equilibrium.  Several told me that they have the discretion to refuse to process any 
transaction if they feel uncomfortable about it. 
 
 “In certain situations, if you have just a gut feel about somebody or something, that 
something‟s rotten in Denmark, then there is. And the correct decision is not always 
made. But for the most part you go with the things you check off. If this is true, this is 
true, this is true, cash the check. But I've been in situations where I've just had a bad 
feeling about the check, and I didn't cash it.” 
 “We'll maintain a conversation.  Nobody's trying to talk over anyone else. It's a pretty 
good group. We get along fairly well with the other people in the group.” 
 
The closure of a discussion could be precipitated by circumstances like the need for an 
immediate decision or interruption by a surge of customers.  However, more free-ranging 
conversations often occur in the morning before a given branch opens to customers, either in an 
official staff meeting or in informal discussion while preparing to open.  These conversations 
typically reached a resolution either when participants had no further reasons or questions to 
contribute, or when all participants reached a consensus with which they were personally 
comfortable. 
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 “If we all agree on what's been said and we all feel the same way about it.  That's really 
how we get to it.” 
 “They usually take every problem and try to make sure that we take care of it then.  And 
make sure that everyone understands what it is or is not about.” 
 “We all kind of decide how we're going to agree, how were going to handle it, it always 
boils down to „is that the way you see it? Is that the way you see it?  Is that the way you 
see it? Then that's the way we're going to do it.‟” 
 
Participants reported a moderate degree of satisfaction with the ethical decisions made in 
their branches; in light of the strong reports of the importance of ethics, the emphasis on ethics, 
and the emphasis on open communication and learning, I was surprised to see that the overall 
degree of satisfaction was not similarly high.  However, there were no reports of either genuine 
dissatisfaction or exuberant satisfaction; rather, the tone ranged from “fair” to “good but could be 
better.” 
 
 “I think the assumption is that you don't always get it right.  I mean, that's true in any 
sense.  Because there's always mistakes to be made, there's always different ways of 
looking at something, and different decisions, depending on the situation.” 
 “I do get the feeling that everybody is here who wants to be here. I think we're all in it 
not just because it's a paycheck, or at least I hope that's true, that we all really want to do 
as well as we can.” 
 “I think there is definitely room for improvement. It's one of those where it's not like 
excellent, but it's not like completely terrible.  I think it's kind of like in the middle.” 
 “I think that everyone here at this branch is satisfied with the decisions we make.  That 
way everybody knows what they're doing with the situation, everybody is comfortable in 
that situation.  And it helps them to do their job better, because they know that everybody 
else is going to back them up.” 
 “Here, I think that things are really done right.  We try to work as a team, and we try to 
make sure everybody gets to say what they want to say, and I think that if you were to 
interview any other teller, that they would say „we might not know the answer to 
something, but [name] might know, and we make sure that it gets done right.‟” 
 
Conclusions 
I was genuinely surprised by the prevailing degree of communication present in [Bank] branches.  
I was also surprised to hear that both line and line-management employees considered moral 
equivocality to be a regular occurrence, though it generally seemed to be a matter of determining 
94 
 
whether some known rule or procedure applied in a specific instance.  It seemed that most 
participants were satisfied that communication in their work groups was open to all perspectives 
and logical, that closure occurred when consensus was reached, and that domination by a peer 
was rare.  Participants often seemed relieved that their supervisors often took responsibility for 
decisions, and did not perceive that as domination.  However, moral decision-making often 
proceeded on an intuitive basis, and consensus often seemed to be a matter of intuitive agreement 
rather than analytical coherence.  Finally, satisfaction with the decisions reached was only 
moderate.  These results indicated to me that the climate for discursive moral openness in work 
groups was a topic that participants would be able to answer questions about, and encouraged me 
to proceed to the next stage of the study: Pre-testing the survey instruments for moral openness 
climate, contention, and moral satisfaction. 
 
Study Two: Pre-Test 
Small-sample pre-tests of each dimension of moral openness climate, contention, and 
moral satisfaction were conducted in September, November, and December of 2007, using 22, 
30, and 26 members of the eLab panel, respectively.  Each pre-test was conducted with a new set 
of panelists.  These pre-tests followed the method recommended by Anderson and Gerbing 
(1991), which entailed asking respondents to match draft survey items to written descriptions of 
the constructs that those items were supposed to measure.  If the coefficient of substantive 
variation for a given item exceeded the critical value for the same variable, then it was 
reasonable to expect that that item would load on the intended factor in a subsequent exploratory 
factor analysis. 
95 
 
For the first pre-test, 22 responses out of 32 were usable, for a 69% response rate.  The 
mean age of respondents was 38.68 (9.97 SD), while the mean age of non-respondents was 43.4 
(10.3 SD); 36% of respondents were female, while 60% of non-respondents were female.  The 
CSVfor only four items out of seventy-nine exceeded the critical CSV of 0.273; sixteen were 
between 0.1 and 0.272.  Twenty-nine items were indeterminate, while thirty had a negative CSV, 
indicating that they were more frequently matched with a different construct than the one 
intended.  This disappointing set of results indicated that both the items and the construct 
descriptions were phrased too abstractly, and that massive revisions were needed.  The initial sets 
of survey items are shown in AppendicesB-H, and the results of the first pre-test are shown in 
Table 5.1. 
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For the second pre-test, 30 responses out of 54 were usable, for a 55.6% response rate.  
The mean age of respondents was 43.23 (12.39 SD), while the mean age of non-respondents was 
44.13 (11.72 SD); 43% of respondents were female, while 46% of non-respondents were female.  
The second pre-test was conducted using a new set of survey items, as shown in Appendix I. 
For n=thirty respondents, the critical CSV was 0.267; 19 respondents for an item would 
exceed the binomial probability with 95% confidence.  Results are shown in Table 5.2; the 
revised items loaded substantially better than in the first pre-test.  However, many items still 
loaded poorly on their intended construct.  Moreover, “Commitment to Understanding” and 
“Procedural Equity” only had one item each that loaded as intended, and attracted a number of 
crossloadings from other constructs.  Accordingly, I revised the item set again and conducted 
another pre-test. 
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For the third pre-test, 26 responses out of 34 were usable, for a 76.5% response rate.  The 
mean age of respondents was 43.42 (14.13 SD), while the mean age of non-respondents was 
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46.88 (9.99 SD); 54% of respondents were female, while 75% of non-respondents were female.  
The third pre-test was conducted using a new set of survey items, as shown in Appendix J.  This 
eliminated “Procedural Equity,”changed “Commitment to Understanding” to “Power” for clarity, 
renamed “Agreed Closure” as “Closure” for clarity, and culled a number of weak items from the 
prior pre-test.   
For n=26 respondents, the critical CSV was 0.31; 17 respondents for an item would 
exceed the binomial probability with 95% confidence.  Results are shown in Table 5.3.  These 
results led to another cull of survey items, resulting in the 38 items that were subsequently used 
in Study 3. 
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Study Three: Scale Development 
 
Study three examined the reliability of the scales for moral openness climate, contention, 
and moral satisfaction, and tested the factor structure of moral openness climate, contention, and 
moral satisfaction, using Exploratory Factor Analysis.Except where noted, all factor analyses 
used Maximum Likelihood extraction and Promax rotation with Kappa = 2.  Factor extraction 
was performed according to the Kaiser Criterion, with factors extracted for Eigenvalues of 
greater than 1.  I eliminated items that had high cross-loadings (i.e. loadings of greater then 0.3 
on more than one factor), or communalities of less than 0.3.  I finally evaluated the reliability of 
each resulting scale against a Cronbach’s Alpha criterion (Alpha >= 0.7).  Descriptive statistics 
for the sample are shown in Table 5.4.  The survey instrument is shown in Appendix K.The 
correlation matrix is shown in Table 5.5. 
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TABLE 5.4 
Descriptive Statistics for eLab Sample in Study 3 
 
Demographic Variable   Completed Survey Did Not Complete Survey 
 
TOTAL     604   124 
 
Mean Age     44.01   46.21 
Median Age     44   46 
Modal Age     30   46 
Standard Deviation of Age   11.99   12.30 
 
Male      243 (40%)  47 (38%) 
Female     361 (60%)  77 (62%) 
 
Clerical or service worker   154 (25%)  30 (24%) 
Full-time homemaker    0 (0%)   1 (1%) 
Laborer or machine operator   43 (7%)  7 (6%) 
Management – middle   104 (17%)  22 (18%) 
Management – upper    1 (0%)   0 (0%) 
Other      2 (0%)   0 (0%) 
Professional or technical   210 (35%)  49 (40%) 
Sales or marketing    57 (9%)  14 (11%) 
Tradesman     33 (5%)  1 (1%) 
 
Associate’s degree    61 (10%)  11 (9%) 
Bachelor’s degree    148 (25%)  31 (25%) 
Completed grades 9-12, no diploma  8 (1%)   1 (1%) 
Completed high school   77 (13%)  14 (11%) 
Completed less than 9
th
 grade   1 (0%)   0 (0%) 
Completed some college   197 (33%)  44 (35%) 
Graduate or professional degree  96 (16%)  17 (14%) 
NULL      16 (3%)  6 (5%) 
 
United States     446 (74%)  97 (78%) 
Canada     158 (26%)  27 (22%) 
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TABLE 5.5 
Correlation Matrix 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Q1                     
Q2 0.496***                   
Q3 0.423*** 0.489***                 
Q4 0.420*** 0.425*** 0.309***               
Q5 -0.068  -0.008  0.019  0.020              
Q6 -0.397*** -0.346*** -0.293*** -0.219*** 0.227***           
Q7 -0.095* -0.085* -0.106** -0.105** 0.165*** 0.309***         
Q8 -0.115** -0.108** -0.158*** -0.094* 0.180*** 0.295*** 0.438***       
Q9 -0.352*** -0.336*** -0.327*** -0.253*** 0.220*** 0.608*** 0.335*** 0.344***     
Q10 -0.235*** -0.237*** -0.214*** -0.119** 0.018  0.205*** 0.048  0.049  0.228***   
Q11 -0.258*** -0.249*** -0.191*** -0.165*** 0.125** 0.373*** 0.220*** 0.182*** 0.462*** 0.284*** 
Q12 -0.041  0.017  0.054  -0.107** 0.113** 0.169*** 0.237*** 0.091* 0.134*** 0.034  
Q13 -0.271*** -0.246*** -0.218*** -0.146*** 0.282*** 0.542*** 0.390*** 0.366*** 0.526*** 0.199*** 
Q14 -0.322*** -0.357*** -0.298*** -0.203*** 0.002  0.292*** 0.094* 0.163*** 0.297*** 0.326*** 
Q15 -0.420*** -0.359*** -0.311*** -0.296*** 0.018  0.330*** 0.120** 0.162*** 0.326*** 0.257*** 
Q16 -0.406*** -0.413*** -0.348*** -0.369*** 0.034  0.277*** 0.139*** 0.181*** 0.334*** 0.287*** 
Q17 -0.347*** -0.321*** -0.234*** -0.268*** 0.037  0.210*** 0.051  0.020  0.224*** 0.181*** 
Q18 -0.351*** -0.354*** -0.240*** -0.291*** 0.057  0.288*** 0.173*** 0.106** 0.307*** 0.266*** 
Q19 -0.324*** -0.329*** -0.362*** -0.287*** 0.051  0.322*** 0.079* 0.125** 0.335*** 0.201*** 
Q20 -0.325*** -0.371*** -0.353*** -0.390*** 0.098** 0.279*** 0.108** 0.118** 0.285*** 0.151*** 
Q21 -0.300*** -0.299*** -0.286*** -0.247*** 0.009  0.274*** 0.081* 0.148*** 0.311*** 0.231*** 
Q22 -0.457*** -0.500*** -0.425*** -0.350*** 0.063  0.382*** 0.080* 0.126** 0.367*** 0.286*** 
Q23 -0.453*** -0.449*** -0.387*** -0.412*** 0.101** 0.426*** 0.123** 0.126** 0.425*** 0.253*** 
Q24 -0.383*** -0.367*** -0.198*** -0.455*** 0.036  0.328*** 0.112** 0.061  0.265*** 0.195*** 
Q25 -0.082* -0.011  -0.072* -0.095* 0.152*** 0.110** 0.192*** 0.198*** 0.164*** -0.018  
Q26 0.033  0.028  0.040  -0.026  0.169*** 0.030  0.144*** 0.202*** 0.102** -0.030  
Q27 0.088* 0.168*** 0.055  0.114** 0.174*** 0.073* 0.044  0.119** 0.161*** -0.111** 
Q28 0.005  -0.043  -0.065  -0.032  -0.133*** -0.128*** -0.194*** -0.101** -0.099** 0.027  
Q29 -0.145*** -0.195*** -0.164*** -0.140*** -0.179*** 0.020  -0.014  -0.087* 0.043  0.057  
Q30 -0.091* -0.111** -0.129*** 0.014  0.127** 0.283*** 0.293*** 0.198*** 0.331*** 0.057  
Q31 -0.485*** -0.374*** -0.345*** -0.372*** 0.236*** 0.504*** 0.282*** 0.269*** 0.565*** 0.167*** 
Q32 -0.436*** -0.404*** -0.275*** -0.337*** 0.258*** 0.491*** 0.274*** 0.213*** 0.529*** 0.200*** 
Q33 -0.399*** -0.399*** -0.298*** -0.272*** 0.229*** 0.483*** 0.263*** 0.288*** 0.570*** 0.177*** 
Q34 -0.443*** -0.391*** -0.314*** -0.313*** 0.236*** 0.488*** 0.239*** 0.245*** 0.533*** 0.202*** 
Q35 -0.402*** -0.358*** -0.292*** -0.242*** 0.249*** 0.440*** 0.216*** 0.220*** 0.496*** 0.129*** 
Q36 -0.442*** -0.378*** -0.330*** -0.337*** 0.206*** 0.486*** 0.243*** 0.206*** 0.535*** 0.219*** 
Q37 -0.478*** -0.438*** -0.344*** -0.383*** 0.236*** 0.538*** 0.251*** 0.215*** 0.589*** 0.180*** 
Q38 -0.456*** -0.392*** -0.337*** -0.376*** 0.216*** 0.520*** 0.254*** 0.229*** 0.564*** 0.176*** 
 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.5 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix 
  Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 
Q1                     
Q2                     
Q3                     
Q4                     
Q5                     
Q6                     
Q7                     
Q8                     
Q9                     
Q10                     
Q11                     
Q12 0.106**                   
Q13 0.399*** 0.169***                 
Q14 0.181*** 0.012  0.267***               
Q15 0.212*** -0.001  0.278*** 0.392***             
Q16 0.226*** 0.025  0.305*** 0.340*** 0.546***           
Q17 0.141*** -0.042  0.205*** 0.260*** 0.333*** 0.378***         
Q18 0.185*** 0.063  0.234*** 0.297*** 0.386*** 0.443*** 0.395***       
Q19 0.186*** 0.021  0.291*** 0.342*** 0.259*** 0.339*** 0.303*** 0.331***     
Q20 0.082* -0.004  0.204*** 0.314*** 0.308*** 0.377*** 0.272*** 0.323*** 0.350***   
Q21 0.179*** 0.010  0.233*** 0.291*** 0.250*** 0.305*** 0.281*** 0.258*** 0.514*** 0.277*** 
Q22 0.214*** -0.058  0.269*** 0.402*** 0.382*** 0.415*** 0.334*** 0.345*** 0.440*** 0.456*** 
Q23 0.287*** 0.056  0.307*** 0.375*** 0.438*** 0.447*** 0.396*** 0.368*** 0.451*** 0.467*** 
Q24 0.153*** 0.077* 0.210*** 0.253*** 0.348*** 0.387*** 0.299*** 0.319*** 0.292*** 0.397*** 
Q25 0.102** 0.049  0.184*** -0.012  0.044  0.126** 0.059  0.055  0.021  0.032  
Q26 0.091* -0.031  0.170*** -0.123** 0.038  0.050  -0.036  0.010  -0.060  0.003  
Q27 0.084* -0.019  0.149*** -0.090* -0.087* -0.069* -0.077* -0.073* -0.011  -0.067  
Q28 -0.111** -0.128*** -0.153*** 0.027  0.057  0.079* 0.067  0.022  0.049  0.101** 
Q29 0.016  -0.125** -0.060  0.181*** 0.156*** 0.129*** 0.168*** 0.157*** 0.142*** 0.105** 
Q30 0.272*** 0.126** 0.383*** 0.148*** 0.064  0.103** -0.022  0.148*** 0.148*** 0.102** 
Q31 0.399*** 0.155*** 0.508*** 0.242*** 0.337*** 0.339*** 0.270*** 0.303*** 0.276*** 0.363*** 
Q32 0.414*** 0.146*** 0.449*** 0.244*** 0.348*** 0.313*** 0.243*** 0.316*** 0.271*** 0.297*** 
Q33 0.401*** 0.113** 0.446*** 0.202*** 0.309*** 0.272*** 0.215*** 0.266*** 0.283*** 0.316*** 
Q34 0.372*** 0.106** 0.488*** 0.243*** 0.348*** 0.335*** 0.280*** 0.307*** 0.290*** 0.351*** 
Q35 0.367*** 0.091* 0.439*** 0.200*** 0.324*** 0.258*** 0.284*** 0.253*** 0.251*** 0.294*** 
Q36 0.371*** 0.087* 0.461*** 0.225*** 0.336*** 0.313*** 0.245*** 0.304*** 0.257*** 0.365*** 
Q37 0.398*** 0.135*** 0.490*** 0.224*** 0.347*** 0.372*** 0.281*** 0.338*** 0.312*** 0.349*** 
Q38 0.366*** 0.116** 0.481*** 0.279*** 0.373*** 0.396*** 0.291*** 0.345*** 0.283*** 0.380*** 
 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.5 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix 
  Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 Q27 Q28 Q29 Q30 
Q1                     
Q2                     
Q3                     
Q4                     
Q5                     
Q6                     
Q7                     
Q8                     
Q9                     
Q10                     
Q11                     
Q12                     
Q13                     
Q14                     
Q15                     
Q16                     
Q17                     
Q18                     
Q19                     
Q20                     
Q21                     
Q22 0.336***                   
Q23 0.432*** 0.559***                 
Q24 0.287*** 0.350*** 0.521***               
Q25 0.034  0.038  0.070* 0.057              
Q26 -0.051  -0.007  0.028  0.029  0.398***           
Q27 0.009  -0.153*** -0.053  -0.090* 0.221*** 0.311***         
Q28 -0.012  0.062  0.052  0.002  -0.091* -0.075* -0.106**       
Q29 0.128*** 0.195*** 0.113** 0.116** -0.047  -0.113** -0.170*** 0.143***     
Q30 0.131*** 0.126** 0.144*** -0.006  0.093* 0.092* 0.184*** -0.130*** -0.008    
Q31 0.281*** 0.369*** 0.456*** 0.347*** 0.179*** 0.158*** 0.056  -0.123** 0.072* 0.320*** 
Q32 0.261*** 0.386*** 0.439*** 0.308*** 0.148*** 0.167*** 0.009  -0.153*** 0.064  0.271*** 
Q33 0.260*** 0.328*** 0.358*** 0.233*** 0.103** 0.085* 0.057  -0.092* 0.044  0.297*** 
Q34 0.266*** 0.404*** 0.448*** 0.278*** 0.067  0.079* 0.060  -0.057  0.025  0.250*** 
Q35 0.182*** 0.339*** 0.373*** 0.226*** 0.096* 0.110** 0.047  -0.144*** 0.082* 0.281*** 
Q36 0.270*** 0.326*** 0.442*** 0.318*** 0.154*** 0.140*** 0.052  -0.053  0.109** 0.244*** 
Q37 0.302*** 0.393*** 0.443*** 0.333*** 0.126** 0.124** 0.068* -0.138*** 0.087* 0.301*** 
Q38 0.321*** 0.394*** 0.440*** 0.346*** 0.199*** 0.122** 0.070* -0.078* 0.135*** 0.271*** 
 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.5 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix 
  Q31 Q32 Q33 Q34 Q35 Q36 Q37 Q38 
Q1                 
Q2                 
Q3                 
Q4                 
Q5                 
Q6                 
Q7                 
Q8                 
Q9                 
Q10                 
Q11                 
Q12                 
Q13                 
Q14                 
Q15                 
Q16                 
Q17                 
Q18                 
Q19                 
Q20                 
Q21                 
Q22                 
Q23                 
Q24                 
Q25                 
Q26                 
Q27                 
Q28                 
Q29                 
Q30                 
Q31                 
Q32 0.724***               
Q33 0.714*** 0.688***             
Q34 0.721*** 0.673*** 0.733***           
Q35 0.680*** 0.663*** 0.704*** 0.708***         
Q36 0.735*** 0.687*** 0.671*** 0.675*** 0.637***       
Q37 0.776*** 0.717*** 0.683*** 0.710*** 0.671*** 0.759***     
Q38 0.737*** 0.665*** 0.657*** 0.670*** 0.640*** 0.702*** 0.768***   
 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Maximum Likelihood computation is widely accepted for EFA and is superior to the 
more-commonly-used Principal Components Analysis method (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, 
& Strahan, 1999).Promax rotation (Hendrickson & White, 1964) is a widely-used oblique factor 
rotation method that has generally been found to produce satisfactory results (Fabrigar et al., 
1999).  Orthogonal rotations are easier to interpret, but oblique rotations are methodologically 
superior because non-correlation between factors is generally an untenable assumption (Conway 
& Huffcutt, 2003; Fabrigar et al., 1999).  Promaxcan be conducted with a range of Kappa values, 
such that Kappa = 1 results in a Varimax (orthogonal) rotation, and higher values result in 
progressively more oblique rotations (Norusis, 2006).  Kappa values greater than four entail 
strong correlations between factors and are not recommended (Norusis, 2006).  I ran my analyses 
using Kappa = 2. 
The first factor analysis produced the results shown in Table 5.6.  Extraction produced 
seven factors, with high cross-loadings.  Several items also had alarmingly low communalities. 
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TABLE 5.6 
First Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
  Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Q1 .460 -.499 -.522 -.110 -.267 -.020 -.384 -.422 1 11.536 30.359 30.359 
Q2 .487 -.435 -.518 -.094 -.295 .038 -.345 -.564 2 3.369 8.865 39.224 
Q3 .384 -.352 -.407 -.121 -.349 -.045 -.180 -.626 3 1.708 4.494 43.718 
Q4 .399 -.349 -.387 -.048 -.180 -.074 -.625 -.386 4 1.481 3.897 47.615 
Q5 .196 .286 .030 .251 .106 .245 -.030 -.144 5 1.262 3.320 50.935 
Q6 .524 .576 .411 .501 .426 .107 .153 .144 6 1.125 2.961 53.896 
Q7 .343 .275 .156 .649 .035 .222 .047 .091 7 1.089 2.865 56.760 
Q8 .321 .259 .188 .548 .109 .304 -.059 .166 8 .986 2.595 59.356 
Q9 .571 .641 .413 .510 .427 .216 .094 .194 9 .948 2.495 61.850 
Q10 .244 .196 .423 .121 .211 -.068 .053 .140 10 .894 2.354 64.204 
Q11 .331 .458 .293 .364 .231 .125 .016 .093 11 .810 2.132 66.336 
Q12 .153 .133 -.004 .334 .000 -.034 .145 -.134 12 .800 2.104 68.441 
Q13 .513 .549 .374 .589 .326 .271 .002 .057 13 .784 2.063 70.504 
Q14 .352 .244 .542 .183 .344 -.095 .105 .288 14 .749 1.971 72.475 
Q15 .429 .363 .709 .135 .122 .074 .224 .264 15 .726 1.909 74.384 
Q16 .476 .338 .713 .155 .195 .153 .314 .318 16 .655 1.725 76.109 
Q17 .319 .286 .508 -.021 .238 .017 .261 .194 17 .631 1.660 77.769 
Q18 .349 .325 .562 .153 .216 .043 .269 .217 18 .604 1.591 79.359 
Q19 .426 .304 .431 .120 .625 -.003 .193 .282 19 .588 1.547 80.906 
Q20 .395 .368 .440 .049 .348 .064 .394 .345 20 .572 1.504 82.411 
Q21 .365 .292 .382 .109 .546 .020 .216 .215 21 .560 1.475 83.885 
Q22 .509 .405 .572 .083 .455 .003 .289 .449 22 .526 1.385 85.270 
Q23 .564 .469 .601 .115 .517 .081 .445 .276 23 .496 1.306 86.576 
Q24 .416 .313 .487 .073 .282 .055 .613 .140 24 .487 1.281 87.857 
Q25 .244 .144 .064 .221 -.014 .566 .088 .058 25 .463 1.220 89.077 
Q26 .302 .142 -.002 .141 -.100 .682 .017 -.056 26 .451 1.187 90.264 
Q27 .256 .085 -.147 .143 .125 .456 -.205 -.213 27 .443 1.165 91.429 
Q28 .153 -.132 .101 -.273 .013 -.098 .027 .133 28 .423 1.113 92.542 
Q29 .183 .073 .208 -.133 .059 -.138 .141 .281 29 .386 1.016 93.558 
Q30 .283 .337 .097 .421 .232 .161 -.134 .054 30 .348 .917 94.475 
Q31 .748 .867 .362 .328 .247 .243 .336 .258 31 .342 .899 95.375 
Q32 .672 .815 .377 .303 .215 .191 .285 .217 32 .317 .834 96.208 
Q33 .693 .832 .314 .319 .242 .134 .135 .264 33 .293 .770 96.978 
Q34 .696 .835 .396 .263 .271 .129 .194 .233 34 .268 .705 97.683 
Q35 .648 .808 .327 .241 .194 .145 .131 .223 35 .253 .667 98.350 
Q36 .688 .826 .358 .249 .234 .214 .308 .246 36 .232 .611 98.960 
Q37 .761 .868 .382 .295 .283 .204 .338 .260 37 .214 .563 99.523 
Q38 .697 .816 .423 .289 .265 .237 .330 .263 38 .181 .477 100.000 
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Accordingly, I eliminated items 5, 10, 12, 27, 28, 29, and 30 from the second factor 
analysis, because they had communalities of less than 0.3.  I suspected that these low 
communalities caused the ungainly factor structure in the first analysis.  Item 25 had a 
communality of 0.244, but I retained it because of its high face validity (“People here are 
expected to provide evidence to back up their claims”).  I also eliminated items 19 and 21 
because they loaded too heavily on a different factor than other items from the power dimension, 
and because they were quite similar to each other (“Powerful people here usually get their way 
on questions of ethics” and “Popular people here usually get their way on questions of ethics”), 
which caused me to suspect that they were disrupting other loadings.  The other parameters of 
the analysis were the same (Maximum Likelihood, and Promax rotation with Kappa = 2), and the 
results are shown in Table 5.7. 
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TABLE 5.7 
Second Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 4 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
Q1 0.457 -0.496 -0.631 -0.184 0.004 1 10.769 37.133 37.133 
Q2 0.477 -0.429 -0.651 -0.192 0.107 2 2.586 8.916 46.049 
Q3 0.354 -0.329 -0.526 -0.215 0.071 3 1.586 5.471 51.520 
Q4 0.375 -0.362 -0.579 -0.024 -0.175 4 1.281 4.416 55.936 
Q6 0.513 0.557 0.444 0.591 -0.002 5 0.985 3.396 59.332 
Q7 0.294 0.276 0.112 0.514 0.244 6 0.922 3.179 62.511 
Q8 0.309 0.247 0.129 0.542 0.203 7 0.861 2.968 65.478 
Q9 0.561 0.624 0.429 0.620 0.071 8 0.801 2.763 68.241 
Q11 0.300 0.445 0.250 0.422 0.050 9 0.726 2.504 70.745 
Q13 0.477 0.524 0.309 0.645 0.157 10 0.673 2.319 73.064 
Q14 0.311 0.219 0.517 0.316 -0.177 11 0.637 2.195 75.260 
Q15 0.413 0.354 0.605 0.275 -0.004 12 0.616 2.123 77.383 
Q16 0.467 0.323 0.665 0.256 0.107 13 0.594 2.049 79.431 
Q17 0.290 0.275 0.516 0.107 -0.025 14 0.545 1.878 81.309 
Q18 0.319 0.307 0.543 0.219 0.038 15 0.533 1.838 83.147 
Q20 0.373 0.354 0.580 0.116 0.024 16 0.499 1.719 84.866 
Q22 0.477 0.393 0.680 0.246 -0.121 17 0.485 1.672 86.538 
Q23 0.537 0.460 0.715 0.253 0.000 18 0.468 1.614 88.152 
Q24 0.407 0.320 0.603 0.104 0.133 19 0.452 1.557 89.710 
Q25 0.227 0.134 0.064 0.199 0.512 20 0.412 1.421 91.130 
Q26 0.232 0.120 -0.044 0.124 0.519 21 0.371 1.278 92.408 
Q31 0.743 0.869 0.465 0.341 0.235 22 0.361 1.246 93.654 
Q32 0.663 0.814 0.443 0.330 0.160 23 0.335 1.156 94.810 
Q33 0.689 0.829 0.365 0.382 0.024 24 0.305 1.053 95.863 
Q34 0.688 0.828 0.449 0.351 0.009 25 0.286 0.988 96.850 
Q35 0.630 0.797 0.364 0.315 0.027 26 0.266 0.916 97.767 
Q36 0.678 0.829 0.446 0.289 0.202 27 0.237 0.817 98.584 
Q37 0.756 0.869 0.490 0.318 0.187 28 0.223 0.769 99.353 
Q38 0.690 0.814 0.507 0.338 0.221 29 0.188 0.647 100.000 
 
 
For the third factor analysis, I eliminated items 6, 9, 13, and 38 because of their high 
cross-loadings on different factors from other items in their same expected dimensions 
(Participation for the first three, and Satisfaction for the last).  The results are shown in Table 
5.8. 
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TABLE 5.8 
Third Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 4 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
Q1 0.452 -0.492 -0.630 -0.075 -0.001 1 8.927 35.709 35.709 
Q2 0.476 -0.431 -0.652 0.034 -0.070 2 2.403 9.611 45.320 
Q3 0.350 -0.329 -0.527 0.020 -0.143 3 1.531 6.122 51.443 
Q4 0.359 -0.345 -0.569 -0.236 0.130 4 1.146 4.582 56.025 
Q7 0.261 0.290 0.125 0.323 0.388 5 0.978 3.914 59.939 
Q8 0.282 0.263 0.142 0.276 0.576 6 0.920 3.681 63.620 
Q11 0.249 0.455 0.260 0.144 0.149 7 0.829 3.317 66.937 
Q14 0.295 0.224 0.523 -0.113 0.216 8 0.773 3.092 70.029 
Q15 0.412 0.357 0.610 0.049 0.151 9 0.704 2.814 72.844 
Q16 0.455 0.320 0.668 0.140 0.115 10 0.654 2.616 75.460 
Q17 0.287 0.272 0.517 0.006 -0.020 11 0.628 2.511 77.971 
Q18 0.317 0.306 0.545 0.086 0.078 12 0.581 2.324 80.295 
Q20 0.370 0.347 0.577 0.073 0.002 13 0.557 2.230 82.524 
Q22 0.472 0.392 0.680 -0.036 0.089 14 0.514 2.055 84.579 
Q23 0.530 0.459 0.717 0.120 -0.017 15 0.497 1.989 86.568 
Q24 0.397 0.307 0.601 0.241 -0.165 16 0.484 1.935 88.503 
Q25 0.210 0.128 0.063 0.479 0.083 17 0.456 1.825 90.328 
Q26 0.221 0.121 -0.041 0.482 0.042 18 0.430 1.720 92.048 
Q31 0.734 0.864 0.467 0.326 0.050 19 0.373 1.491 93.539 
Q32 0.662 0.817 0.447 0.252 0.066 20 0.351 1.404 94.943 
Q33 0.681 0.841 0.368 0.091 0.227 21 0.295 1.181 96.123 
Q34 0.684 0.836 0.454 0.079 0.157 22 0.287 1.148 97.271 
Q35 0.627 0.805 0.369 0.073 0.156 23 0.247 0.989 98.260 
Q36 0.673 0.824 0.447 0.291 -0.012 24 0.237 0.947 99.207 
Q37 0.728 0.857 0.490 0.278 -0.010 25 0.198 0.793 100.000 
 
 
For the fourth factor analysis, I eliminated item 7 (“People here ask coworkers for advice 
about moral problems”), because it combined low communality with high cross-loadings.  The 
results are shown in Table 5.9. 
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TABLE 5.9 
Fourth Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 4 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
Q1 0.451 -0.493 -0.608 -0.024 -0.329 1 8.849 36.873 36.873 
Q2 0.474 -0.432 -0.645 0.041 -0.259 2 2.327 9.697 46.570 
Q3 0.350 -0.334 -0.537 -0.016 -0.145 3 1.436 5.984 52.554 
Q4 0.356 -0.338 -0.495 -0.085 -0.512 4 1.072 4.466 57.021 
Q8 0.173 0.283 0.183 0.317 -0.058 5 0.977 4.071 61.092 
Q11 0.247 0.462 0.265 0.145 0.102 6 0.845 3.522 64.613 
Q14 0.295 0.234 0.563 -0.057 0.037 7 0.812 3.381 67.994 
Q15 0.396 0.360 0.621 0.092 0.165 8 0.742 3.091 71.085 
Q16 0.453 0.326 0.677 0.176 0.235 9 0.674 2.809 73.894 
Q17 0.286 0.272 0.511 0.008 0.212 10 0.653 2.719 76.613 
Q18 0.311 0.309 0.545 0.082 0.208 11 0.625 2.603 79.215 
Q20 0.375 0.347 0.552 0.018 0.330 12 0.580 2.416 81.632 
Q22 0.471 0.396 0.681 -0.014 0.239 13 0.535 2.231 83.862 
Q23 0.532 0.459 0.680 0.061 0.425 14 0.507 2.114 85.976 
Q24 0.396 0.299 0.526 0.074 0.562 15 0.479 1.997 87.974 
Q25 0.204 0.134 0.046 0.609 0.118 16 0.458 1.909 89.882 
Q26 0.218 0.128 -0.063 0.621 0.099 17 0.437 1.819 91.701 
Q31 0.734 0.864 0.412 0.233 0.408 18 0.372 1.550 93.252 
Q32 0.661 0.818 0.409 0.197 0.328 19 0.352 1.466 94.718 
Q33 0.683 0.845 0.363 0.109 0.162 20 0.297 1.236 95.954 
Q34 0.684 0.839 0.439 0.074 0.227 21 0.287 1.198 97.152 
Q35 0.627 0.808 0.363 0.106 0.155 22 0.248 1.033 98.184 
Q36 0.673 0.822 0.387 0.184 0.411 23 0.237 0.989 99.174 
Q37 0.728 0.854 0.430 0.162 0.425 24 0.198 0.826 100.000 
 
 
For the fifth factor analysis, in an attempt to simplify the factor structure (and particularly 
to get clean loadings for contention and moral satisfaction, which ought to be separate from 
moral openness) I eliminated six items: 4 (“The decisions we make here are morally 
controversial”), 23 (“People here trade favors to win support for their arguments”), 24 
(“Disagreements about ethics here often involve threats”), 31 (“I believe that my group’s moral 
decisions are fair”), 36 (“My group makes good moral decisions”), and 37 (“My group makes 
respectable moral decisions”).  Each of these were eliminated because of their high cross-
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loadings.  This succeeded in producing a three-factor solution, albeit one with stubbornly high 
cross-loadings.  The results are shown in Table 5.10. 
 
TABLE 5.10 
Fifth Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
Q1 0.421 -0.630 -0.471 0.006 1 6.100 33.890 33.890 
Q2 0.447 -0.655 -0.433 0.057 2 1.870 10.392 44.282 
Q3 0.329 -0.555 -0.316 0.010 3 1.380 7.667 51.949 
Q8 0.164 0.166 0.286 0.284 5 0.974 5.410 57.359 
Q11 0.234 0.267 0.458 0.130 6 0.903 5.016 62.375 
Q14 0.284 0.551 0.230 -0.081 7 0.837 4.650 67.024 
Q15 0.384 0.620 0.354 0.077 8 0.690 3.834 70.859 
Q16 0.442 0.694 0.302 0.160 9 0.674 3.746 74.605 
Q17 0.269 0.514 0.266 0.000 10 0.645 3.585 78.189 
Q18 0.309 0.567 0.292 0.072 11 0.598 3.321 81.511 
Q20 0.314 0.541 0.333 -0.005 12 0.575 3.193 84.704 
Q22 0.431 0.669 0.398 -0.020 13 0.529 2.937 87.640 
Q25 0.192 0.064 0.109 0.575 16 0.476 2.647 90.288 
Q26 0.215 -0.052 0.112 0.668 17 0.463 2.571 92.859 
Q32 0.603 0.438 0.795 0.173 19 0.421 2.338 95.197 
Q33 0.658 0.378 0.863 0.080 20 0.322 1.787 96.983 
Q34 0.651 0.453 0.842 0.052 21 0.297 1.648 98.631 
Q35 0.604 0.382 0.817 0.098 22 0.246 1.369 100.000 
 
 
For the sixth factor analysis, I eliminated item 8 (“People here ask supervisors for advice 
about moral problems”) because of its low communality (0.164).  This resulted in another three-
factor solution; however, simple structure was not yet achieved.  Note particularly that the two 
remaining logic items (25 and 26) are the only two which load simply on factor 3, the four 
remaining satisfaction items (32-35) and the three remaining contention items (1-3) load heavily 
on factor 2 but cross-load on factor 1, and everything but items 11, 25, and 26 load on factor 1.  
The results are shown in Table 5.11. 
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TABLE 5.11 
Sixth Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
Q1 0.421 -0.629 -0.473 -0.001 1 6.019 35.407 35.407 
Q2 0.445 -0.654 -0.434 0.051 2 1.809 10.639 46.046 
Q3 0.326 -0.554 -0.315 0.023 3 1.339 7.878 53.923 
Q11 0.232 0.265 0.459 0.130 4 0.941 5.534 59.458 
Q14 0.274 0.551 0.228 -0.103 5 0.857 5.040 64.497 
Q15 0.383 0.620 0.355 0.074 6 0.756 4.446 68.943 
Q16 0.440 0.694 0.305 0.151 7 0.675 3.968 72.911 
Q17 0.264 0.514 0.269 0.017 8 0.650 3.822 76.733 
Q18 0.309 0.568 0.295 0.077 9 0.603 3.548 80.280 
Q20 0.314 0.540 0.334 0.000 10 0.578 3.402 83.682 
Q22 0.431 0.668 0.399 -0.013 11 0.539 3.172 86.854 
Q25 0.182 0.067 0.115 0.548 12 0.476 2.803 89.657 
Q26 0.200 -0.050 0.119 0.695 13 0.463 2.724 92.381 
Q32 0.602 0.436 0.798 0.197 14 0.423 2.489 94.870 
Q33 0.651 0.375 0.860 0.086 15 0.324 1.906 96.775 
Q34 0.651 0.450 0.842 0.070 16 0.300 1.763 98.538 
Q35 0.604 0.379 0.819 0.121 17 0.248 1.462 100.000 
 
 
For the seventh factor analysis, I therefore reintroduced item 27 from the logic subscale 
(“People who discuss ethics expect others to challenge the reasons they give for their position”), 
in the hope that a stronger third factor for moral openness climate might emerge.  The results are 
shown in Table 5.12; as hoped, the item loaded with the other logic items. 
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TABLE 5.12 
Seventh Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
Q1 0.419 -0.630 -0.467 0.018 1 6.035 33.525 33.525 
Q2 0.455 -0.658 -0.426 0.080 2 1.993 11.071 44.596 
Q3 0.329 -0.551 -0.314 0.037 3 1.405 7.805 52.401 
Q11 0.234 0.265 0.455 0.141 4 0.943 5.239 57.640 
Q14 0.277 0.545 0.228 -0.118 5 0.848 4.711 62.351 
Q15 0.388 0.623 0.347 0.051 6 0.819 4.548 66.900 
Q16 0.442 0.698 0.301 0.111 7 0.732 4.067 70.967 
Q17 0.266 0.514 0.270 -0.012 8 0.670 3.723 74.691 
Q18 0.309 0.569 0.291 0.047 9 0.646 3.590 78.280 
Q20 0.314 0.540 0.339 -0.020 10 0.601 3.337 81.618 
Q22 0.436 0.669 0.395 -0.046 11 0.578 3.213 84.831 
Q25 0.202 0.080 0.105 0.551 12 0.527 2.928 87.759 
Q26 0.256 -0.034 0.121 0.722 13 0.465 2.583 90.341 
Q27 0.168 -0.181 0.070 0.406 14 0.460 2.554 92.895 
Q32 0.603 0.442 0.792 0.185 15 0.413 2.293 95.188 
Q33 0.650 0.374 0.860 0.101 16 0.319 1.773 96.961 
Q34 0.654 0.446 0.844 0.084 17 0.298 1.656 98.617 
Q35 0.604 0.379 0.818 0.129 18 0.249 1.383 100.000 
 
 
For the eighth factor analysis, I eliminated Q11 (“Moral decision-making includes 
everyone who would be affected”), because it had the lowest communality among the items that 
loaded on factors 1 and 2, and I hoped that eliminating an item with a low communality would 
increase the simplicity of the factor structure.  The results are shown in Table 5.13.  
Unfortunately, this did not produce a simple structure; cross-loadings remained high between 
factors 1 and 2. 
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TABLE 5.13 
Eighth Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
Q1 0.419 -0.632 -0.464 0.009 1 5.848 34.398 34.398 
Q2 0.453 -0.659 -0.423 0.067 2 1.928 11.340 45.738 
Q3 0.327 -0.550 -0.312 0.031 3 1.394 8.201 53.938 
Q14 0.273 0.544 0.223 -0.114 4 0.936 5.508 59.446 
Q15 0.388 0.624 0.344 0.058 5 0.819 4.819 64.265 
Q16 0.438 0.697 0.295 0.114 6 0.738 4.340 68.606 
Q17 0.265 0.514 0.269 -0.007 7 0.726 4.272 72.877 
Q18 0.309 0.570 0.288 0.052 8 0.665 3.912 76.790 
Q20 0.300 0.543 0.343 -0.004 9 0.608 3.578 80.368 
Q22 0.436 0.671 0.393 -0.034 10 0.590 3.472 83.840 
Q25 0.201 0.081 0.099 0.543 11 0.527 3.100 86.940 
Q26 0.257 -0.031 0.115 0.736 12 0.470 2.762 89.702 
Q27 0.164 -0.179 0.065 0.402 13 0.465 2.737 92.439 
Q32 0.595 0.449 0.787 0.203 14 0.415 2.440 94.878 
Q33 0.645 0.382 0.859 0.122 15 0.321 1.891 96.769 
Q34 0.654 0.453 0.846 0.106 16 0.300 1.764 98.533 
Q35 0.602 0.386 0.819 0.151 17 0.249 1.467 100.000 
 
 
For the ninth factor analysis, therefore, I eliminated all three items for contention.  
Although I hesitated to do so because of the place of contention in my theory, it became clear 
over the course of this analysis that contention would not have discriminant validity from moral 
openness climate or moral satisfaction, and incorporating such a confound into subsequent 
analyses would detract from them.  The results are shown in Table 5.14.  Moral satisfaction 
items loaded strongly on factor 1, and logic items loaded strongly on factor 3, while other moral 
openness climate items loaded relatively strongly on factor 2 with weaker but still meaningful 
cross-loadings. 
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TABLE 5.14 
Ninth Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
Q14 0.261 0.217 0.535 -0.121 1 4.729 33.780 33.780 
Q15 0.380 0.341 0.658 0.050 2 1.879 13.424 47.204 
Q16 0.426 0.296 0.737 0.108 3 1.385 9.896 57.100 
Q17 0.256 0.277 0.521 -0.011 4 0.822 5.868 62.969 
Q18 0.303 0.294 0.592 0.050 5 0.793 5.664 68.632 
Q20 0.293 0.351 0.532 -0.004 6 0.732 5.226 73.858 
Q22 0.389 0.398 0.620 -0.027 7 0.673 4.808 78.666 
Q25 0.190 0.100 0.079 0.538 8 0.608 4.346 83.012 
Q26 0.247 0.125 -0.011 0.751 9 0.569 4.068 87.080 
Q27 0.149 0.060 -0.157 0.390 10 0.499 3.561 90.641 
Q32 0.588 0.788 0.417 0.216 11 0.428 3.055 93.696 
Q33 0.637 0.855 0.350 0.133 12 0.325 2.320 96.015 
Q34 0.649 0.849 0.423 0.117 13 0.299 2.132 98.148 
Q35 0.603 0.822 0.360 0.157 14 0.259 1.852 100.000 
 
 
For the tenth factor analysis of Study 3, I eliminated the logic items (25-27) because logic 
consistently appeared as a separate factor in these analyses.  This resulted in a two-factor 
solution with high cross-loadings; eliminating the logic items from moral openness climate did 
not seem to simplify the factor structure.  The results are shown in Table 5.15. 
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TABLE 5.15 
Tenth Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Communalities 
Structure 
Matrix 
Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
Q14 0.238 0.221 0.529 1 4.687 42.605 42.605 
Q15 0.374 0.350 0.654 2 1.621 14.734 57.339 
Q16 0.417 0.308 0.729 3 0.825 7.501 64.841 
Q17 0.253 0.280 0.525 4 0.739 6.717 71.557 
Q18 0.305 0.302 0.595 5 0.655 5.952 77.509 
Q20 0.293 0.345 0.542 6 0.607 5.518 83.027 
Q22 0.380 0.400 0.622 7 0.521 4.738 87.765 
Q32 0.575 0.790 0.408 8 0.442 4.016 91.781 
Q33 0.633 0.855 0.337 9 0.339 3.077 94.859 
Q34 0.644 0.849 0.419 10 0.304 2.765 97.624 
Q35 0.600 0.822 0.354 11 0.261 2.376 100.000 
 
 
For the eleventh and twelfth factor analyses of Study 3, I duplicated the item sets of 
analyses nine and ten, respectively, but instead of using Promax factor rotation with Kappa = 2, I 
used a Varimax factor rotation, which is intended to produce an orthogonal result.  Orthogonal 
factor rotations are more likely to produce a simple factor structure, but are generally not 
recommended for psychological or organizational research because non-correlation between 
factors is generally an untenable assumption (Conway & Huffcutt, 2003; Fabrigar et al., 1999).  
Nonetheless, it is useful to examine the outcomes of orthogonal rotations, and these results are 
reported in Tables 5.16 and 5.17, respectively; note the lack of cross-loadings. 
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TABLE 5.16 
Eleventh Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
Q14 0.261 0.150 0.503 -0.130 1 4.729 33.780 33.780 
Q15 0.380 0.248 0.608 0.032 2 1.879 13.424 47.204 
Q16 0.426 0.182 0.710 0.100 3 1.385 9.896 57.100 
Q17 0.256 0.208 0.476 -0.027 4 0.822 5.868 62.969 
Q18 0.303 0.209 0.551 0.036 5 0.793 5.664 68.632 
Q20 0.293 0.284 0.466 -0.029 6 0.732 5.226 73.858 
Q22 0.389 0.320 0.545 -0.055 7 0.673 4.808 78.666 
Q25 0.190 0.052 0.086 0.536 8 0.608 4.346 83.012 
Q26 0.247 0.078 -0.007 0.745 9 0.569 4.068 87.080 
Q27 0.149 0.060 -0.165 0.382 10 0.499 3.561 90.641 
Q32 0.588 0.752 0.220 0.132 11 0.428 3.055 93.696 
Q33 0.637 0.840 0.122 0.036 12 0.325 2.320 96.015 
Q34 0.649 0.823 0.202 0.024 13 0.299 2.132 98.148 
Q35 0.603 0.802 0.145 0.065 14 0.259 1.852 100.000 
 
 
TABLE 5.17 
Twelfth Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Communalities 
Structure 
Matrix 
Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
Q14 0.238 0.146 0.501 1 4.687 42.605 42.605 
Q15 0.374 0.261 0.594 2 1.621 14.734 57.339 
Q16 0.417 0.205 0.689 3 0.825 7.501 64.841 
Q17 0.253 0.209 0.477 4 0.739 6.717 71.557 
Q18 0.305 0.220 0.546 5 0.655 5.952 77.509 
Q20 0.293 0.274 0.474 6 0.607 5.518 83.027 
Q22 0.380 0.319 0.543 7 0.521 4.738 87.765 
Q32 0.575 0.766 0.185 8 0.442 4.016 91.781 
Q33 0.633 0.845 0.086 9 0.339 3.077 94.859 
Q34 0.644 0.826 0.176 10 0.304 2.765 97.624 
Q35 0.600 0.808 0.115 11 0.261 2.376 100.000 
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Reliability analysis was then conducted for four scales: moral openness climate, moral 
openness climate less logic, logic, and moral satisfaction.  Moral openness climate was 
comprised of items 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, and 27, and had a Cronbach’s Alpha of 
0.704.  Moral openness climate less logicwas comprised of items 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, and 22, 
and had a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.801.  Moral satisfaction was comprised of items 32, 33, 34, and 
35, and had a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.898.  Logic was comprised of items 25, 26, and 27, and had 
a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.57. 
Overall, I decided to use the complete moral openness climate scale for the Study 4 
survey, incorporating what remained of the subscales for participation, closure, power, and logic.  
Doing so enabled subsequent analysis of derivative versions of moral openness climate in Study 
Four.  Moral satisfaction had superb reliability, indicating its readiness for use in Study 4.  
Unfortunately, contention did not emerge from Study 3 as a reliable construct in its own right, 
but rather lacked discriminant validity from both moral openness climate and moral satisfaction.  
This made subsequent analyses incorporating contention as a scale of its own impossible. 
 
Study Four: Assessment of Construct Validity Using Field Data 
 
The fourth study attempted to ascertain the construct validity of moral openness climate.  
Using data collected through both online and paper surveys, I measured the sharedness of moral 
openness climate perceptions using standard measures of aggregation that are typical for climate 
research: Rwg(j) (James et al., 1984), One-way ANOVA (Kenny & Judd, 1986), and ICC(1) and 
ICC(2) (Bliese, 2000).  I also ran another factor analysis to assess the expected unidimensionality 
of moral openness climate, and a separate factor analysis to establish its discriminant validity 
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from other similar but conceptually distinct scales: respectful interaction (Vogus, 2004), and 
participatory decision-making (Arnold et al., 2000).  I next ran regressions to test whether the 
machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) of a work group’s manager predicted moral openness 
climate.  I also ran regression analyses to establish its criterion validity with respect to other 
scales with which moral openness climatecould be expected to be related: collective moral 
character and collective moral motivation (Arnaud, 2006), and moral satisfaction.  Finally, I ran 
regressions to test whether the standard deviation of moral openness climate within a work group 
(as a proxy for contention) predicted moral satisfaction or moderated the relationship between 
moral openness climate and moral satisfaction. 
Because the eLab panel was used for the prior two studies, it was important to return to 
the field to assess construct validity, especially since moral openness climate’s nature as a 
climate construct requires that it be assessed as a shared perception within work groups rather 
than as the independent perceptions of dissociated individuals.  I used three surveys to gather 
information on moral openness climate and its related scales: an initial survey that was sent to 
work group members in participating organizations, which incorporated all of the scales listed 
above except moral satisfaction; a manager survey that was sent at the same time as the initial 
survey and incorporated machiavellianism items; and a followup survey which only incorporated 
moral satisfaction items, and that was sent to work group members in participating organizations 
three weeks after the initial survey.  I sent the followup survey to introduce temporal separation 
and thereby control common method bias: Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff 
(2003)state "[I]f the predictor and criterion variables can be measured from different sources, we 
recommend that this be done.  Additional statistical remedies could be used but in our view are 
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probably unnecessary in these instances." (Podsakoff et al., 2003: 897).  The three surveys are 
shown in Appendices L-N. 
 
Sample sizes and response rates 
I solicited a grand total of 73 organizations, with 24 agreeing to participate, for a 33% 
response rate.  Participating organizations included retail banks in Tennessee, Michigan, and 
New Jersey; a commercial bank in Georgia; CPA firms in Georgia and California; an 
architecture firm in Georgia; a software company in North Carolina; a commercial real estate 
appraisal firm in Georgia; a roofer in Michigan; an electrical engineering and contracting firm in 
Michigan; a legal document production and management company in Michigan; a furniture 
manufacturer in Michigan; an automotive aftermarket parts manufacturer in Michigan; and 
dentists in Georgia, Illinois, and Michigan.   
Within those 24 organizations, I surveyed 56 groups, of which 16 were usable (i.e. had a 
manager response and 33% staff response rates for both the initial and followup surveys), for a 
29% response rate.   
I sent out a total of 463 staff and 74 manager surveys; I got 196 usable initial staff 
surveys back (42%), and 148 usable followup staff surveys back (32%).  I got 37 usable manager 
surveys back (50%).  A survey was usable if the consent box was checked, if the respondent was 
over 18, and if the survey was substantially completed (i.e. with only occasional missing data).   
Finally, the subset of usable individual responses that occur within usable groups is 
smaller: 97 staff for the initial survey (23%), 98 staff for the followup survey (also 23%), and 19 
managers (or 26%), (three of whom were managers at the California accounting firm to whom 15 
employees reported collectively; I averaged their responses together for their group).   
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Descriptive statistics and correlations are shown in Tables 5.18-5.25. 
 
TABLE 5.18 
Descriptive Statistics for Initial Staff Survey 
  
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
  
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
MOC1 97 3.27 .99 CMM1 95 4.29 .74 
MOC2 97 3.04 1.00 CMM2 96 4.40 .76 
MOC3 97 2.91 1.02 CMM3 95 3.92 1.02 
MOC4 97 2.57 .92 CMM4 96 3.83 .93 
MOC5 97 2.39 1.03 CMM5 96 4.16 .82 
MOC6 97 2.20 1.11 CMM6 96 4.36 .71 
MOC7 97 2.40 1.11 CMM7 96 4.28 .84 
MOC8 95 2.45 .90 CMM8 96 4.21 .81 
MOC9 96 2.65 1.03 PDM1 96 1.92 .87 
MOC10 96 3.26 .81 PDM2 96 1.82 .58 
CMC1 97 1.77 .71 PDM3 93 2.02 .77 
CMC2 96 2.14 .88 PDM4 96 1.92 .78 
CMC3 96 2.32 1.01 PDM5 94 2.23 .84 
CMC4 96 2.27 1.03 PDM6 95 3.72 .96 
CMC5 95 2.24 .82 RI1 95 2.42 .89 
CMC6 96 1.78 .78 RI2 96 1.81 .76 
        RI3 96 1.99 .67 
        RI4 96 1.61 .70 
 
 
Staff respondents were 71.1% female.  Educational attainment included less than high 
school (6.2 %), a Diploma (23.7%), some college (11.3%), Bachelor’s degree (36.1%), and 
Graduate degree (22.7%).  Staff job typesincluded Clerical / Service (14.4%), Sales / Marketing 
(2.1%), Management (4.1%) and Professional / Technical (64.9%).  Modal job tenures were 1 
year (19.6%), 3 years (16.5%), and 4 and 5 years (7.2% each).  Their mean age was 41. 
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TABLE 5.19 
Correlation Matrix for Initial Staff Survey 
 
 
MOC1 MOC2 MOC3 MOC4 MOC5 MOC6 MOC7 MOC8 MOC9 MOC10 
MOC1 1 
 
 
 
           
 
   
MOC2 .246
*
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
MOC3 .220
*
 .655
**
 1 
 
     
 
       
MOC4 .170 .320
**
 .372
**
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
       
MOC5 .027 .237
*
 .105 .352
**
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
     
MOC6 .041 .218
*
 .189 .323
**
 .256
*
 1 
 
 
 
     
MOC7 .133 .356
**
 .399
**
 .438
**
 .378
**
 .232
*
 1       
MOC8 -.114 .194 .112 -.175 .269
*
 .233
*
 -.043 1 
 
   
MOC9 -.249
*
 .104 .119 -.017 .016 -.016 -.099 .347
**
 1 
 
 
MOC10 -.053 .071 -.009 -.097 .090 .065 -.117 .198 .290
**
 1 
CMC1 -.179 .145 .207
*
 .051 .136 -.080 .332
**
 .088 .172 -.028 
CMC2 -.161 .161 .187 .183 .377
**
 .263
*
 .228
*
 .207
*
 .294
**
 -.083 
CMC3 .065 .337
**
 .256
*
 .286
**
 .339
**
 .160 .418
**
 .135 .077 .051 
CMC4 .021 .235
*
 .046 .093 .228
*
 .064 .220
*
 .275
**
 .214
*
 .075 
CMC5 .064 .389
**
 .265
*
 .103 .184 .124 .195 .233
*
 .157 -.083 
CMC6 -.102 .168 .231
*
 .104 .318
**
 .141 .423
**
 .148 .256
*
 .173 
CMM1 -.006 -.284
**
 -.259
*
 -.324
**
 -.316
**
 -.083 -.562
**
 .032 -.012 .163 
CMM2 .112 -.303
**
 -.310
**
 -.277
**
 -.338
**
 -.110 -.473
**
 -.143 .019 .095 
CMM3 .030 -.219
*
 -.243
*
 -.298
**
 -.242
*
 -.031 -.413
**
 -.037 .045 .072 
CMM4 -.055 -.171 -.182 -.257
*
 -.220
*
 -.068 -.255
*
 .178 -.101 -.188 
CMM5 .059 -.147 -.203 -.310
**
 -.255
*
 .000 -.456
**
 .116 -.121 -.030 
CMM6 .074 -.244
*
 -.416
**
 -.257
*
 -.335
**
 -.180 -.426
**
 -.106 -.049 .041 
CMM7 .167 -.252
*
 -.257
*
 -.309
**
 -.371
**
 -.059 -.558
**
 -.010 -.093 -.018 
CMM8 .056 -.360
**
 -.416
**
 -.257
*
 -.225
*
 -.330
**
 -.376
**
 -.146 -.033 -.117 
PDM1 -.044 .174 .215
*
 .191 .323
**
 .044 .276
**
 .128 .199 .117 
PDM2 .020 .165 .225
*
 .090 .233
*
 .070 .160 .184 .185 .137 
PDM3 -.036 .188 .213
*
 .072 .373
**
 -.003 .285
**
 .174 .276
**
 .179 
PDM4 .038 .213
*
 .254
*
 .104 .256
*
 .109 .140 .209
*
 -.002 .066 
PDM5 -.068 .066 .133 .180 .257
*
 .071 .262
*
 .238
*
 .236
*
 .180 
PDM6 -.044 -.245
*
 -.178 -.211
*
 -.304
**
 -.113 -.303
**
 -.081 -.173 -.154 
RI1 .117 .180 .267
*
 .226
*
 .363
**
 .014 .390
**
 .229
*
 .142 .104 
RI2 -.130 .201 .199 .202 .375
**
 .113 .383
**
 .238
*
 .218
*
 .022 
RI3 .087 .167 .139 .235
*
 .195 .176 .395
**
 .210
*
 .144 -.048 
RI4 -.053 .185 .345
**
 .201 .399
**
 .142 .364
**
 .171 .170 .064 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.19 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix for Initial Staff Survey 
 
 
CMC1 CMC2 CMC3 CMC4 CMC5 CMC6 CMM1 CMM2 CMM3 CMM4 
MOC1                     
MOC2     
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
MOC3 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
MOC4     
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOC5   
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOC6   
 
                 
MOC7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOC8   
 
   
 
 
 
           
MOC9   
 
   
 
   
 
         
MOC10                     
CMC1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
CMC2 .246
*
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
CMC3 .286
**
 .268
*
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
CMC4 .309
**
 .243
*
 .504
**
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
CMC5 .357
**
 .291
**
 .312
**
 .380
**
 1 
 
         
CMC6 .400
**
 .358
**
 .376
**
 .332
**
 .301
**
 1 
 
 
 
     
CMM1 -.272
**
 -.199 -.394
**
 -.326
**
 -.165 -.338
**
 1 
 
 
 
   
CMM2 -.396
**
 -.215
*
 -.294
**
 -.256
*
 -.191 -.364
**
 .556
**
 1 
 
   
CMM3 -.180 -.274
**
 -.267
*
 -.132 -.184 -.171 .390
**
 .497
**
 1 
 
 
CMM4 -.051 -.062 -.170 .016 -.107 -.202 .182 .193 .440
**
 1 
CMM5 -.231
*
 -.167 -.375
**
 -.351
**
 -.128 -.357
**
 .496
**
 .491
**
 .408
**
 .465
**
 
CMM6 -.517
**
 -.278
**
 -.250
*
 -.072 -.188 -.548
**
 .455
**
 .695
**
 .436
**
 .381
**
 
CMM7 -.454
**
 -.250
*
 -.320
**
 -.260
*
 -.127 -.488
**
 .562
**
 .674
**
 .490
**
 .426
**
 
CMM8 -.133 -.144 -.082 -.159 -.195 -.293
**
 .166 .486
**
 .320
**
 .228
*
 
PDM1 .253
*
 .312
**
 .379
**
 .351
**
 .158 .330
**
 -.367
**
 -.294
**
 -.368
**
 -.340
**
 
PDM2 .237
*
 .143 .145 .086 .221
*
 .203 -.030 -.230
*
 -.412
**
 -.479
**
 
PDM3 .255
*
 .265
*
 .295
**
 .273
**
 .153 .428
**
 -.314
**
 -.256
*
 -.259
*
 -.354
**
 
PDM4 .233
*
 .170 .192 .271
**
 .328
**
 .141 -.092 -.316
**
 -.330
**
 -.264
*
 
PDM5 .205 .238
*
 .108 .146 .187 .315
**
 -.115 -.229
*
 -.441
**
 -.370
**
 
PDM6 -.174 -.062 -.136 -.066 -.048 -.168 .298
**
 .202 .298
**
 .400
**
 
RI1 .351
**
 .178 .297
**
 .250
*
 .144 .285
**
 -.345
**
 -.249
*
 -.186 -.240
*
 
RI2 .506
**
 .231
*
 .163 .365
**
 .161 .482
**
 -.341
**
 -.353
**
 -.363
**
 -.218
*
 
RI3 .360
**
 .309
**
 .258
*
 .424
**
 .292
**
 .322
**
 -.178 -.298
**
 -.347
**
 -.203 
RI4 .337
**
 .340
**
 .244
*
 .157 .119 .616
**
 -.287
**
 -.426
**
 -.286
**
 -.168 
* p < 
.05 
* p < 
.05 
** p < 
.01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.19 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix for Initial Staff Survey 
 
 
CMM5 CMM6 CMM7 CMM8 PDM1 PDM2 PDM3 PDM4 PDM5 PDM6 
MOC1                     
MOC2   
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
   
 
 
MOC3   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
MOC4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
MOC5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOC6       
 
             
MOC7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
MOC8               
 
 
 
   
MOC9             
 
   
 
   
MOC10                     
CMC1 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
CMC2   
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
CMC3 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
       
CMC4 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
     
CMC5           
 
   
 
     
CMC6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
   
CMM1 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
     
 
 
CMM2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
CMM3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMM4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMM5 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
CMM6 .425
**
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMM7 .686
**
 .707
**
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMM8 .333
**
 .499
**
 .398
**
 1   
 
   
 
 
 
   
PDM1 -.454
**
 -.322
**
 -.481
**
 -.195 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PDM2 -.190 -.399
**
 -.321
**
 -.247
*
 .516
**
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PDM3 -.450
**
 -.314
**
 -.398
**
 -.203 .728
**
 .472
**
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PDM4 -.200 -.349
**
 -.309
**
 -.340
**
 .597
**
 .699
**
 .404
**
 1 
 
 
 
 
PDM5 -.371
**
 -.320
**
 -.331
**
 -.359
**
 .355
**
 .577
**
 .389
**
 .445
**
 1 
 
 
PDM6 .349
**
 .232
*
 .385
**
 .107 -.509
**
 -.461
**
 -.483
**
 -.245
*
 -.374
**
 1 
RI1 -.191 -.274
**
 -.285
**
 -.156 .372
**
 .263
*
 .432
**
 .237
*
 .223
*
 -.358
**
 
RI2 -.284
**
 -.477
**
 -.513
**
 -.310
**
 .445
**
 .391
**
 .440
**
 .323
**
 .230
*
 -.395
**
 
RI3 -.294
**
 -.230
*
 -.256
*
 -.131 .398
**
 .293
**
 .301
**
 .275
**
 .228
*
 -.325
**
 
RI4 -.351
**
 -.628
**
 -.565
**
 -.405
**
 .345
**
 .402
**
 .384
**
 .311
**
 .275
**
 -.174 
* p < 
.05 
* p < 
.05 
** p < 
.01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.19 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix for Initial Staff Survey 
 
 
RI1 RI2 RI3 RI4 
MOC1         
MOC2         
MOC3 
 
     
 
 
MOC4 
 
   
 
   
MOC5 
 
 
 
   
 
 
MOC6         
MOC7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOC8 
 
 
 
 
 
   
MOC9   
 
     
MOC10         
CMC1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMC2   
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMC3 
 
   
 
 
 
 
CMC4 
 
 
 
 
 
   
CMC5     
 
   
CMC6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMM1 
 
 
 
   
 
 
CMM2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMM3   
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMM4 
 
 
 
     
CMM5   
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMM6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMM7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMM8   
 
   
 
 
PDM1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PDM2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PDM3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PDM4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PDM5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PDM6 
 
 
 
 
 
   
RI1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RI2 .591
**
 1 
 
 
 
 
RI3 .373
**
 .527
**
 1 
 
 
RI4 .251
*
 .566
**
 .257
*
 1 
* p < 
.05 
* p < 
.05 
** p < 
.01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.20 
Correlation Matrix for All Survey Scales Included in the Initial Staff Survey 
 
 
MO MO-LL StDevMOC-
LL 
StDevMOC CMC CMM PDM RI 
MO 1 .964
**
 -.068 -.070 .429
**
 .344
**
 .165 .425
**
 
MO-LL .964
**
 1 -.085 -.076 .413
**
 .410
**
 .139 .412
**
 
StDevMOC-
LL 
-.068 -.085 1 .842
**
 -.199 -.150 -.140 -.185 
StDevMOC -.070 -.076 .842
**
 1 -.279
**
 -.159 -.169 -.223
*
 
CMC .429
**
 .413
**
 -.199 -.279
**
 1 .422
**
 .442
**
 .574
**
 
CMM .344
**
 .410
**
 -.150 -.159 .422
**
 1 .456
**
 .512
**
 
PDM .165 .139 -.140 -.169 .442
**
 .456
**
 1 .467
**
 
RI .425
**
 .412
**
 -.185 -.223
*
 .574
**
 .512
**
 .467
**
 1 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 
        
 
TABLE 5.21 
 
TABLE 5.22 
Descriptive Statistics for Followup Survey 
 
Correlation Matrix for Followup Survey 
  
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
 
 
QSat1 QSat2 QSat3 QSat4 
QSat1 98 1.90 .82 
 
QSat1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QSat2 98 1.84 .80 
 
QSat2 .766
**
 1 
 
 
 
 
QSat3 98 1.91 .83 
 
QSat3 .794
**
 .903
**
 1 
 
 
QSat4 98 2.14 .86 
 
QSat4 .606
**
 .726
**
 .700
**
 1 
     
* p < 
.05 
** p < 
.01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.23 
Descriptive Statistics for Managers 
  
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
  
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
MOC1 16 2.72 1.00 RI1 16 2.42 .80 
MOC2 16 2.53 .81 RI2 16 1.63 .62 
MOC3 16 2.31 .70 RI3 16 2.28 .82 
MOC4 16 2.59 .88 RI4 16 1.48 .62 
MOC5 16 2.28 .58 Mach1 16 3.96 .93 
MOC6 16 1.93 1.05 Mach2 16 3.92 .77 
MOC7 16 2.41 1.11 Mach3 16 3.29 .93 
MOC8 16 2.53 .76 Mach4 16 3.71 1.09 
MOC9 16 2.60 1.04 Mach5 16 3.71 .78 
MOC10 16 3.03 .78 Mach6 16 2.02 1.01 
CMC1 16 1.73 .44 Mach7 15 3.43 1.27 
CMC2 16 2.16 .51 Mach8 16 4.03 .59 
CMC3 16 1.92 .45 Mach9 16 4.44 .51 
CMC4 16 2.25 .86 Mach10 16 3.98 .52 
CMC5 16 2.29 .62 Mach11 15 3.09 .67 
CMC6 16 1.48 .50 Mach12 16 3.71 .96 
CMM1 16 4.73 .44 Mach13 16 3.94 .85 
CMM2 16 4.39 .79 Mach14 16 2.78 .80 
CMM3 16 4.43 .60 Mach15 16 3.40 .49 
CMM4 16 3.77 .79 Mach16 16 3.23 1.11 
CMM5 16 4.15 .50 Mach17 16 2.80 .73 
CMM6 16 4.42 .61 Mach18 16 3.98 .70 
CMM7 16 4.51 .48 
    CMM8 16 4.23 .66 
     
 
 
 Manager respondents were 40% female.  Educational attainment included a Diploma 
(12.5%), some college / Associate’s degree (20%), a Bachelor’s degree (6.7%), and a Graduate 
degree (60%).  Their mean age was 51. 
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TABLE 5.24 
Correlation Matrix for All Survey Scales Included in the Manager Survey 
 
 MO MO-LL CMC CMM RI MachIV Honesty Optimism 
MO 1 .932
**
 .362 .779
**
 .566
*
 -.154 .109 .167 
MO-LL .932
**
 1 .384 .760
**
 .490 -.305 .091 -.013 
CMC .362 .384 1 .610
*
 .499
*
 -.021 -.009 .114 
CMM .779
**
 .760
**
 .610
*
 1 .574
*
 -.244 -.049 .259 
RI .566
*
 .490 .499
*
 .574
*
 1 -.227 -.109 .098 
MachIV -.154 -.305 -.021 -.244 -.227 1 .707
**
 .503
*
 
Honesty .109 .091 -.009 -.049 -.109 .707
**
 1 .237 
Optimism .167 -.013 .114 .259 .098 .503
*
 .237 1 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 
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TABLE 5.25 
Correlation Matrix for Manager Survey 
 
 
MOC1 MOC2 MOC3 MOC4 MOC5 MOC6 MOC7 MOC8 MOC9 MOC10 
MOC1 1   
 
               
MOC2 .283 1                 
MOC3 .626
*
 .123 1               
MOC4 -.145 .339 .280 1   
 
         
MOC5 .197 .293 .480 .323 1           
MOC6 -.228 .232 .100 .667
**
 .091 1         
MOC7 -.036 .319 .000 .147 .167 .394 1       
MOC8 .067 .056 .227 -.373 .187 -.202 .254 1   
 
 
MOC9 -.030 -.244 .399 -.068 .324 .088 -.054 .486 1 
 
 
MOC10 .017 -.113 .150 -.409 -.173 -.154 -.043 .544
*
 .579
*
 1 
CMC1 -.411 .224 .035 .131 .347 .325 .461 .432 .208 -.030 
CMC2 .619
*
 .497 .453 -.051 .346 .100 .314 .235 -.038 -.030 
CMC3 .355 .313 .298 .146 .366 .322 .095 .084 .122 -.412 
CMC4 .322 .294 -.008 -.319 .109 -.226 -.074 .076 .077 -.197 
CMC5 .311 .663
**
 .004 .023 .475 -.137 -.036 -.137 -.205 -.210 
CMC6 .147 -.145 .452 .044 .363 .153 .286 .072 .337 -.052 
CMM1 -.411 -.352 -.190 .131 -.187 -.273 -.558
*
 -.382 -.106 -.236 
CMM2 -.297 -.688
**
 -.175 -.202 -.651
**
 .031 -.234 -.174 -.077 .224 
CMM3 -.079 -.671
**
 -.093 -.059 -.500 -.269 -.345 -.187 -.011 -.163 
CMM4 .106 -.355 -.087 -.300 -.557
*
 -.492 -.067 -.031 -.246 -.080 
CMM5 .008 -.531
*
 -.318 -.382 -.630
*
 -.417 -.021 -.176 -.316 -.166 
CMM6 -.028 -.470 -.084 -.400 -.039 -.425 -.463 -.306 .217 .256 
CMM7 -.116 -.419 .019 -.213 -.225 -.365 -.794
**
 -.123 .164 .383 
CMM8 -.264 -.575
*
 -.111 -.206 -.148 -.249 -.537
*
 -.260 .262 .155 
RI1 .042 .492 .151 .172 .147 .216 .053 .099 .291 .025 
RI2 -.061 .480 -.064 .038 .248 .366 .676
**
 .276 .120 .044 
RI3 .185 .052 .579
*
 .275 .201 .185 -.235 .405 .650
**
 .266 
RI4 .076 .437 -.007 .145 .135 .176 .332 .340 -.129 -.259 
* p < 
.05 
** p < 
.01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.25 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix for Manager Survey 
 
 
CMC1 CMC2 CMC3 CMC4 CMC5 CMC6 CMM1 CMM2 CMM3 CMM4 
MOC1   
 
                 
MOC2         
 
     
 
 
 
   
MOC3                     
MOC4                     
MOC5               
 
   
 
 
MOC6                     
MOC7             
 
       
MOC8                     
MOC9                     
MOC10                     
CMC1 1                   
CMC2 .218 1 
 
       
 
       
CMC3 .248 .656
**
 1               
CMC4 .028 .206 .412 1       
 
     
CMC5 .044 .422 .364 .268 1     
 
 
 
   
CMC6 .223 .380 .425 -.126 .035 1         
CMM1 -.049 -.688
**
 -.436 .028 -.215 -.411 1       
CMM2 -.145 -.276 -.341 -.545
*
 -.584
*
 -.063 .252 1     
CMM3 -.374 -.390 -.152 -.208 -.589
*
 .031 .413 .514 1 
 
 
CMM4 -.387 -.256 -.299 .179 -.486 -.228 .342 .316 .593
*
 1 
CMM5 -.439 -.366 -.270 -.097 -.380 .051 .172 .418 .733
**
 .715
**
 
CMM6 -.407 -.320 -.431 .196 -.115 -.017 .363 .144 .100 .152 
CMM7 -.377 -.549
*
 -.507 -.152 -.115 -.368 .604
*
 .412 .168 .118 
CMM8 -.351 -.720
**
 -.470 .160 -.336 -.162 .617
*
 .209 .215 .255 
RI1 .135 -.018 .257 .611
*
 .163 .084 -.057 -.637
*
 -.341 -.138 
RI2 .317 .324 .358 .204 .271 .377 -.683
**
 -.486 -.593
*
 -.289 
RI3 .056 .162 .441 -.019 -.084 .256 -.132 -.085 .141 -.131 
RI4 .250 .374 .605
*
 -.006 .355 .236 -.505 -.313 -.143 -.162 
* p < 
.05 
** p < 
.01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.25 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix for Manager Survey 
 
 
CMM5 CMM6 CMM7 CMM8 RI1 RI2 RI3 RI4 Mach1 Mach2 
MOC1                     
MOC2 
 
     
 
             
MOC3             
 
       
MOC4                     
MOC5 
 
                   
MOC6                     
MOC7     
 
 
 
   
 
         
MOC8                     
MOC9             
 
       
MOC10                     
CMC1                     
CMC2     
 
 
 
             
CMC3               
 
     
CMC4         
 
           
CMC5                     
CMC6                     
CMM1     
 
 
 
   
 
         
CMM2         
 
           
CMM3 
 
         
 
         
CMM4 
 
                   
CMM5 1                   
CMM6 .076 1 
 
 
 
       
 
     
CMM7 .031 .537
*
 1 
 
   
 
   
 
     
CMM8 .171 .789
**
 .717
**
 1       
 
     
RI1 -.304 -.010 -.133 .167 1           
RI2 -.233 -.318 -.615
*
 -.334 .503 1   
 
     
RI3 -.279 -.304 .105 -.104 .310 .040 1     
 
 
RI4 .007 -.822
**
 -.522
*
 -.682
**
 .143 .551
*
 .365 1     
* p < 
.05 
** p < 
.01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.25 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix for Manager Survey 
 
 MOC1 MOC2 MOC3 MOC4 MOC5 MOC6 MOC7 MOC8 MOC9 MOC10 
Mach1 .369 -.110 .489 -.254 -.065 -.237 -.297 .327 .364 .499 
Mach2 .011 .072 -.335 -.513 -.392 -.151 .383 .048 -.284 .227 
Mach3 -.169 -.076 -.534
*
 -.364 -.268 -.243 .081 .057 -.082 -.185 
Mach4 .407 -.051 .293 -.287 .366 -.497 -.449 .244 .207 .319 
Mach5 .293 -.260 .072 -.377 .117 -.245 -.380 .069 .306 .363 
Mach6 .497 .482 .378 .288 .333 -.035 .115 -.075 .139 -.176 
Mach7 -.286 -.308 .262 .544
*
 .172 .355 -.156 -.250 -.037 -.186 
Mach8 .165 -.158 -.160 -.280 -.242 -.052 -.060 -.245 -.268 -.299 
Mach9 -.230 -.427 -.120 -.204 -.071 -.146 .065 .018 -.196 .129 
Mach10 -.104 -.614
*
 -.171 -.411 -.201 -.222 .020 -.025 .299 .514
*
 
Mach11 .334 .172 .399 -.219 .108 -.255 .228 .353 .163 .560
*
 
Mach12 .481 .078 .385 -.035 .222 -.021 -.012 -.045 .137 .082 
Mach13 .117 .000 -.084 -.349 -.164 -.421 -.074 .007 .121 .049 
Mach14 -.079 .317 -.132 -.052 .338 -.270 -.040 .306 -.105 .185 
Mach15 .113 -.204 -.141 -.002 -.463 -.021 -.022 -.419 -.050 .040 
Mach16 .122 .204 .474 .092 .554
*
 -.203 -.019 .500 .527
*
 .501 
Mach17 -.690
**
 -.259 -.478 .233 -.100 .248 .030 .103 .032 -.105 
Mach18 .013 -.559
*
 .054 -.256 -.287 -.347 -.424 -.079 .260 -.006 
* p < 
.05 
** p < 
.01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.25 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix for Manager Survey 
 
 CMC1 CMC2 CMC3 CMC4 CMC5 CMC6 CMM1 CMM2 CMM3 CMM4 
Mach1 -.101 .041 -.211 .214 -.343 -.006 .070 -.020 .097 .110 
Mach2 .143 .038 -.387 .238 -.082 -.291 -.054 .138 -.235 .238 
Mach3 -.027 .056 .180 .514
*
 -.138 -.179 -.027 -.077 .225 .421 
Mach4 -.346 .338 .065 -.054 .316 .038 -.205 -.093 -.113 -.138 
Mach5 -.310 .178 -.060 .169 -.064 -.184 -.091 .063 -.003 -.129 
Mach6 -.253 .253 .331 .378 .350 .328 -.253 -.730
**
 -.040 -.019 
Mach7 .068 -.359 -.214 -.494 -.316 -.082 .443 .366 .052 -.039 
Mach8 -.425 -.041 .175 .461 -.151 .101 -.137 -.067 .060 .355 
Mach9 .125 -.135 -.548
*
 -.414 -.415 .000 .125 .371 .117 .000 
Mach10 -.288 -.238 -.547
*
 -.285 -.391 -.020 .004 .478 .223 .173 
Mach11 .143 .158 -.381 -.163 .156 -.008 -.092 .013 -.307 -.012 
Mach12 -.299 .287 .064 .307 -.092 .270 -.299 -.370 -.088 -.062 
Mach13 -.052 .103 -.016 .573
*
 -.100 .072 .127 -.218 .253 .359 
Mach14 .190 .305 -.059 -.302 .478 -.165 -.195 -.168 -.345 -.386 
Mach15 -.728
**
 -.291 -.171 -.112 -.156 .118 -.090 .188 .394 .402 
Mach16 .076 .067 -.134 -.193 .220 .286 -.203 -.432 -.294 -.337 
Mach17 .347 -.543
*
 -.206 -.381 -.282 -.391 .347 .253 .224 -.146 
Mach18 -.378 -.361 -.078 .283 -.504 .221 .327 .120 .659
**
 .502 
* p < 
.05 
** p < 
.01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.25 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix for Manager Survey 
 
 CMM5 CMM6 CMM7 CMM8 RI1 RI2 RI3 RI4 Mach1 Mach2 
Mach1 -.094 .359 .323 .298 .279 -.326 .230 -.484 1   
Mach2 .189 .186 -.108 .002 -.068 .066 -.699
**
 -.360 .168 1 
Mach3 .241 .130 -.360 -.024 .075 .175 -.188 .068 -.194 .198 
Mach4 -.266 .308 .323 .005 -.286 -.188 .257 -.040 .179 -.359 
Mach5 -.256 .594
*
 .258 .237 -.231 -.354 -.035 -.559
*
 .444 .089 
Mach6 -.036 -.063 -.366 -.157 .612
*
 .337 .315 .258 .134 -.318 
Mach7 -.183 -.026 .387 .303 -.290 -.348 .087 -.239 -.119 -.335 
Mach8 .354 .286 -.093 .349 .298 .267 -.247 -.016 .039 .101 
Mach9 .109 .320 .087 .129 -.513 -.356 -.553
*
 -.538
*
 .305 .387 
Mach10 .240 .622
*
 .256 .371 -.493 -.236 -.298 -.641
*
 .122 .343 
Mach11 -.088 .009 .202 -.111 -.134 -.078 -.051 -.190 .337 .443 
Mach12 -.150 .422 -.171 .145 .351 .090 -.028 -.354 .626
*
 .037 
Mach13 .181 .444 -.171 .146 .338 -.051 -.115 -.320 .428 .294 
Mach14 -.413 -.167 -.014 -.450 -.364 .014 -.021 .248 -.225 -.142 
Mach15 .592
*
 .194 .059 .242 .071 .122 .017 -.003 -.185 -.099 
Mach16 -.389 .045 .153 -.003 .250 .206 .465 .109 .309 -.392 
Mach17 .022 -.340 .069 -.009 -.297 -.213 -.012 .104 -.369 -.119 
Mach18 .499 .509 .238 .599
*
 .263 -.258 .177 -.317 .469 -.178 
* p < 
.05 
** p < 
.01 *** p < .001 
        
  
140 
 
TABLE 5.25 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix for Manager Survey 
 
 Mach3 Mach4 Mach5 Mach6 Mach7 Mach8 Mach9 Mach10 Mach11 Mach12 
Mach1                   
 
 
Mach2                     
Mach3 1       
 
       
 
   
Mach4 -.043 1 
 
               
Mach5 .203 .618
*
 1         
 
     
Mach6 .034 .053 -.135 1             
Mach7 -.532
*
 -.083 -.173 -.420 1           
Mach8 .383 -.095 .026 .166 -.157 1         
Mach9 -.119 .025 .312 -.510 .211 -.077 1       
Mach10 .120 .210 .566
*
 -.348 -.020 -.083 .468 1     
Mach11 -.535
*
 .113 -.008 -.059 -.021 -.507 .168 .246 1   
Mach12 .050 .230 .496 .508 -.257 .442 .244 .109 -.083 1 
Mach13 .618
*
 -.022 .293 .387 -.643
**
 .216 .064 .146 -.110 .491 
Mach14 -.013 .613
*
 .202 -.159 -.119 -.533
*
 .154 -.013 .170 -.219 
Mach15 .103 -.118 -.166 .362 -.161 .405 -.341 .274 -.168 .079 
Mach16 -.413 .508 .049 .390 -.024 -.372 -.050 -.019 .405 .220 
Mach17 .009 -.341 -.187 -.516
*
 .351 -.445 .136 .032 -.199 -.643
**
 
Mach18 .311 -.018 .155 .262 -.147 .507 .042 .147 -.368 .427 
* p < 
.05 
** p < 
.01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.25 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix for Manager Survey 
 
 Mach13 Mach14 Mach15 Mach16 Mach17 Mach18 
Mach1             
Mach2             
Mach3 
 
           
Mach4   
 
         
Mach5             
Mach6         
 
   
Mach7 
 
           
Mach8   
 
         
Mach9             
Mach10             
Mach11             
Mach12         
 
   
Mach13 1         
 
 
Mach14 -.171 1       
 
 
Mach15 .069 -.443 1       
Mach16 -.059 .432 -.115 1     
Mach17 -.406 .149 -.260 -.179 1   
Mach18 .591
*
 -.558
*
 .383 -.030 -.240 1 
* p < 
.05 
** p < 
.01 *** p < .001 
    
 
Alpha reliabilities and measures of aggregation 
I used two versions of the moral openness climate scale for the analyses in Study Four.  
The first version is a modified nine-item scale that includes all of the items incorporated into 
moral openness climate at the end of Study Three, except for “People who discuss ethics are 
expected to provide reasons to justify their position,” which is one of the three items for Logic; 
omission of this item resulted in an Alpha reliability of .69, while inclusion of it resulted in an 
inadequate reliability of .63.  The second version is the seven-item scale that emerged at the end 
of Study Three, which omits all three items for logic, and which I call here “moral openness 
climate less logic.”  It seems valuable to include both scales in this analysis because the former 
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incorporates items that are conceptually important to the original construct domain of moral 
openness climate, while the latter has superior psychometric properties, as will become clear 
below. 
The original ten-item moral openness climate scale had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .63, while 
the modified nine-item moral openness climate scale has an Alpha of .69, as noted above.  Moral 
openness climate less logic had a superior Cronbach’s Alpha of .74, which is unsurprising in 
light of the superior reliability (Alpha = .80) that the same scale had using the data from Study 3. 
Three of the scales that I used to test the criterion validity of moral openness climate 
against all had adequate-or-better reliability: collective moral character (CMC) and collective 
moral motivation (CMM) had Cronbach’s Alpha reliabilities of .76 and .86, respectively, while 
moral satisfaction came in at .92.  However, machiavellianism rated a surprisingly low .32, even 
though I omittedthe distracting items “Most men forget more easily the death of their father than 
the loss of their property” and “People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice 
of being put painlessly to death.”  This surprisingly low reliability may result from the age of the 
scale; cultural changes since the 1970s may have disrupted response patterns.  The scales I used 
to test discriminant validity had mixed reliabilities: participatory decision making (PDM) came 
in at a disappointing .51, but respectful interaction (RI) hit .74. 
To test aggregation, I first took the Median Rwg(j) (James et al., 1984), and found that it 
was above .92 for all scales but moral satisfaction, which was .89; all are well above the 
recommended threshold of .70 (James et al., 1984).  This indicates that systematic variance 
among respondents within work groups was a dominant proportion of total variance within work 
groups, for each construct.   
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An ANOVA test revealed significantly greater differences between groups than within 
groups for moral openness climate,moral openness climate less logic, moral satisfaction, and 
CMC; however, the F-test was insignificant for CMM, PDM, and RI, indicating negligible 
variation in these constructs across the groups in the sample.   
A separate measure, ICC(1), assesses the proportion of individual variation among 
responses for a given scale that can be explained by group membership; ICC(1) was .16 for 
moral openness climate, .15 for moral openness climate less logic, .16 for moral satisfaction, and 
.13 for CMC, but only .01 for RI, and a disappointing -.03 for CMM, and -.01 for PDM.  Finally, 
ICC(2) assesses the reliability of group means; it was .53 for moral openness climate, .51 for 
moral openness climate less logic, .53 for moral satisfaction, and .48 for CMC, but again only 
.06 for RI, and a disappointing -.18 for CMM, and-.09 for PDM.Note that because 
Machiavellianism was measured only for work group managers, it only exists at the work group 
level and requires no aggregation analysis.  Alpha reliabilities and measures of aggregation are 
listed for all variables in Table 5.26. 
 
 
TABLE 5.26 
 
Aggregation and Reliability 
 
Median Rwg(j) ANOVA F ANOVA Sig ICC(1) ICC(2) Alpha 
MOC 0.93 2.13 0.02 0.16 0.53 0.69 
MOC Less Logic 0.92 2.03 0.02 0.15 0.51 0.74 
CMC 0.94 1.91 0.04 0.13 0.48 0.76 
CMM 0.96 0.84 0.63 -0.03 -0.18 0.86 
PDM 0.94 0.97 0.50 -0.01 -0.03 0.51 
RI 0.92 1.06 0.41 0.01 0.06 0.74 
Moral 
Satisfaction 0.89 2.12 0.02 0.16 0.53 0.92 
Machiavellianism           0.32 
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These results indicate that aggregation may be appropriate for both versions of moral 
openness climate, for CMM, and for moral satisfaction, but not for the other variables measured 
here.  In particular, the other variables seem to be strangely consistent across groups.  I suspect 
that such consistently resulted from a sampling artifact: data collection for this study began in the 
spring of 2008 and ended in the winter of 2009, concurrent with the unfolding of a major 
financial crisis.  Tremendous uncertainty in the business environment, coupled with 
overwhelmingly negative coverage of business ethics in the news media, may have caused only 
organizations with a strong culture not only of ethics but also of openness, to participate in my 
survey. 
Correlations for aggregated variables appear in Table 5.27.  Note that the bivariate 
correlations in this table correspond, by definition, to the standardized regression coefficients for 
the bivariate group-level OLS regressions that follow. 
 
TABLE 5.27 
Correlation Matrix for Variables Aggregated to the Group Level 
 
 
MO MO-LL StDevMOC-
LL 
StDevMOC CMC CMM 
MO 1 .617
*
 .026 .395 .408 .176 
MO-LL .617
*
 1 .571
*
 .579
*
 .248 .034 
StDevMOC-
LL 
.026 .571
*
 1 .741
**
 -.262 -.262 
StDevMOC .395 .579
*
 .741
**
 1 -.237 -.193 
CMC .408 .248 -.262 -.237 1 .680
**
 
CMM .176 .034 -.262 -.193 .680
**
 1 
RI .570
*
 .365 -.257 -.080 .463 .336 
PDM .018 .092 -.252 -.416 .559
*
 .445 
MachIV .105 -.325 -.246 -.134 .033 -.087 
Honesty .318 .012 -.125 -.103 .110 -.075 
Optimism .054 -.057 -.102 -.002 .244 .250 
MoralSat .209 .351 .062 -.021 .791
**
 .619
*
 
 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 
     
145 
 
TABLE 5.27 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix for Variables Aggregated to the Group Level 
 
 RI PDM MachIV Honesty Optimism MoralSat 
MO .570
*
 .018 .105 .318 .054 .209 
MO-LL .365 .092 -.325 .012 -.057 .351 
StDevMOC-
LL 
-.257 -.252 -.246 -.125 -.102 .062 
StDevMOC -.080 -.416 -.134 -.103 -.002 -.021 
CMC .463 .559
*
 .033 .110 .244 .791
**
 
CMM .336 .445 -.087 -.075 .250 .619
*
 
RI 1 .363 -.225 .059 .217 .202 
PDM .363 1 -.136 .068 -.012 .538
*
 
MachIV -.225 -.136 1 .707
**
 .503
*
 -.252 
Honesty .059 .068 .707
**
 1 .237 .023 
Optimism .217 -.012 .503
*
 .237 1 .081 
MoralSat .202 .538
*
 -.252 .023 .081 1 
 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 
     
 
Factor Analyses 
To assess test-retest validity of the expected unidimensionality of moral openness 
climate, I ran an exploratory factor analysis on both the 9-item modified moral openness climate 
scale, and the seven-item “moral openness climate less logic” scale, using the field data.  I ran 
EFAs to allow factors to emerge from the data rather than constraining the solution to one factor 
and then assessing goodness of fit; this results in a more conservative test of unidimensionality, 
because even if the fit of a single-factor model to the data is adequate, other factor structures may 
have a better fit.  Per the recommendations of Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, and Strahan 
(1999), I used Maximum Likelihood extraction.  Multiple-factor models were rotated first using 
Promax, with Kappa=2, because I would expect emergent multiple within the scale factors to be 
correlated and therefore an oblique rotation is appropriate; I then used an orthogonal Varimax 
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rotation to better discern a simple structure (Conway & Huffcutt, 2003).  All tests were run on 
the same set of data as subsequent analyses, that is, on valid responses from valid groups. 
Unfortunately, unidimensional solutions did not emerge for either moral openness 
climate scale.  For moral openness climate, a three-factor solution emerged, and for moral 
openness climate less logic, a two-factor solution emerged.  For moral openness climate less 
logic, an orthogonal rotation produced a simple structure, but oblique rotation did not; item 1 
(“People who have trouble putting their thoughts into words get left out of conversations about 
ethics”) had a low communality and weak loadings on both factors, while items 2 and 3 
(“Discussions about morality often end before any conclusion is reached” and “Discussions 
about ethics often end before all the arguments have been heard”) loaded separately from the 
remainder of the scale.  For moral openness climate, neither rotation produced a simple structure.  
Items 1 and 10 (“People who discuss ethics expect others to challenge the reasons they give for 
their position”) had low communalities and weak loadings, item 8 (“People here are expected to 
provide evidence to back up their claims”) accounted for a factor of its own, while items 4 and 7 
(“Sometimes people here stretch the truth to win an argument about ethics”) had cross-loadings 
between the other two factors.  Results are shown in Tables 5.28-5.31. 
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TABLE 5.28 
EFA (Promax Rotation, Kappa = 2) on MOC Less Logic 
Communalities 
Structure 
Matrix 
Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
MOC1 0.097 0.216 0.267 1 2.830 40.433 40.433 
MOC2 0.486 0.672 0.346 2 1.134 16.194 56.627 
MOC3 0.501 0.999 0.253 3 0.884 12.634 69.261 
MOC4 0.376 0.383 0.697 4 0.739 10.555 79.817 
MOC5 0.255 0.161 0.605 5 0.618 8.834 88.650 
MOC6 0.178 0.186 0.490 6 0.498 7.110 95.760 
MOC7 0.333 0.390 0.617 7 0.297 4.240 100.000 
 
 
TABLE 5.29 
EFA (Varimax Rotation) on MOC Less Logic 
Communalities Rotated Factor Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
MOC1 0.097 0.176 0.248 1 2.830 40.433 40.433 
MOC2 0.486 0.635 0.276 2 1.134 16.194 56.627 
MOC3 0.501 0.989 0.142 3 0.884 12.634 69.261 
MOC4 0.376 0.274 0.671 4 0.739 10.555 79.817 
MOC5 0.255 0.060 0.602 5 0.618 8.834 88.650 
MOC6 0.178 0.106 0.481 6 0.498 7.110 95.760 
MOC7 0.333 0.295 0.588 7 0.297 4.240 100.000 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.30 
EFA (Promax Rotation, Kappa = 2) on MOC 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
MOC1 0.110 0.230 0.155 -0.111 1 2.788 30.973 30.973 
MOC2 0.496 0.672 0.345 0.187 2 1.450 16.113 47.085 
MOC3 0.510 0.999 0.248 0.123 3 1.112 12.357 59.442 
MOC4 0.412 0.396 0.711 -0.157 4 0.861 9.570 69.013 
MOC5 0.296 0.170 0.569 0.240 5 0.786 8.735 77.748 
MOC6 0.229 0.202 0.459 0.235 6 0.768 8.528 86.277 
MOC7 0.311 0.397 0.565 -0.006 7 0.556 6.175 92.451 
MOC8 0.283 0.174 0.045 0.999 8 0.386 4.293 96.744 
MOC10 0.067 0.004 0.022 0.225 9 0.293 3.256 100.000 
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TABLE 5.31 
EFA (Varimax Rotation) on MOC 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
MOC1 0.110 0.223 0.123 -0.132 1 2.788 30.973 30.973 
MOC2 0.496 0.627 0.278 0.132 2 1.450 16.113 47.085 
MOC3 0.510 0.989 0.133 0.047 3 1.112 12.357 59.442 
MOC4 0.412 0.305 0.671 -0.205 4 0.861 9.570 69.013 
MOC5 0.296 0.059 0.576 0.216 5 0.786 8.735 77.748 
MOC6 0.229 0.112 0.458 0.211 6 0.768 8.528 86.277 
MOC7 0.311 0.318 0.529 -0.049 7 0.556 6.175 92.451 
MOC8 0.283 0.089 0.077 0.993 8 0.386 4.293 96.744 
MOC10 0.067 -0.019 0.034 0.225 9 0.293 3.256 100.000 
 
 
Moral satisfaction was unifactorial.  Results are shown in Table 5.32. 
 
TABLE 5.32 
EFA on Moral Satisfaction 
Communalities Factor 
Matrix 
Total Variance Explained 
    
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
QSat1 0.645 0.821 1 3.255 81.383 81.383 
QSat2 0.837 0.946 2 0.409 10.224 91.607 
QSat3 0.843 0.954 3 0.241 6.026 97.633 
QSat4 0.540 0.748 4 0.095 2.367 100.000 
 
Discriminant Validity 
The discriminant validity of moral openness climate was first assessed using exploratory 
factor analysis.  As seen in the interscale correlation matrix shown in Table 5.20, moral openness 
climate is significantly correlated with respectful interaction but not with participatory decision-
making.  Both moral openness climate and moral openness climate less logic were separately 
analyzed together with participatory decision-making and respectful interaction; if EFA 
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produced a simple factor structure, that result would be strong evidence of these constructs’ 
discriminant validity.  Unfortunately, moral openness climate less logicproduced high cross-
loadings with participatory decision-making, whetheran oblique or an orthogonal rotation was 
used.  An EFA of moral openness climate less logic with respectful interaction failed to extract 
factors after 100 iterations.  Moral openness climate produced high cross-loadings with 
respectful interaction, whether oblique or orthogonal rotations were used. It also produced high 
cross-loadings with participatory decision-making when an oblique rotation was used, although 
an orthogonal rotation resulted in a four-factor solution in which each scale loaded on two 
factors of its own.Results are shown in Tables 5.33-5.38.  The items that comprised respectful 
interaction and participatory decision-making are shown in Appendices O and P, respectively. 
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TABLE 5.33 
EFA (Promax Rotation with Kappa = 2) on MOC Less Logic and PDM 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
MOC1 0.104 0.019 0.309 -0.047 1 4.206 32.355 32.355 
MOC2 0.502 0.175 0.75 0.214 2 2.154 16.569 48.924 
MOC3 0.535 0.231 0.748 0.226 3 1.184 9.11 58.034 
MOC4 0.389 0.083 0.562 0.217 4 0.938 7.219 65.253 
MOC5 0.372 0.192 0.36 0.393 5 0.838 6.443 71.696 
MOC6 0.179 0.055 0.369 0.06 6 0.745 5.734 77.43 
MOC7 0.393 0.134 0.578 0.348 7 0.697 5.363 82.793 
PDM1 0.685 0.518 0.141 0.86 8 0.574 4.412 87.205 
PDM2 0.637 0.999 0.121 0.361 9 0.528 4.064 91.269 
PDM3 0.616 0.463 0.157 0.786 10 0.423 3.253 94.523 
PDM4 0.626 0.688 0.21 0.461 11 0.299 2.3 96.823 
PDM5 0.411 0.574 0.127 0.34 12 0.25 1.921 98.743 
PDM6 0.435 -0.474 -0.214 -0.517 13 0.163 1.257 100 
 
 
TABLE 5.34 
EFA (Promax Rotation with Kappa = 2) on MOC and PDM 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 4 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
MOC1 0.12 0.013 -0.032 0.287 0.043 1 4.298 28.655 28.655 
MOC2 0.515 0.138 0.215 0.737 0.241 2 2.177 14.51 43.166 
MOC3 0.537 0.194 0.247 0.893 0.084 3 1.419 9.459 52.625 
MOC4 0.476 0.048 0.227 0.453 0.412 4 1.161 7.74 60.364 
MOC5 0.444 0.161 0.339 0.193 0.818 5 0.956 6.372 66.736 
MOC6 0.258 0.041 0.065 0.268 0.377 6 0.866 5.771 72.507 
MOC7 0.423 0.097 0.297 0.48 0.472 7 0.782 5.212 77.719 
MOC8 0.357 0.148 0.119 0.122 0.291 8 0.703 4.684 82.403 
MOC10 0.12 0.095 0.092 0.012 0.165 9 0.666 4.44 86.843 
PDM1 0.69 0.456 0.989 0.167 0.152 10 0.522 3.481 90.324 
PDM2 0.641 0.997 0.433 0.169 0.043 11 0.436 2.905 93.23 
PDM3 0.62 0.422 0.722 0.182 0.271 12 0.327 2.181 95.41 
PDM4 0.637 0.666 0.551 0.233 0.116 13 0.298 1.985 97.396 
PDM5 0.46 0.568 0.323 0.114 0.239 14 0.232 1.548 98.944 
PDM6 0.448 -0.446 -0.504 -0.178 -0.222 15 0.158 1.056 100 
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TABLE 5.35 
EFA (Promax Rotation with Kappa = 2) on MOC and RI 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 4 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
MOC1 0.18 -0.059 0.228 0.223 -0.101 1 3.958 30.444 30.444 
MOC2 0.529 0.288 0.655 0.294 0.17 2 1.651 12.701 43.145 
MOC3 0.6 0.288 0.997 0.2 0.084 3 1.292 9.935 53.08 
MOC4 0.443 0.295 0.374 0.661 -0.163 4 1.09 8.386 61.466 
MOC5 0.471 0.453 0.105 0.585 0.266 5 0.926 7.124 68.591 
MOC6 0.269 0.192 0.197 0.421 0.237 6 0.878 6.751 75.342 
MOC7 0.459 0.44 0.381 0.567 -0.033 7 0.708 5.445 80.787 
MOC8 0.387 0.286 0.15 -0.054 0.995 8 0.679 5.223 86.01 
MOC10 0.092 0.057 0.005 0.013 0.222 9 0.524 4.033 90.043 
RI1 0.514 0.596 0.257 0.21 0.22 10 0.494 3.802 93.845 
RI2 0.645 0.992 0.147 0.151 0.178 11 0.385 2.961 96.806 
RI3 0.405 0.555 0.121 0.276 0.192 12 0.242 1.858 98.664 
RI4 0.512 0.601 0.314 0.257 0.125 13 0.174 1.336 100 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.36 
EFA (Varimax Rotation) on MOC Less Logic and PDM 
Communalities Rotated Factor Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
MOC1 0.104 0.01 0.319 -0.087 1 4.206 32.355 32.355 
MOC2 0.502 0.105 0.737 0.115 2 2.154 16.569 48.924 
MOC3 0.535 0.162 0.731 0.116 3 1.184 9.11 58.034 
MOC4 0.389 0.018 0.55 0.157 4 0.938 7.219 65.253 
MOC5 0.372 0.116 0.322 0.344 5 0.838 6.443 71.696 
MOC6 0.179 0.027 0.368 0.014 6 0.745 5.734 77.43 
MOC7 0.393 0.05 0.551 0.286 7 0.697 5.363 82.793 
PDM1 0.685 0.395 0.038 0.799 8 0.574 4.412 87.205 
PDM2 0.637 0.985 0.038 0.167 9 0.528 4.064 91.269 
PDM3 0.616 0.348 0.064 0.729 10 0.423 3.253 94.523 
PDM4 0.626 0.635 0.136 0.328 11 0.299 2.3 96.823 
PDM5 0.411 0.541 0.068 0.232 12 0.25 1.921 98.743 
PDM6 0.435 -0.401 -0.147 -0.432 13 0.163 1.257 100 
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TABLE 5.37 
EFA (Varimax Rotation) on MOC and PDM 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 4 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
MOC1 0.12 0.006 -0.069 0.296 0.03 1 4.298 28.655 28.655 
MOC2 0.515 0.076 0.105 0.711 0.192 2 2.177 14.51 43.166 
MOC3 0.537 0.128 0.142 0.876 0.024 3 1.419 9.459 52.625 
MOC4 0.476 -0.011 0.133 0.41 0.378 4 1.161 7.74 60.364 
MOC5 0.444 0.091 0.181 0.091 0.807 5 0.956 6.372 66.736 
MOC6 0.258 0.014 -0.023 0.238 0.366 6 0.866 5.771 72.507 
MOC7 0.423 0.026 0.186 0.422 0.435 7 0.782 5.212 77.719 
MOC8 0.357 0.126 0.037 0.081 0.289 8 0.703 4.684 82.403 
MOC10 0.12 0.081 0.049 -0.016 0.166 9 0.666 4.44 86.843 
PDM1 0.69 0.316 0.943 0.027 0.096 10 0.522 3.481 90.324 
PDM2 0.641 0.971 0.222 0.055 0.06 11 0.436 2.905 93.23 
PDM3 0.62 0.318 0.636 0.062 0.235 12 0.327 2.181 95.41 
PDM4 0.637 0.602 0.412 0.127 0.102 13 0.298 1.985 97.396 
PDM5 0.46 0.537 0.172 0.025 0.247 14 0.232 1.548 98.944 
PDM6 0.448 -0.378 -0.398 -0.083 -0.204 15 0.158 1.056 100 
 
 
TABLE 5.38 
EFA (Varimax Rotation) on MOC and RI 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 4 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
MOC1 0.18 -0.096 0.222 0.218 -0.094 1 3.958 30.444 30.444 
MOC2 0.529 0.199 0.606 0.243 0.132 2 1.651 12.701 43.145 
MOC3 0.6 0.197 0.972 0.121 0.025 3 1.292 9.935 53.08 
MOC4 0.443 0.217 0.284 0.615 -0.181 4 1.09 8.386 61.466 
MOC5 0.471 0.363 -0.018 0.562 0.247 5 0.926 7.124 68.591 
MOC6 0.269 0.106 0.128 0.418 0.234 6 0.878 6.751 75.342 
MOC7 0.459 0.366 0.279 0.508 -0.069 7 0.708 5.445 80.787 
MOC8 0.387 0.183 0.097 -0.03 0.977 8 0.679 5.223 86.01 
MOC10 0.092 0.032 -0.01 0.022 0.221 9 0.524 4.033 90.043 
RI1 0.514 0.558 0.163 0.143 0.158 10 0.494 3.802 93.845 
RI2 0.645 0.996 0.007 0.036 0.07 11 0.385 2.961 96.806 
RI3 0.405 0.519 0.021 0.223 0.142 12 0.242 1.858 98.664 
RI4 0.512 0.564 0.219 0.181 0.061 13 0.174 1.336 100 
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Discriminant validity was also assessed through regression analysis.  Participatory 
decision-making significantly predicted moral satisfaction, collective moral motivation, and 
collective moral character, while respectful interaction significantly predicted only collective 
moral motivation and collective moral character.  Results are reported in Tables 5.39-41.As will 
be shown below, these predictive results are similar to those for moral openness climate, 
although MOC did not predict moral satisfaction in the following analyses.  These results 
provide evidence against the discriminant validity of moral openness climate. Hypotheses 1a was 
not supported.  Because participatory decision-making is not significantly correlated with moral 
openness climate, and loads on separate factors from moral openness climate in EFA using an 
orthogonal rotation, Hypothesis 1b was partially supported. 
 
TABLE 5.39 
OLS Regression of Moral Satisfaction on PDM and RI 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. R
2
 B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Moral 
Satisfaction 
(Constant) -1.689 1.542 
  
-1.095 .292 
0.289 
PDM 1.602 .671 .538 2.387 .032 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Moral 
Satisfaction 
(Constant) 1.280 .922 
  
1.389 .187 
0.041 
RI .341 .443 .202 .770 .454 
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TABLE 5.40 
Linear Mixed Model Regression of Collective Moral Motivation on 
PDM and RI, with Random Effects for Group  
  
Parameter 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error df t Sig. 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Collective 
Moral 
Motivation 
Intercept 1.441412 .134315 105 10.732 .000 
PDM .181169 .062297 105 2.908 .004 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Collective 
Moral 
Motivation 
Intercept .764365 .173184 107 4.414 .000 
RI .529339 .085563 107 6.187 .000 
 
 
TABLE 5.41 
Linear Mixed Model Regression of Collective Moral Character on 
PDM and RI, with Random Effects for Group  
  
Parameter 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error df t Sig. 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Collective 
Moral 
Character 
Intercept .288575 .060461 45.791 4.773 .000 
PDM .785101 .037739 202.426 20.803 .000 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Collective 
Moral 
Character 
Intercept .097569 .045443 24.244 2.147 .042 
RI .974051 .027615 200.016 35.273 .000 
 
 
Predictive Validity 
According to my theory, I expected a group’s moral openness climate to be predicted by 
the machiavellianism of its manager.  I expected moral openness climate to predict collective 
moral motivation (CMM) and collective moral character (CMC).  I expected both of those 
constructs to mediate the relationship between moral openness climate and moral satisfaction.  
155 
 
Finally, I expected contention (a construct intended to capture the shared perception of the 
importance and lack of consensus on moral issues faced by a work group) to moderate the 
relationship between moral openness climate and moral satisfaction; however, I was unable to 
create a reliable scale with which to measure contention, so instead I have included the standard 
deviation of moral openness climate as a rough proxy for it. 
Machiavellianism did not have sufficient reliability (Alpha = .32, well below the usual 
threshold of .7) to justify inclusion as a scale of its own in this study.  Therefore, I conducted 
another EFA on the eighteen items used in this study(shown in Appendix Q) to ascertain whether 
certain subscales might have acceptable properties.  Unfortunately, because only managers were 
surveyed on machiavellianism, the sample size was too small to support EFA if only managers 
from the “good” groups were used.  Therefore, I performed EFA on the set of all 37usable 
manager responses.  Correlations are shown in Table 5.42, and results are shown in Table 5.43.  
Extraction produced six factors, but due to the small sample size, the rotation algorithm was not 
able to converge on a solution.  Therefore I constrained the solution to five factors and re-ran the 
analysis; this produced the model shown in Table 5.43, though it was difficult to interpret.   
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TABLE 5.42 
Correlations between Machiavellianism Items 
 
 Mach1 Mach2 Mach3 Mach4 Mach5 Mach6 Mach7 Mach8 Mach9 
Mach1 1 
 
             
 
 
Mach2 .376
*
 1 
 
           
 
 
Mach3 .169 .378
*
 1             
Mach4 .290 .080 .040 1 
 
         
Mach5 .126 .260 .075 .468
**
 1         
Mach6 .065 .310 .158 .116 .037 1 
 
   
 
 
Mach7 .111 .081 .102 -.030 -.131 .612
**
 1   
 
 
Mach8 .133 .097 .066 .031 .122 -.084 -.029 1   
Mach9 .372
*
 .384
*
 .077 .121 .070 .530
**
 .391
*
 .024 1 
Mach10 .367
*
 .345
*
 .202 .286 .156 .475
**
 .196 -.071 .394
*
 
Mach11 .104 .304 -.074 .113 .183 .113 -.035 -.056 .056 
Mach12 .384
*
 .156 .057 .341
*
 .341
*
 -.048 -.030 .541
**
 .124 
Mach13 .152 .128 .017 .192 .277 -.245 -.369
*
 .178 -.036 
Mach14 -.092 .051 -.087 .463
**
 .252 .047 -.190 -.018 -.034 
Mach15 .034 .004 -.013 -.029 -.133 -.299 -.064 .311 -.260 
Mach16 .380
*
 -.028 .021 .269 .055 -.012 .125 -.012 .250 
Mach17 -.079 .149 -.053 .025 .099 .231 .153 -.289 .107 
Mach18 .373
*
 .189 .050 .373
*
 .373
*
 -.062 .016 .569
**
 .103 
 
* p < 
.05 
** p < 
.01 
*** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.42 (Continued) 
Correlations between Machiavellianism Items 
 
 Mach10 Mach11 Mach12 Mach13 Mach14 Mach15 Mach16 Mach17 Mach18 
Mach1 
 
   
 
       
 
   
 
 
Mach2 
 
                 
Mach3                   
Mach4     
 
   
 
       
 
 
Mach5     
 
           
 
 
Mach6 
 
                 
Mach7       
 
           
Mach8     
 
           
 
 
Mach9 
 
                 
Mach10 1             
 
   
Mach11 .047 1       
 
       
Mach12 .209 .124 1           
 
 
Mach13 -.054 -.024 .249 1         
 
 
Mach14 .000 .321 .162 .010 1         
Mach15 .081 -.439
**
 -.010 .183 -.139 1       
Mach16 .191 .027 .210 -.197 .172 -.013 1     
Mach17 .347
*
 -.235 -.269 -.148 .130 .027 -.085 1   
Mach18 .111 .025 .475
**
 .466
**
 .035 .296 -.050 -.001 1 
 
* p < 
.05 
** p < 
.01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 5.43 
EFA (Promax Rotation with Kappa = 2) on Machiavellianism 
Communalities Structure Matrix Total Variance Explained 
    Factor 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
Mach1 0.547 0.189 0.340 0.329 0.397 0.025 1 3.489 19.382 19.382 
Mach2 0.633 0.181 0.131 0.161 0.994 -0.039 2 2.850 15.834 35.217 
Mach3 0.357 0.138 0.069 0.030 0.372 -0.021 3 1.947 10.815 46.032 
Mach4 0.569 0.074 0.212 0.863 0.142 -0.017 4 1.520 8.443 54.475 
Mach5 0.421 -0.067 0.269 0.549 0.292 -0.166 5 1.410 7.832 62.307 
Mach6 0.731 0.808 -0.122 0.092 0.276 -0.208 6 1.159 6.439 68.745 
Mach7 0.632 0.752 -0.029 -0.106 0.053 0.031 7 0.949 5.274 74.019 
Mach8 0.640 -0.056 0.806 -0.007 0.127 0.259 8 0.828 4.598 78.618 
Mach9 0.576 0.600 0.094 0.141 0.362 -0.213 9 0.657 3.650 82.268 
Mach10 0.689 0.475 0.009 0.361 0.362 0.135 10 0.634 3.522 85.790 
Mach11 0.645 -0.016 0.032 0.172 0.284 -0.473 11 0.621 3.451 89.241 
Mach12 0.638 0.005 0.711 0.377 0.190 -0.053 12 0.496 2.755 91.996 
Mach13 0.469 -0.353 0.349 0.252 0.168 0.118 13 0.381 2.114 94.110 
Mach14 0.549 -0.102 -0.006 0.494 0.079 -0.149 14 0.356 1.978 96.088 
Mach15 0.682 -0.219 0.224 -0.043 0.072 0.988 15 0.258 1.432 97.520 
Mach16 0.425 0.161 0.070 0.278 -0.010 0.012 16 0.224 1.246 98.766 
Mach17 0.612 0.240 -0.336 0.111 0.147 0.075 17 0.144 0.803 99.568 
Mach18 0.712 -0.027 0.699 0.387 0.244 0.257 18 0.078 0.432 100.000 
 
 
I subsequently created subscales for “Honesty” and “Optimism” based on common strong 
loadings in the five-factor structure matrix, and on face similarities between the items.  Honesty 
was comprised of items 6, 7, 9, and 10, while optimism was comprised of 4, 14, and 16.  The 
Cronbach’s Alpha for honesty was .69, but deletion of item 7 boosted the alpha to .71.  Alpha for 
optimism was .97. 
I subsequently ran an OLS regression on the relationship between honesty and average 
moral openness climate in a given manager’s work group, and between optimism and average 
moral openness climate in a given manager’s work group, for all “good” groups.  I also ran OLS 
regressions for honesty and average moral openness climate less logic, and for optimism and 
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average moral openness climate less logic, for all “good” groups.  Results in all cases were 
insignificant, so Hypothesis 1c was not supported.Results are shown in Tables 5.44 and 5.45. 
 
TABLE 5.44 
OLS Regression of MOC and MOC Less Logic on Honesty 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. R
2
 B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Dependent 
Variable: 
MOC 
(Constant) 1.534 1.022 
  
1.501 .156 
0.101 
Honesty .368 .293 .318 1.257 .229 
Dependent 
Variable: 
MOC Less 
Logic 
(Constant) 2.518 2.373 
  
1.061 .307 
0.000 
Honesty .030 .679 .012 .044 .965 
 
 
TABLE 5.45 
OLS Regression of MOC and MOC Less Logic on Optimism 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. R
2
 B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Dependent 
Variable: 
MOC 
(Constant) 2.734 .400 
  
6.830 .000 
0.003 
Optimism .024 .120 .054 .203 .842 
Dependent 
Variable: 
MOC Less 
Logic 
(Constant) 2.806 .881 
  
3.185 .007 
0.003 
Optimism -.057 .264 -.057 -.215 .833 
 
 
Contention was measured using the variance of moral openness climate for a given 
workgroup.  OLS regressions on the relationships between average moral openness climate, 
average moral openness climate less logic, andaverage moral satisfactionat the group level also 
showed no significant relationship, so Hypothesis 2a was not supported. Results are shown in 
Table 5.46.  I ran an OLS regression on the relationship between contention (i.e. the standard 
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deviation of moral openness climate and moral openness climate less logic) and moral 
satisfaction for all “good” groups.  Results were insignificant, so Hypothesis 2b was not 
supported.  Results are shown in Table 5.47.  Because neither H2a nor H2b were supported, H2c 
is moot, since a nonexistent relationship cannot be moderated.  It appears that contention does 
not moderate the relationship between moral openness climate and moral satisfaction, nor does 
moral openness climate predict moral satisfaction. 
 
TABLE 5.46 
OLS Regression of Moral Satisfaction on MOC 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. R
2
 B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Moral 
Satisfaction 
(Constant) 1.280 .889 
  
1.441 .172 
0.044 
MOC .251 .313 .209 .800 .437 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Moral 
Satisfaction 
(Constant) 1.484 .373 
  
3.974 .001 
0.123 
MOC Less 
Logic 
.191 .136 .351 1.402 .183 
 
 
TABLE 5.47 
OLS Regression of Moral Satisfaction on Contention 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. R
2
 B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Moral 
Satisfaction 
(Constant) 2.013 .378 
  
5.328 .000 
0.000 
StDev MOC -.065 .839 -.021 -.077 .939 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Moral 
Satisfaction 
(Constant) 1.911 .342 
  
5.592 .000 
0.004 
StDev MOC 
Less Logic 
.150 .648 .062 .231 .821 
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CMMwas hypothesized to mediate the relationship between moral openness climate and 
moral satisfaction.  I also incorporated the similar scale for CMC, anticipating the same 
relationship; items for both scales are shown in Appendices R and S.  Because group-level 
aggregation is not appropriate for CMM or CMC, as discussed above, I ran a linear mixed model 
with moral openness climate entered as a fixed covariate predicting CMM, and a random factor 
for group membership.  This random-effects model allows different regression slopes to be 
specified for each random factor (i.e. group) while a single coefficient estimate is produced for 
the covariate of interest (i.e. CMM), thereby partialing out the effects of group membership.  
Therefore, random-effects modeling allows individual-response data to be used while controlling 
for group effects.  That model returned strongly significant results; moral openness climate 
predicted CMM with a beta of 0.39 with a significance of p<.001, while moral openness climate 
less logic predicted CMM with a beta of 0.33 and a significance of p<.001.  (Note that all of the 
items for CMM were reverse-coded).Accordingly, Hypothesis 3a was supported.  Results are 
shown in Table 5.48.Even more powerful results were obtained for CMC:moral openness climate 
had a beta of 0.74 with a significance of p<.001, and moral openness climate less logic had a 
beta of 0.72 with a significance of p<.001.  Accordingly, Hypothesis 3b was supported.Results 
are shown in Table 5.49. 
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TABLE 5.48 
Linear Mixed Model Regression of Collective Moral Motivation on 
MOC, with Random Effects for Group  
  
Parameter 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error df t Sig. 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Collective 
Moral 
Motivation 
Intercept .751820 .251498 106 2.989 .003 
MOC .391607 .092587 106 4.230 .000 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Collective 
Moral 
Motivation 
Intercept .939797 .196662 107 4.779 .000 
MOC Less 
Logic 
.329468 .073220 107 4.500 .000 
 
 
TABLE 5.49 
Linear Mixed Model Regression of Collective Moral Character on 
MOC, with Random Effects for Group  
  
Parameter 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error df t Sig. 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Collective 
Moral 
Character 
Intercept .070219 .054364 24.416 1.292 .209 
MOC .737248 .020737 196.134 35.553 .000 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Collective 
Moral 
Character 
Intercept .118043 .056136 21.926 2.103 .047 
MOC Less 
Logic 
.722914 .022738 196.448 31.793 .000 
 
 
Similarly, CMM and CMC both significantly predicted moral satisfaction.  It was 
necessary to conduct an OLS regression at the group level, because these variables were 
measured in two different surveys, and there is no correspondence between individual-level 
responses.  OLS on the relationship of CMM to moral satisfaction produced a standardized Beta 
of .619, with p=.010.  OLS on the relationship of CMC to moral satisfaction produced a 
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standardized Beta of .791, with p=.000.Accordingly, Hypotheses 3c and 3d were both supported.  
Results are shown in Table 5.50. 
 
TABLE 5.50 
OLS Regression of Moral Satisfaction on CMM and CMC 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. R
2
 B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Moral 
Satisfaction 
(Constant) .203 .610 
  
.333 .744 
0.384 
CMM .960 .325 .619 2.953 .010 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Moral 
Satisfaction 
(Constant) -.386 .494 
  
-.780 .448 
0.626 
CMC 1.113 .230 .791 4.845 .000 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this dissertation, I have attempted to develop the concept of moral openness climate.  I 
outlined the necessary presuppositions of reasoned agreement, which together constitute the 
conditions for a morally-valid consensus on the acceptability of a norm.  However, these 
conditions are ideal, and actual attempts to reach a reasoned agreement will only adhere to them 
to some limited extent.  Moral openness climate therefore describes the extent to which a given 
group’s prevailing habits of moral discourse realize the ideal conditions of morally valid 
consensus.I theorized that moral openness climate would be negatively related to the 
machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) of a group’s manager, since the manager’s beliefs 
about the possibility and / or desirability of reasoned agreement are likely to influence the 
climate for such agreement within the work group.  I theorized that moral openness climate 
would be negatively related to the satisfaction that members of a work group feel with the moral 
decisions made in their group, because of the criticism to which discourse exposes familiar 
conceptions of the ethical good, and because of the effort that discourse requires.  I theorized that 
contention would be negatively related to that same satisfaction, because an experienced lack of 
consensus on the issues at hand or on the means for resolving them seems likely to highlight 
points of dissatisfaction with those issues’ resolutions.  I theorized that contention would 
moderate the impact of moral openness climate on a group’s moral satisfaction, because the 
importance of valid moral discourse would become more obvious with higher contention.  I 
theorized that moral openness climate would increase collective moral motivation and collective 
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moral character, that is, the group’s prevailing inclination to follow through on its moral 
decisions, and to persist in the face of resistance.  I finally theorized that CMM and CMC would 
positively predict moral satisfaction, because it is difficult to be satisfied with decisions that are 
not implemented. 
Over the course of four empirical studies, I qualitatively confirmed that front-line 
workers and managers both experience moral equivocality and engage in moral discourse in 
order to reach a reasoned agreement about how to resolve it.  I then created survey scales for 
moral openness climate and for moral satisfaction that had satisfactory psychometric qualities.  
Using field data, I finally tested the above-theorized relationships, as well as the appropriateness 
for group-level aggregation, the reliability, and the discriminant validity of moral openness 
climate. 
Results indicated that moral satisfaction and a shortened version of the moral openness 
climate scale that omits items for procedural equity and logic have adequate reliability and 
aggregation properties.  However, even that moral openness climate scale did not have 
discriminant validity from other similar scales, and it did not achieve test-retest reliability in an 
EFA of its expected unifactorial structure.  It did not have a significant relationship with 
machiavellianism, although machiavellianism itself had problematic psychometric properties in 
this study.  It did not have a significant relationship with moral satisfaction, nor did the standard 
deviation of moral openness climate (a proxy for contention, for which a reliable survey scale 
could not be created) have a significant relationship with moral satisfaction.  However, moral 
openness climate did positively predict CMM and CMC at the level of individual perceptions, 
which was the appropriate level of analysis because CMM and CMC did not support group-level 
aggregation.  CMM and CMC subsequently positively predicted moral satisfaction. 
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These results would seem to indicate that moral openness climate does not have the 
reliability or the relationships with other constructs that would indicate construct validity.  
However, it is important to note that if moral openness climate does not incorporate logic or 
procedural equity, leaving it comprised of participation, closure, and power, then it is 
conceptually rather similar to participatory decision-making (Arnold et al., 2000) and especially 
respectful interaction (Vogus, 2004), both of which characterize openness to voice within work 
groups.  The lack of discriminant validity between moral openness climate and these alternative 
constructs is therefore unsurprising, and may indicate that the latter constructs may have 
important implications for ethical decision-making as well as their other known consequences.  
Although they are conceptually distinct, moral openness climate may be descriptively the same 
as empowerment. 
Assimilating moral openness climate to empowerment can also account for my other 
empirical results.  If the two are effectively congruent, it is not surprising that employees to 
whom participatory empowerment is extended would be more likely to intend to follow through 
on the decisions made, since empowerment has already been found to increase follow-through 
intentions for other decisions (Conger & Kanungo, 1988; Spreitzer, 1995).  Moreover, if moral 
openness climate implies a sharing of responsibility as well as authority, it is not surprising that 
it would not have an effect on moral satisfaction; Barker (1993) found that a particular form of 
empowerment (i.e. self-managing teams) did not lead to higher satisfaction with management 
decisions in one workplace, but simply familiarized employees with the difficulties of decision-
making. 
Altogether, it appears that moral discourse does occur within organizations, and that 
moral openness climate can characterize some of the variation between work groups in their 
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propensities to engage in those discourses.  However, despite the conceptual distinctiveness of 
moral openness climate, it also appears that it is empirically quite similar to the participatory 
elements of empowerment. 
 
Contributions 
 
These findings suggest contributions to the literatures onvoice and silence, moral 
psychology, sensemaking, and discourse ethics in business. 
 
Voice and silence 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on voice and silence (Bird & Waters, 1989; 
Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003;Morrison & Milliken, 2000).  Moral muteness has been 
shown to be related to a desire to appear decisive and a desire to keep others’ focus on the non-
moral aspects of the problem at hand (Bird & Waters, 1989), while the collective-level 
phenomenon of silence has been shown to be predicted by beliefs that management knows best, 
and predictive of reduced communication (Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003; Morrison & 
Milliken, 2000).  Moral openness climate describes and measures a continuous range of 
restrictions of voice, like excluding certain participants or ending the conversation before a 
conclusion has been reached, rather than a binary dichotomy between voice and silence.  This 
continuous range can be used to characterize the differential impact of various organizational 
antecedents upon silence, and the differential impact of varying degrees of silence upon various 
consequences.  If moral openness climate is found to be congruent with participatory decision-
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making or other elements of empowerment in future research, the continuous characterization of 
silence described above could be generalized beyond ethical issues to issues of all types. 
 
Moral psychology 
This dissertation has implications for the literature on moral psychology.  Rest (1986) 
distinguished moral judgment from moral motivation or moral character, and Arnaud (2006) 
theorized an extension of Rest’s four-part model to the level of work-group climate.  I have 
found that moral openness climate positively predicts collective moral motivation and collective 
moral character, which are the latter two stages of Arnaud’s model.  It appears that a group’s 
moral openness in deliberative discourse does enhance the willingness of parties to it to follow 
through on the decisions made, and to persist in the face of setbacks.  Pending empirical 
confirmation in future research, it appears that moral openness climate is an important antecedent 
of these two elements of collective moral action, which may be an important finding for 
practicing managers who strive to improve the business conduct of their organizations.  
Moreover, if future research finds that moral openness climate and aspects of empowerment are 
congruent, the practical implications of this finding become all the more valuable: greater 
collective ethical follow-through can be added to the other known advantages of participatory 
management, further commending the practice to managers. 
 
Sensemaking 
Sensemaking occurs as people face a stream of experiences and impressions and ask 
“now what should I do?” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005: 410), a question that requires 
some meaning to be assigned to those experiences and impressions.  Sensemaking can be used to 
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model a range of individual and collective decisions (Weick et al., 2005), including ethical ones 
(Sonenshein, 2007), and describes the broader set of rational and non-rational decision-making 
processes of which moral openness is a part.My findings that many of the rational nuances of 
reasoned agreement are unimportant to most businesspeople (i.e. that they do not readily 
discriminate between moral openness climate and respectful interaction or participatory decision-
making; that they neither reliably recognize separate dimensions for theoretically important 
aspects of moral openness climate like logic, nor incorporate those into a single factor for moral 
openness climate; and that participants in the qualitative study readily accede to managerial 
authority) supports the assertion in sensemaking theory that decision-making is more narrative 
(Weick, 1979; Weick et al., 2005) and intuitive (Sonenshein, 2007) than rational.   
The sensemaking-intuition model of ethical decision making (Sonenshein, 2007) posits 
that individuals who face a situation of moral equivocality first construct the issue at hand, 
applying a label to it that encompasses and highlights its salient features.  That issue construction 
has individual-level antecedents in the decision-maker’s expectations about what a signal will 
mean, and his or her motivations to reach instrumental conclusions about those meanings.  Issue 
construction also has social antecedents in social anchors (i.e. the reference group against which 
the individual tests the plausibility of his or her interpretation) and the decision-maker’s 
representations of how others are expected to see the situation.  Once an issue has been 
constructed, the decision-maker will make an instantaneous intuitive judgment about whether the 
situation is good or bad, or whether the action under consideration is right or wrong.  Only after 
that judgment has been made will rational processes engage to explain and justify the intuitive 
determination (Sonenshein, 2007). 
170 
 
My findings may be understood in the context of sensemaking as a more nuanced view of 
social anchoring, that is, “having interlocutors who help an actor test his or her interpretation of 
social stimuli” (Sonenshein, 2007: 1030), which is thought to influence issue construction 
(Sonenshein, 2007).  Greater moral openness may contribute to more influential social 
anchoring.  Normatively,it might be expected that greater moral openness would help decision-
makers to reach more valid conclusions by more carefully engaging their interlocutors, and 
thereby better comprehending the normative implications of the problem at hand. My findings 
also descriptively suggest that perceptions of moral openness in engaging social anchors enhance 
perceptions of motivation to follow through; perhaps more robust constructions of the issue at 
hand are easier to subsequently justify.   
Moreover, if understood as an aspect of social anchoring, moral openness may best 
describe not deliberation over what ought to be done, but rather bounded deliberation over the 
construction of moral issues.  Once those issues have been constructed, the adequacy of those 
constructions for encompassing salient features of the situation and guiding subsequent action 
may influence collective moral motivation and collective moral character.Satisfaction with the 
eventual outcomes of the decision may only be distally influenced by the openness of the 
discourse in which the issues were constructed; other processes of individual and collective 
deliberation and action intervene between issue construction and moral satisfaction (or the lack 
thereof).   
 
Discourse ethics in business 
The literature on discourse ethics in business (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007; Smith, 2004) comprehends the impossibility of adhering to the principles of ideal 
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speech that ought to structure reasoned agreement at its best (Habermas, 1979 & 1984); however, 
it does so by shifting the locus of analysis from reasoned agreement between individuals 
(Forester, 2003) to deliberative democracy, which mediates among representative institutions 
(Habermas, 1996).  The existing literature therefore normatively commends corporate 
participation in deliberative democracy, particularly with reference to corporate social 
responsibility.  As important as reasoned agreement is between organizations and their 
institutional stakeholders, I believe that it is also important to study the possibility and actuality 
of reasoned agreement among individuals, and particularly those individuals who work within 
organizations.  My findings have identified the descriptive form and limitations of the climate for 
reasoned agreement at a lower level of analysis, within organizations rather than between them. 
This dissertation has provided evidence that moral discourse does occur within 
organizations, and it has described moral openness climate as a construct that characterizes the 
degree to which a group of interdependent workers’ shared perceptions of moral discourse 
approximate the terms of ideal speech.  Importantly, my empirical investigation has examined 
whether or not those perceptions meaningfully encompass the principles of reasoned agreement, 
and I have found that some of those principles are not reliably related to the others.  Participants 
did not distinguish between my original dimensions of moral openness climate, but instead 
subsumed them all under a single factor, indicating that the articulation of dimensions of 
openness like closure or power may not be salient for most people.  Moreover, logic appears to 
be a separate and distinct construct, though one that is difficult to reliably measure.  Finally, 
procedural equity did not emerge as an aspect of moral openness climate at all.  These results 
seem to indicate that most people do not have a particularly nuanced conception of moral 
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openness, and therefore that they may not object when important principles of discourse ethics 
are violated in the course of reaching a (somewhat) reasoned agreement. 
The empirical finding that businesspeople do not recognize conceptually important 
principles of valid moral discourse has normative implications.  Discourse ethics identifies the 
ideal principles that a moral discourse must adhere to in order for its conclusions to be 
normatively valid.  Actual businesspeople seem to honor only a subset of these principles, while 
remaining blithely unaware of the others.  It therefore follows that actual moral discourses in 
organizations likely fall considerably short of the ideals of valid reasoned agreement; instead, 
they are probably rife with inconsistent or fallacious logic, unchallenged premises, and 
uncontested assertions, and may be frequently dominated by skillful talkers or people who have 
the luxury of time to participate.  The objection that rational moral discourse is also a field that is 
readily dominated by parties who are able to marshal considerable supporting evidence by virtue 
of their financial or social power (Lyotard, 1984) is likely to be all the more true if moral 
openness omits logic or procedural equity. When others who lack the resources to provide 
contradictory evidence also lack the inclination to challenge their opponents’ logic or expose 
their domination, then conclusions based on the volume of supporting information rather than its 
quality will likely proliferate.  Such conclusions probably disproportionately favor powerful 
parties. 
Is moral openness therefore simply an instrument of domination, whereby the values and 
preferences of some people are reified into an ethos that is subsequently used not only to control 
others, but also to legitimate that control over them (Scott, 1996)?  Not necessarily.  If ethics is a 
sublime and inexhaustible human experience (Scott, 1996), amenable to partial but not complete 
theorization (Lyotard, 1984), then all ethical schemes will have limitations.  In fact, those 
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limitations may not be apparent for quite some time (Rorty, 2006), and may emerge as a result of 
the scheme’s success and widespread adoption (Scott, 1996).  The prevalence of the ethos of 
rationality seems to be exposing the limitations of reasoned agreement, particularly as some 
parties resist the forms of domination it facilitates, as listed above (Welcomer et al., 2000).  But 
reasoned agreement nonetheless represents an attempt to solve some ethical problem 
consensually rather than by the assertion of one party’s will (Habermas, 1984).  Where social 
cooperation necessitates agreement upon the acceptability of the means and ends of that 
cooperation, as is often the case in business, then reasoned agreement enables cooperation 
without coercion; that cooperation becomes less coercive as the reasoned agreement that 
facilitates it becomes more open.Satisfaction with the process and its outcomes must be 
recognized as being limited and provisional (Habermas, 1993), and always open to revision in 
light of new realizations (Alexy, 1990).  If satisfaction is not mistaken for the achievement of 
moral perfection, but instead prompts the search for the perspectives that have been inadequately 
represented in the discourse at hand (Benhabib, 1992), then it need not facilitate domination. 
 
Limitations 
 
The small sample size of the fourth study is the primary limitation of this dissertation, 
and it both constrained the set of analytical techniques available and impacted the results of those 
tests.  This small sample size occurred for two reasons.  First, the timing of the survey was 
unfortunate, coming at a time when businesspeople at every level were likely more distracted 
and fearful than usual; an outsider wanting to ask questions about business ethics is not well-
received in a crisis.  Second, the design of the study impacted the sample size, because inclusion 
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of a work group required not only 33% usable responses for a single survey, but for two . . . plus 
a usable response from the manager of a given group.  A larger sample would have lent itself to 
more powerful analyses.  The non-significant result for the relationship of moral openness 
climate to moral satisfactionin particular may be an artifact of the small sample size available for 
that group-level regression, accounting for the perplexing finding that moral openness climate 
predicts CMM& CMC, which predicts moral satisfaction, but moral openness climate does not 
predict moral satisfaction.Were it collected at a time of economic normalcy, it might also have 
incorporated greater between-group variation on several of the variables, had a broader sample of 
organizations agreed to participate; as it stands, participating organizations were likely those that 
already had strong climates for ethics and openness. 
Furthermore, use of the follow-up survey to collect moral satisfaction data eliminated 
individual-response correspondence between those data and the other scales.  Although it does 
produce the temporal separation needed to establish causality, the small number of groups 
successfully measured reduces the power of the tests run.  Had moral satisfaction been 
incorporated into a single survey, the larger number of individual responses might have enabled 
more robust tests of its relationships to other variables at the level of individual perceptions 
rather than group climate.  In particular, it would have been possible to directly test for mediation 
between moral openness climate, CMM& CMC, and moral satisfaction. 
Similarly, the manager-only nature of the machiavellianism response also restricted its 
analysis to the group level.  Surveying all participants on machiavellianism, and then attempting 
to aggregate that variable to the group level, would have allowed for more robust analyses at the 
level of individual perception, although that was not its intended level of analysis. 
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Finally, it is risky to generalize too much from this set of results.  Moral openness climate 
does not have apparent discriminant validity from participatory decision-making (Arnold et al., 
2000) or respectful interaction (Vogus, 2004), and it does not relate to other constructs in its 
nomological net (i.e. machiavellianism, contention, and moral satisfaction) as expected.  Moral 
openness climate and moral satisfaction do appear to be reliable scales using field data, and they 
do relate to two other constructs of theoretical interest: collective moral motivation and 
collective moral character (Arnaud, 2006).  However, the small sample sizes obtained during 
data collection limit the scope of interpretation of these findings, whether positive or negative.  
Further research, incorporating larger and better-designed samples, might replicate these findings 
and extend them by testing the relationship of moral openness climate to other potentially-related 
constructs. 
 
Future Research 
 
One possibility for future research addresses the embeddedness of moral discourse within 
broader non-rational processes of moral reasoning.A qualitative study, perhaps even a 
conversation analysis (Rapley, 2007)that quantifies and analyzes relationships among coded 
speech acts identified in transcripts of actual conversations between research participants, could 
help to better understand the elements of reasoned agreement that are important to 
businesspeople.  For instance, small groups of business students could each separately read a 
case that contains a moral problem, and then jointly formulate a solution to the case in a 
transcribed conversation, before rating their satisfaction with the solution, their inclination to 
follow through with it, and perhaps their assessment of the distributive, procedural, and 
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interactional justice of the solution (Niehoff & Moorman, 1993).  Analysis of a number of such 
conversations could identify violations of the principles of reasoned agreement, and relate them 
to the participants’ subjective ratings of the outcome, as well as perhaps a judge’s assessment of 
the adequacy of the solution.  Such a study could also identify the extent to which the 
conversations focus on issue construction rather than justification of a decision.  By better 
understanding the aspects of openness that are salient to businesspeople in particular moral 
discourses, conversation analysis studies could enable a more accurate theory of the climate for 
moral openness climate in work groups. 
Another possibility for future research is to conduct further survey studies on moral 
openness climate.  One study could further confirm or disconfirm the discriminant validity of 
moral openness climate; because participants may confound moral openness climate with an 
overall sense of the value of their participation, or of the justice of the decision, it would be 
valuable to incorporate the entire empowering leadership questionnaire (Arnold et al., 2000), the 
empowerment climate questionnaire (Blanchard, Carlos, & Randolph, 1995; Seibert, Silver, & 
Randolph, 2004), and scales for distributive, procedural, or interactional justice (Niehoff & 
Moorman, 1993).  Such a study need not be conducted in the field using clustered members of 
workgroups, but could instead be conducted using a large sample of participants who have no 
association with each other.  Importantly, this study could better assess whether moral openness 
climate is effectively congruent with participatory management or other aspects of 
empowerment. 
A different study could further confirm or disconfirm the construct validity of moral 
openness climate, using different predictor and outcome variables.  Such a study would need to 
garner a larger sample, which may be feasible if it is conducted during a period of economic 
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normalcy.  One predictor might be the entire empowering leadership questionnaire (Arnold et al., 
2000), which I would expect to increase moral openness climate by suppressing the belief that 
“management knows best,” itself an antecedent of silence (Morrison & Milliken, 2000) and 
potentially a mediator of the relationship between empowering leadership and moral openness 
climate.  The presence of corporate ethics program elements like ethics training, a code of 
conduct, a confidential ethics advice line, and / or a confidential ethics reporting hotline (Harned, 
Baviskar, & Seligson, 2005) may all indicate the organization’s commitment to explaining and 
upholding ethical standards, and similarly positively predict moral openness climate.  One 
different outcomemay bemoral disengagement (Bandura, 1999; Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 
2008), which encompasses various rationalizations of ethical misbehavior like blaming the 
victim or denial of responsibility, and would likely be negatively predicted by moral openness 
climate since robust discourse would likely expose the disingenuousness of such 
excuses.Similarly, moral openness climate may also positively predict distributive, procedural, or 
interactional justice (Niehoff & Moorman, 1993), since robust discourse would likely eliminate 
solutions that violate these. 
Moral openness may have implications for ethical leadership.If the “burdens of 
judgment” (Rawls, 1993) are unavoidable in ethical decision-making, in part because of the 
equivocality that occasions moral discourse, then it may be particularly important for leaders to 
accept several responsibilities.  Maintaining orderly participation and eliciting contributions from 
reluctant parties are two functions of a leader that are entirely consistent with the rules specified 
by Alexy (1989).  However, reasoned agreement may require leaders to bear the burdens of 
judgment, and by authoritative actions create the circumstances under which discourse is 
possible (Habermas, 1996).  These actions may include raising an issue and framing the problem 
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in a way that allows relevant parties to recognize it and discuss it, rather than in a way that 
alienates or privileges some participants; recognizing impasses that cannot be resolved because 
of a lack of information or will, and making a decision (with a concomitant acceptance of 
responsibility) that breaks the impasse and allows the discourse to resume; and sometimes even 
hurrying a discourse along in order to leave a point intentionally vague, whether to prevent 
unproductive conflict in the present or leave leeway for interpretation in the future.Future 
normative research may examine the normative implications of these restrictions on moral 
openness, which necessarily privilege the prerogatives of the manager and raise the possibility of 
domination.  Future empirical research may examine the prevalence of these leadership practices 
and their antecedents in the personality traits or demographic characteristics of the leader, as well 
as the attributes of the leadership situation.  Such research may also investigate the consequences 
of such leadership practices for the depth of the consensus and satisfaction among group 
members.  Such research may finally examine the overlap of these leadership practices with the 
attributes of ethical leadership as defined by Brown, Trevino, and Harrison (2005: 120): “the 
demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal 
relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, 
reinforcement, and decision-making.”Conversation analyses of actual work groups solving case 
studies in ethics under the facilitation of their leaders may provide valuable data. 
Finally, it will be important to examine the normative weaknesses of actual reasoned 
agreement.  Existing research has demonstrated that procedural aspects of a decision contribute 
to perceptions of its justice, especially among individuals disposed to attend to the formal 
elements of ethics rather than to its consequences (Schminke, Ambrose, & Noel, 1997).  Moral 
openness may highlight a new set of procedural elements that predict perceptions of the justice 
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of a decision, or at least intentions to follow through on it.  However, justice perceptions are not 
the same as justice.  Rather, moral opennessmay be an expression of the ethea of ethical 
rationality (Habermas, 1984), employee empowerment (Potterfield, 1999), or both. These ethea 
have limitations of their own, whether in their reduction of the set of admissible considerations 
(Lyotard, 1984; Scott, 1996), in their constraint of the scope of issues which employees are 
empowered to decide (Potterfield, 1999), or in the displacement of responsibility from some 
decision-makers to others (Jackall, 1988; Potterfield, 1999).  Such limitations will become all the 
more dangerous to the extent that they are ignored, a problem which in turn may become all the 
more prevalent as participants feel more satisfied with the openness of their decisions: like every 
ethos (Scott, 1996), the success of moral openness may bring about its downfall.  Therefore, in 
addition to the critiques of the exclusivity (Benhabib, 1992; Lyotard, 1984) and utopianism 
(Apel, 1990) of discourse ethics that have already been made,  it will be important to elaborate 
the specific normative weaknesses of actual moral discourse in organizations.  Even if those 
limitations cannot yet be overcome so long as decision-makers must reach some reasoned 
agreement, it will be important for those decision-makers to recognize and accept responsibility 
for those limitations. 
All of these opportunities for future research may facilitate greater moral openness in 
actual organizations, and therefore better adaptation to emergent moral problems in a changing 
and pluralistic world. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Interview Instrument 
 
Hello, 
 
My name is Jason Stansbury, and I’m a researcher from VanderbiltUniversity. 
 
I’m studying ethical decision-making in organizations, and [Bank] is taking part in my research.  
They’re letting me interview employees in several branches about their experiences in making 
ethical decisions. 
 
Research has shown that although some decisions are obviously ethical or unethical, others are 
not so clear.  Sometimes you may not know if there is a rule or policy that applies, and 
sometimes there may not be one.  I’m interested in finding out how people respond to situations 
when they don’t know what the right thing to do is, and especially in finding out whether they 
talk with anyone, and how those conversations go. 
 
[Bank] cares about ethical business conduct, and that is why they are participating in my study.  
However, I don’t work for [Bank], and I will not be sharing any of my interview notes or 
transcripts with them.  I do hope to eventually publish my results, but will present them as a 
summary of my findings so that no one person or group of people can be recognized.   
 
I’m also not trying to find out about any specific problem or incident.  What’s more important to 
me is to understand how real people like yourself decide what to do when they aren’t sure what 
is right.   
 
You have the right to quit this interview at any time, or to not answer any question.  If you 
decide to quit, you can leave immediately, or remain here and talk with me until the end of the 
scheduled time.   
 
You may also decide to grant me this interview without bring audio-recorded.  The recording is 
intended to help me not to miss anything that you say, but I can turn the recorder off if you want 
me to. 
 
Before we start, I need you to sign this consent form.  If you allow me to record our 
conversation, I also need you to acknowledge that our conversation is being recorded, so that I 
can write up a complete transcript. 
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As an example of a moral decision where people weren’t sure what was right, let me tell you 
about something that happened at a coffee shop across the street from Vanderbilt.  Last winter, a 
number of homeless people kept coming into the store, panhandling customers, sleeping in the 
chairs, and sometimes taking things.  One employee kept a blog on the internet, and asked her 
friends on the blog (most of whom also worked at the coffee shop) what they should do about the 
homeless.  Some said give them a glass of milk, others said ask them to leave if they bother a 
paying customer, and others said call the police because they’re trespassing.  The store manager 
(who also visited the blog) agreed to call a meeting to discuss what the policy should be. 
 
Would you tell me about some circumstances that come up at this branch, where employees are 
not sure what the right thing to do is? 
 
 
 
 
Do you remember any decisions made here that were at all controversial, in ethical terms?  Do 
the decisions impact people that you know?  Do the decisions have much of an impact? 
 
 
 
 
Do you or other people here ask others for advice when they don’t know what the right thing to 
do is?  Do you or others ask coworkers, supervisors, friends, family, or someone else? 
 
 
 
 
Are there some topics that it’s not safe to ask about?  Are there some people that it’s best not to 
ask questions of? 
 
 
 
 
Is everyone allowed to ask questions or share opinions, or do a few people do most of the 
talking?  Who does the talking?  Does anyone get ignored when they speak up? 
 
 
 
 
When you or others here talk about what the right thing to do is, do you reach a conclusion?  
How do you know when you’ve reached a conclusion? 
 
 
 
 
Do conversations about doing the right thing ever get cut short?  Why? 
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Are conversations about doing the right thing ever used to discredit someone?  Do people take 
sides because of popularity, or to win favors? 
 
 
 
 
Are decisions about doing the right thing influenced by the good debaters, the people who care 
the most, or the people with time to spend? 
 
 
 
Do people give reasons for what they think the right thing to do is?  Can other people disagree 
with those reasons? 
 
 
 
When talking about what the right thing to do is, do people reason together, or do they change 
the subject?  Argue emotionally?  Confuse the issue? 
 
 
 
 
Do you feel satisfied that the people in this branch make good decisions when they aren’t sure 
what the right thing to do is? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thanks for all your valuable contributions! 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Pre-Test Survey Items and Construct Definition for Contention 
 
[Construct definition for use in substantive validity pre-test:]Recognized moral impact describes 
the moral intensity that people in the group notice.  The more a group’s decisions (or the 
decisions made by people in the group) hurt or help people, the higher the moral intensity.  But, 
the people in the group may not realize the impact of their decisions; if their decisions have a 
large impact that the decision-makers do not recognize, then moral contention will be low.  
Recognized moral impact doesn’t always mean disagreement; if a group agrees that what it does 
hurts (or helps) lots of people, then recognized moral impact is high. 
 
1. Moral problems never come up here. 
 
2. Our decisions impact lots of people. 
 
3. Employees here think about whether what they do is morally right. 
 
4. When one of our decisions touches people, it affects them a lot. 
 
5. We know the people that our decisions impact. 
 
6. The chances of somebody being hurt by a decision we make here are small. 
 
7. The decisions made here are morally controversial. 
 
8. Outsiders praise our morality. 
 
9. Outsiders think that we are immoral. 
 
10. Our decisions impact mostly strangers.  
 
11. It is hard to predict how our decisions will impact people. 
 
12. Few people have any reason to care about the morality of our decisions. 
 
13. Nothing we do here can hurt anybody very much. 
 
14. Nothing we do here can help anybody very much. 
 
15. We all agree that the people in our department make moral decisions. 
 
184 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
 
Pre-Test Survey Items and Construct Definition for Participation 
 
 
 
[Construct definition for use in substantive validity pre-test:] 
Some groups let everyone who might be affected by a decision have a say in that decision.  Other 
groups restrict participation, so that not everyone has a say, or some things cannot be said.  
Sometimes some things cannot be said by some people, or those things are not listened to if 
certain people say them.  Participation measures how freely everyone can participate in decisions 
that affect them. 
 
16. People ask coworkers for advice about moral problems. 
 
17. People ask supervisors for advice about moral problems. 
 
18. People call the helpline for advice about moral problems. 
 
19. People call the ombudsperson for advice about moral problems. 
 
20. People who raise moral questions here get ignored by their coworkers. 
 
21. People who raise moral questions here get ignored by their supervisors. 
 
22. People here are comfortable speaking up about moral concerns. 
 
23. Everyone’s concerns are taken seriously in moral conversations. 
 
24. Some moral topics never get raised here, even though they concern people. 
 
25. Some people’s moral opinions matter less than others’. 
 
26. People here would rather not talk about ethics. 
 
27. People here are careful who they talk with about moral problems. 
 
28. Moral decision-making includes everyone who would be affected. 
 
29. People keep their moral concerns to themselves here. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
Pre-Test Survey Items and Construct Definition for Agreed Closure 
 
 
 
[Construct definition for use in substantive validity pre-test:] 
Conversations about what is right or wrong must eventually end, so that a decision can be made.  
Sometimes the conversation ends before the participants reach a conclusion; other times, the 
conversation ends when everyone agrees.  Sometimes the conversation ends when everyone 
understands each other, but still disagrees.  Agreed Closure refers to how much understanding 
has been reached before the conversation ends and a decision is made. 
 
 
30. Discussions about morality often end before any conclusion is reached. 
 
31. Decision-makers end conversations about ethics when they feel they have heard enough. 
 
32. People make moral decisions before they understand all the stakes. 
 
33. People stop listening to each other before everyone is done talking. 
 
34. Decision-makers wait until everyone has had their say before making moral decision. 
 
35. Time is a factor in moral decision-making. 
 
36. People are patient with discussions about ethics. 
 
37. Moral problems get a complete hearing before any decision is made. 
 
38. Moral decisions require complete agreement here. 
 
39. People here can tell the difference between disagreements about morality and 
disagreements about the terms of a deal. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
Pre-Test Survey Items and Construct Definition for Commitment to Understanding 
 
 
 
[Construct definition for use in substantive validity pre-test:] 
Sometimes people talk about ethics because they care about deciding what is right.  Other times, 
people care what is right but only talk about it to discredit others who disagree with them.  
Sometimes, people use conversations about ethics to attack other people, to look good 
themselves, or to bargain for things they want.  Commitment to Understanding describes how 
much people seek to reach a reasoned agreement about what is right in conversations about 
ethics. 
 
40. Discussions about ethics are used by some employees to discredit others. 
 
41. Some people talk about ethics to make themselves look good. 
 
42. Some people talk about ethics to make others do things for them. 
 
43. Some people talk about ethics to buy time before a decision is made. 
 
44. Some people say things they don’t believe to win a moral argument. 
 
45. Ethics is sometimes an excuse for attacking someone’s enemies. 
 
46. People here only argue for things they believe themselves. 
 
47. Taking the moral high ground is a sure way to win an argument. 
 
48. Bringing up a moral issue is a common way to delay a decision. 
 
49. Taking someone’s side in a moral debate is a common way to earn favors. 
 
50. People are sometimes made fun of for making a moral argument. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
Pre-Test Survey Items and Construct Definition for Procedural Equity 
 
 
 
[Construct definition for use in substantive validity pre-test:] 
Sometimes people win moral arguments because they have more time to spend than the people 
who disagree with them.  Other people win because they are better at arguing than their 
opponents are, or because their opponents don’t understand their arguments.  Finally, sometimes 
people win moral arguments because their opponents just don’t care enough to argue anymore.  
Procedural Equity measures how often a moral issue is decided because one side lacks the time, 
will, or ability to argue their case, and not because their case is weak. 
 
51. The best debaters dominate discussions about ethics. 
 
52. People who have the most time to spend usually win discussions about ethics. 
 
53. People are willing to give weak moral arguments the benefit of the doubt. 
 
54. Getting your way in moral conversations depends on waiting out the opposition. 
 
55. The people who care the most usually win moral arguments. 
 
56. People here give in to good talkers in moral conversations, even if they aren’t sure they 
believe their arguments. 
 
57. Caring about a moral problem isn’t enough to get your way, you also have to convince 
people who don’t care. 
 
58. Moral debates are decided by majority rule. 
 
59. Moral decisions usually come down to who has more people on their side. 
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APPENDIX G 
 
 
Pre-Test Survey Items and Construct Definition for Logical Reasoning 
 
 
 
[Construct definition for use in substantive validity pre-test:] 
Sometimes moral decisions are made by clearly thinking about the reasons for one alternative or 
another.  Sometimes, some reasons are considered above criticism.  Some participants give 
reasons that contradict each other, or keep changing the subject.  Some participants won’t accept 
the reasons they’ve been given, even if they can’t find anything wrong with them.  Some 
participants won’t give reasons for their position.  Logical Reasoning is about talking about 
ethics by giving consistent reasons for your position, accepting criticism of your reasons from 
others, and criticizing others’ reasons. 
 
60. Discussions about ethics are won by those who shout the loudest.  
 
61. People who discuss ethics are expected to provide reasons to justify their position. 
 
62. People who discuss ethics often contradict themselves. 
 
63. Criticizing a person’s argument is taken as criticizing the person. 
 
64. People who discuss ethics expect others to challenge the reasons they give for their 
position.  
 
65. The moral decisions made here are hard to act on. 
 
66. The moral decisions made here are clearly communicated. 
 
67. Some people will not accept reasons for a moral decision they don’t agree with, even if 
they can’t say what is wrong with those reasons. 
 
68. Some people keep changing the subject when a moral problem comes up. 
 
69. Some people bring extra problems into a moral discussion. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
 
Pre-Test Survey Items and Construct Definition for Survey items for Moral Satisfaction 
 
 
 
[Construct definition for use in substantive validity pre-test:] 
Sometimes people are satisfied with the moral decisions that are made by their groups.  Other 
times, they feel that the wrong decisions have been made.  Moral Satisfaction measures how 
people feel about the morality of the decisions that are made in their work groups. 
 
70. I am generally satisfied with the ethical decisions that are made here. 
 
71. I would agree that decisions here that affect me are made morally. 
 
72. I would agree that decisions here that affect other people are made morally. 
 
73. I would agree that ethics is a problem here. 
 
74. I feel that I work with a morally respectable set of people. 
 
75. I would agree that the moral decisions that are made here are acceptable to everyone.  
 
76. I am proud to work for this group. 
 
77. I disagree with the moral decisions that are made here. 
 
78. I agree that moral decisions are made fairly here. 
 
79. Moral decisions are a sore subject here. 
 
 
 
 
190 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
 
Moral Openness in Organizations (Second Pre-Test)Survey Instrument 
 
 
 
Below we have described seven ideas about moral openness in the workplace.  We have also 
written some sentences that might or might not describe a given workplace.  For each of the 
sentences in the second section, please select the one of the seven ideas that it best matches. 
 
[The following construct descriptions were given for eLab panelists to match survey items to] 
 
Contention describes whether the members of a group believe that right and wrong are at stake in 
their decisions. 
 
Participation measures how freely everyone can participate in decisions that affect them. 
 
Agreed Closure refers to how much understanding has been reached before the conversation 
ends and a decision is made. 
 
Commitment to Understanding describes how much people seek to reach a reasoned agreement 
about what is right, rather than win favors, use their power, or make deals. 
 
Procedural Equity measures how often a moral issue is decided because one side lacks the time, 
will, or ability to argue their case, and not because their case is weak. 
 
Logical Reasoning is about moral decisions being made by giving consistent reasons for a 
position, accepting criticism of those reasons from others, and criticizing others’ reasons. 
 
Moral Satisfaction measures whether people feel that the decisions made in their group are 
acceptable. 
 
[The following items were randomized in the web survey application] 
 
1. People in my work group believe that the ethical problems we face are important. 
 
2. People in my work group ignore questions of right and wrong. 
 
3. Ethical problems do not come up here. 
 
4. People in my workplace are always sure what the ethical thing to do is. 
 
5. People here are often confused about what the ethical thing to do is. 
 
6. People here privately disagree about whether we make good ethical decisions. 
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7. People here have conflicting ideas about right and wrong in the workplace. 
 
8. Not everyone shares the same beliefs about business ethics here. 
 
9. The decisions we make here are morally controversial. 
 
10. People here believe that right and wrong are at stake in our decisions. 
 
11. Supervisors ignore some people’s concerns. 
 
12. People here are comfortable speaking up about moral concerns. 
 
13. Everyone’s concerns are taken seriously in moral conversations. 
 
14. People here ask coworkers for advice about moral problems. 
 
15. People here ask supervisors for advice about moral problems. 
 
16. People here take responsibility for speaking up if they see an ethical problem. 
 
17. It is often impossible here to include everyone in a decision that affects them. 
 
18. People who raise moral questions here get ignored. 
 
19. Some people’s moral opinions matter less than others’. 
 
20. People here avoid talking about ethical issues that concern them. 
 
21. People here are careful who they talk with about moral problems. 
 
22. Moral decision-making includes everyone who would be affected. 
 
23. Discussions about morality often end before any conclusion is reached. 
 
24. Decision-makers end conversations about ethics when they feel they have heard enough. 
 
25. Discussions about ethics often end before all the arguments have been heard. 
 
26. People here wait to make ethical decisions until they can reach agreement with others. 
 
27. People here would agree that discussions about ethics here open more questions than they 
answer.  
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28. Decisions about ethics are made here when time runs out, whether or not agreement has 
been reached. 
 
29. Most people here would agree that making a prompt decision is more important than 
reaching agreement. 
 
30. Conversations about ethics focus on who is responsible for making a decision. 
 
31. Moral decisions require complete agreement here. 
 
32. Disagreements about ethics end here when someone in authority makes a decision. 
 
33. Losing an argument about ethics hurts a person’s reputation here. 
 
34. Powerful people here usually get their way on questions of ethics. 
 
35. Questioning someone’s ethical decisions is a common way to discredit them here. 
 
36. People here care about understanding each other’s reasons for a decision. 
 
37. People here care about reaching a reasonable agreement on questions of ethics. 
 
38. Sometimes people here stretch the truth to win an argument about ethics. 
 
39. People here deceive each other to win arguments about ethics. 
 
40. People here trade favors to win support for their arguments. 
 
41. Disagreements about ethics here often involve threats. 
 
42. People here accept facts that do not support their position in a moral argument. 
 
43. People here point out the weaknesses in their own moral arguments. 
 
44. Caring about a moral problem isn’t enough to get your way, you also have to convince 
people who don’t care. 
 
45. The best debaters dominate discussions about ethics. 
 
46. Moral debates are decided by the people who have time to hear them out. 
 
47. People here voice their opinions, even on problems that do not interest them. 
 
48. Getting your way in moral conversations depends on waiting out the opposition. 
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49. People here make the time to participate in conversations about ethics. 
 
50. Good talkers usually win moral arguments, even if others aren’t sure they are convinced. 
 
51. Moral debates are decided by the people who care enough to hear them out. 
 
52. Moral decisions usually come down to who has more people on their side. 
 
53. People here are expected to provide evidence to back up their claims. 
 
54. People who discuss ethics are expected to provide reasons to justify their position. 
 
55. People contradict themselves often when discussing ethics here. 
 
56. People here are reluctant to contradict each other’s ethical beliefs. 
 
57. People who discuss ethics expect others to challenge the reasons they give for their 
position.  
 
58. Comparing an unfamiliar idea with a familiar one is a common way to make a point here. 
 
59. Moral arguments here often refer back to a few common examples. 
 
60. Some people will not accept reasons for a moral decision they don’t agree with, even if 
they can’t say what is wrong with those reasons. 
 
61. Criticizing a person can win a moral argument as easily as criticizing an idea. 
 
62. It is sometimes hard to stay on-topic in moral discussions. 
 
63. I believe that my group’s moral decisions are fair. 
 
64. I believe that my group’s moral decisions take everyone’s good into account. 
 
65. I believe that my group’s moral decisions are arbitrary. 
 
66. I believe that my group’s moral decisions are justified. 
 
67. I believe that my group’s moral decisions are dishonest. 
 
68. My group’s moral decisions make me feel proud. 
 
69. My group’s moral decisions make me feel guilty. 
 
70. My group’s moral decisions make me feel angry. 
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71. My group’s moral decisions make me feel satisfied. 
 
72. My group’s moral decisions make me feel relieved. 
 
73. My group makes good moral decisions. 
 
74. My group makes respectable moral decisions. 
 
75. My group makes bad moral decisions. 
 
76. My group makes problematic moral decisions. 
 
77. My group makes legitimate moral decisions. 
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APPENDIX J 
 
 
Moral Openness in Organizations (Third Pre-Test)Survey Instrument 
 
 
 
Below we have described six ideas about moral openness in the workplace.  We have also 
written some sentences that might or might not describe a given workplace.  For each of the 
sentences in the second section, please select the one of the six ideas that it best matches. 
 
[The following construct descriptions were given for eLab panelists to match survey items to] 
 
Contention describes whether the members of a group believe that right and wrong are at stake in 
their decisions. 
 
Participation measures how freely everyone participates in decisions that affect them. 
 
Closure refers to how much understanding has been reached before the conversation ends and a 
decision is made. 
 
Power describes whether people decide ethical questions based on the power, popularity, threats, 
or favors that other people can offer.  
 
Logic is about moral decisions being made by giving consistent reasons for a position, accepting 
criticism of those reasons from others, and criticizing others’ reasons. 
 
Moral Satisfaction measures whether people feel that the decisions made in their group are 
acceptable. 
 
[The following items were randomized in the web survey application] 
 
1. People in my work group believe that the ethical problems we face are important. 
 
2. People in my work group ignore questions of right and wrong. 
 
3. Ethical problems do not come up here. 
 
4. People here are often confused about what the ethical thing to do is. 
 
5. People here have conflicting ideas about right and wrong in the workplace. 
 
6. Not everyone shares the same beliefs about business ethics here. 
 
7. The decisions we make here are morally controversial. 
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8. People here believe that right and wrong are at stake in our decisions. 
 
9. People here are comfortable speaking up about moral concerns.  
 
10. People here ask coworkers for advice about moral problems.  
 
11. People here ask supervisors for advice about moral problems.  
 
12. People here take responsibility for speaking up if they see an ethical problem. 
 
13. It is often impossible here to include everyone in a decision that affects them. 
 
14. Some people’s moral opinions matter more than others’.  
 
15. People here avoid talking about ethical issues that concern them.  
 
16. People here are careful who they talk with about moral problems.  
 
17. Moral decision-making includes everyone who would be affected.  
 
18. Moral debates are decided by the people who have time to hear them out. 
 
19. People here voice their opinions, even on problems that do not interest them. 
 
20. People here make the time to participate in conversations about ethics.  
 
21. People who have trouble putting their thoughts into words get left out of conversations 
about ethics. 
 
22. Discussions about morality often end before any conclusion is reached.  
 
23. Decision-makers end conversations about ethics when they feel they have heard enough.  
 
24. Discussions about ethics often end before all the arguments have been heard.  
 
25. People here wait to make ethical decisions until they can reach agreement with others.  
 
26. Decisions about ethics are made here when time runs out, whether or not agreement has 
been reached.  
 
27. Most people here would agree that making a prompt decision is more important than 
reaching agreement. 
 
28. Conversations about ethics focus on who is responsible for making a decision. 
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29. Moral decisions require complete agreement here.  
 
30. Disagreements about ethics end here when someone in authority makes a decision.  
 
31. One of the responsibilities of management here is to make a decision when people don’t 
agree about ethics. 
 
32. Powerful people here usually get their way on questions of ethics.  
 
33. Questioning someone’s ethical decisions is a common way to discredit them here.  
 
34. People here care more about understanding each other’s reasons for a decision than about 
power and politics. 
 
35. Popular people here usually get their way on questions of ethics. 
 
36. Sometimes people here stretch the truth to win an argument about ethics. 
 
37. People here deceive each other to win arguments about ethics. 
 
38. People here trade favors to win support for their arguments. 
 
39. Disagreements about ethics here often involve threats. 
 
40. People here are expected to provide evidence to back up their claims. 
 
41. People who discuss ethics are expected to provide reasons to justify their position.  
 
42. People contradict themselves often when discussing ethics here.  
 
43. People who discuss ethics expect others to challenge the reasons they give for their 
position.  
 
44. Comparing an unfamiliar idea with a familiar one is a common way to make a point here.  
 
45. Moral arguments here often refer back to a few common examples.  
 
46. Some people will not accept reasons for a moral decision they don’t agree with, even if 
they can’t say what is wrong with those reasons.  
 
47. It is sometimes hard to stay on-topic in moral discussions.  
 
48. Getting your way in moral conversations depends on waiting out the opposition.  
 
49. Moral decisions usually come down to who has more people on their side.  
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50. People here point out the weaknesses in their own moral arguments.   
 
51. People here accept facts that do not support their position in a moral argument.  
 
52. I believe that my group’s moral decisions are fair. 
 
53. I believe that my group’s moral decisions take everyone’s good into account. 
 
54. I believe that my group’s moral decisions are arbitrary. 
 
55. I believe that my group’s moral decisions are justified. 
 
56. I believe that my group’s moral decisions are biased. 
 
57. My group’s moral decisions make me feel proud. 
 
58. My group’s moral decisions make me feel guilty. 
 
59. My group’s moral decisions make me feel angry. 
 
60. My group’s moral decisions make me feel satisfied. 
 
61. My group’s moral decisions make me feel relieved. 
 
62. My group makes good moral decisions. 
 
63. My group makes respectable moral decisions. 
 
64. My group makes bad moral decisions. 
 
65. My group makes unreasonable moral decisions. 
 
66. My group makes legitimate moral decisions. 
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APPENDIX K 
 
 
Survey Instrument for Study 3 
 
 
 
Below we have written a series of questions about moral decision-making in your workplace.  
Please choose an answer from the list following each question.  You may decline to answer any 
question, and you may quit the survey at any time. 
 
[The following items were randomized in the web survey application. 
Each question was followed with five Likert-type responses: 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree] 
 
[Contention] 
 
1. People here are often confused about what the ethical thing to do is. 
 
2. People here have conflicting ideas about right and wrong in the workplace. 
 
3. Not everyone shares the same beliefs about business ethics here. 
 
4. The decisions we make here are morally controversial. 
 
5. People here believe that right and wrong are at stake in our decisions. 
 
[Participation] 
 
6. People here are comfortable speaking up about moral concerns.  
 
7. People here ask coworkers for advice about moral problems.  
 
8. People here ask supervisors for advice about moral problems.  
 
9. People here take responsibility for speaking up if they see an ethical problem. 
 
10. It is often impossible here to include everyone in a decision that affects them. 
 
11. Moral decision-making includes everyone who would be affected.  
 
12. People here voice their opinions, even on problems that do not interest them. 
 
13. People here make the time to participate in conversations about ethics.  
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14. People who have trouble putting their thoughts into words get left out of conversations 
about ethics. 
 
 [Closure] 
 
15. Discussions about morality often end before any conclusion is reached.  
 
16. Discussions about ethics often end before all the arguments have been heard.  
 
17. Decisions about ethics are made here when time runs out, whether or not agreement has 
been reached.  
 
18. Most people here would agree that making a prompt decision is more important than 
reaching agreement. 
 
[Power] 
 
19. Powerful people here usually get their way on questions of ethics.  
 
20. Questioning someone’s ethical decisions is a common way to discredit them here.  
 
21. Popular people here usually get their way on questions of ethics. 
 
22. Sometimes people here stretch the truth to win an argument about ethics. 
 
23. People here trade favors to win support for their arguments. 
 
24. Disagreements about ethics here often involve threats. 
 
[Logic] 
 
25. People here are expected to provide evidence to back up their claims. 
 
26. People who discuss ethics are expected to provide reasons to justify their position.  
 
27. People who discuss ethics expect others to challenge the reasons they give for their 
position.  
 
28. Comparing an unfamiliar idea with a familiar one is a common way to make a point here.  
 
29. Moral arguments here often refer back to a few common examples.  
 
30. People here point out the weaknesses in their own moral arguments.   
 
[Moral Satisfaction] 
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31. I believe that my group’s moral decisions are fair. 
 
32. I believe that my group’s moral decisions are justified. 
 
33. My group’s moral decisions make me feel proud. 
 
34. My group’s moral decisions make me feel satisfied. 
 
35. My group’s moral decisions make me feel relieved. 
 
36. My group makes good moral decisions. 
 
37. My group makes respectable moral decisions. 
 
38. My group makes legitimate moral decisions. 
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APPENDIX L 
 
 
Initial Staff Survey for Field Study 
 
 
 
Please begin by helping us learn a little about you. 
 
1. In what year were you born? 
 
_______________________ 
 
2. How many years have you worked for this organization? 
 
_______________________ 
 
3. Are you male or female? 
 
___ Male   ___ Female 
 
4. What is the last year of school that you completed? 
___ Less than High School 
___Completed High School 
___Some College 
___Associate’s Degree 
___Bachelor’s Degree 
___Graduate Degree 
 
5. What type of work do you do? 
___Laborer / Machine Operator 
___Clerical / Service 
___Sales / Marketing 
___Trades 
___Professional / Technical 
___Management 
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Below we have written a series of statements about moral decision-making in your workplace.  
For each statement, please tell us how much you agree or disagree by circling your answer. 
 
6. People who have trouble putting their thoughts into words get left out of conversations 
about ethics. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
7. Discussions about morality often end before any conclusion is reached.  
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
8. Discussions about ethics often end before all the arguments have been heard.  
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
9. Decisions about ethics are made here when time runs out, whether or not agreement has 
been reached.  
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
10. Most people here would agree that making a prompt decision is more important than 
reaching agreement. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
11. Questioning someone’s ethical decisions is a common way to discredit them here.  
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
12. Sometimes people here stretch the truth to win an argument about ethics. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
13. People here are expected to provide evidence to back up their claims. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
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14. People who discuss ethics are expected to provide reasons to justify their position.  
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
15. People who discuss ethics expect others to challenge the reasons they give for their 
position.  
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
16. People around here are confident that they can do the right thing when faced with moral 
dilemmas. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
17. People I work with would feel they had to help a peer even if that person were not a very 
helpful person. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
18. People in my department feel it is better to assume responsibility for a mistake. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
19. No matter how much people around here are provoked, they are always responsible for 
whatever they do. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
20. Generally people in my department feel in control over the outcomes when making 
decisions that concern ethical issues. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
21. When necessary, people in my department take charge and do what is morally right. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
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22. In my department people are willing to break the rules in order to advance in the 
company. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
23. Around here, power is more important than honesty. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
24. In my department authority is considered more important than fairness. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
25. Around here, achievement is valued more than commitment and loyalty. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
26. In my department personal success is more important than helping others. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
27. In my department people strive to obtain power and control even if it means 
compromising ethical values. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
28. Around here, people are willing to tell a lie if it means advancing in the company. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
29. In order to control scarce resources, people in my department are willing to compromise 
their ethical values somewhat. 
 
 Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
30. Our leader encourages work group members to express ideas / suggestions. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
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31. Our leader listens to my work group’s ideas and suggestions. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
32. Our leader uses my work group’s suggestions to make decisions that affect us. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
33. Our leader gives all work group members a chance to voice their opinions. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
34. Our leader considers my work group’s ideas when he / she disagrees with them. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
35. Our leader makes decisions that are based only on his / her own ideas. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
36. We honestly report what we perceive to each other. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
37. We demonstrate a great deal of mutual respect for each other. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
38. When discussing ethical questions, we attempt to integrate our interpretations without 
belittling our own opinions or another person’s. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
39. The people in this department are trustworthy. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
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APPENDIX M 
 
 
Staff Followup Survey for Field Study 
 
 
 
Please begin by helping us learn a little about you. 
 
1. In what year were you born? 
 
_______________________ 
 
2. How many years have you worked for this organization? 
 
_______________________ 
 
3. Are you male or female? 
 
___ Male   ___ Female 
 
4. What is the last year of school that you completed? 
___ Less than High School 
___Completed High School 
___Some College 
___Associate’s Degree 
___Bachelor’s Degree 
___Graduate Degree 
 
5. What type of work do you do? 
___Laborer / Machine Operator 
___Clerical / Service 
___Sales / Marketing 
___Trades 
___Professional / Technical 
___Management 
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Below we have written a series of statements about moral decision-making in your workplace.  
For each statement, please tell us how much you agree or disagree by circling your answer. 
 
 
1. I believe that my group’s moral decisions are justified. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
2. My group’s moral decisions make me feel proud. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
3. My group’s moral decisions make me feel satisfied. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
4. My group’s moral decisions make me feel relieved. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
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APPENDIX N 
 
 
Manager Survey for Field Study 
 
 
 
Please begin by helping us learn a little about you. 
 
1. In what year were you born? 
 
_______________________ 
 
2. How many years have you worked for this organization? 
 
_______________________ 
 
3. Are you male or female? 
 
___ Male   ___ Female 
 
4. What is the last year of school that you completed? 
___ Less than High School 
___Completed High School 
___Some College 
___Associate’s Degree 
___Bachelor’s Degree 
___Graduate Degree 
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Below we have written a series of statements about moral decision-making in your workplace.  
For each statement, please tell us how much you agree or disagree by circling your answer. 
 
5. People who have trouble putting their thoughts into words get left out of conversations 
about ethics here. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
6. Discussions about morality here often end before any conclusion is reached.  
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
7. Discussions about ethics here often end before all the arguments have been heard.  
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
8. Decisions about ethics are made here when time runs out, whether or not agreement has 
been reached.  
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
9. Most people here would agree that making a prompt decision is more important than 
reaching agreement. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
10. Questioning someone’s ethical decisions is a common way to discredit them here.  
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
11. Sometimes people here stretch the truth to win an argument about ethics. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
12. People here are expected to provide evidence to back up their claims. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
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13. People who discuss ethics are expected to provide reasons to justify their position.  
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
14. People who discuss ethics expect others to challenge the reasons they give for their 
position.  
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
15. People around here are confident that they can do the right thing when faced with moral 
dilemmas. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
16. People I work with would feel they had to help a peer even if that person were not a very 
helpful person. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
17. People in my department feel it is better to assume responsibility for a mistake. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
18. No matter how much people around here are provoked, they are always responsible for 
whatever they do. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
19. Generally people in my department feel in control over the outcomes when making 
decisions that concern ethical issues. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
20. When necessary, people in my department take charge and do what is morally right. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
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21. In my department people are willing to break the rules in order to advance in the 
company. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
22. Around here, power is more important than honesty. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
23. In my department authority is considered more important than fairness. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
24. Around here, achievement is valued more than commitment and loyalty. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
25. In my department personal success is more important than helping others. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
26. In my department people strive to obtain power and control even if it means 
compromising ethical values. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
27. Around here, people are willing to tell a lie if it means advancing in the company. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
28. In order to control scarce resources, people in my department are willing to compromise 
their ethical values somewhat. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
29. We honestly report what we perceive to each other. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
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30. We demonstrate a great deal of mutual respect for each other. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
31. When discussing ethical questions, we attempt to integrate our interpretations without 
belittling our own opinions or another person’s. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
32. The people in this department are trustworthy. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
33. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
34. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
35. One should take action only when sure it is morally right. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
36. Most people are basically good and kind. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
37. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and that it will come out when 
they are given a chance. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
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38. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
39. There is no excuse for lying to someone else. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
40. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
41. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
42. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for 
wanting it rather than giving reasons that carry more weight. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
43. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
44. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
45. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are 
stupid enough to get caught. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
46. Most men are brave. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
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47. It is wise to flatter important people. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
48. It is possible to be good in all respects. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
49. Barnum was very wrong when he said that there’s a sucker born every minute. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
 
 
50. Generally speaking, men won’t work hard unless they’re forced to do so. 
 
Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree 
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APPENDIX O 
 
 
Survey items for Respectful Interaction 
 
 
 
1. We honestly report what we perceive to each other. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
2. We demonstrate a great deal of mutual respect for each other. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
3. When discussing important subjects, we attempt to integrate our interpretations without 
belittling our own opinions or anyone else’s. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
4. The people in this group are trustworthy. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
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APPENDIX P 
 
 
Survey Items for Participative Decision-Making 
 
 
 
1. My manager encourages work group members to express ideas and / or suggestions.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
2. My manager listens to my work group’s ideas and suggestions. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
3. My manager uses my work group’s suggestions to make decisions that affect us. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
4. My manager gives all work group members a chance to voice their opinions. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
5. My manager considers my work group’s ideas when he or she disagrees with them. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
6. My manager makes decisions that are based only on his or her own ideas. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
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APPENDIX Q 
 
 
Survey Items for Machiavellianism 
 
 
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
4. Most people are basically good and kind.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ]
 
 
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they 
are given a chance.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ]
 
 
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ]
 
 
8. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ]
 
 
10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for 
wanting it rather than giving reasons that carry more weight.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ]
 
 
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
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13. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are 
stupid enough to get caught.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
14. Most men are brave.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ]
 
 
15. It is wise to flatter important people.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
16. It is possible to be good in all respects.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ]
 
 
17. Barnum was very wrong when he said that there's a sucker born every minute.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ]
 
 
18. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they're forced to do so.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
This scale was published in Studies in Machiavellianism, by Richard Christie & Florence L. 
Geis, on pages 17 and 18, Copyright Elsevier (1970). 
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APPENDIX R 
 
Survey Items for Collective Moral Motivation 
 
 
 
1. In my group, people are willing to break the rules in order to advance in the company.  
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
2. Around here, power is more important than honesty. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
3. In my group, authority is considered more important than fairness. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
4. Around here, achievement is valued more than commitment and loyalty. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
5. In my group, personal success is more important than helping others. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
6. In my group, people strive to obtain power and control even if it means compromising 
ethical values. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
7. Around here, people are willing to tell a lie if it means advancing in the company. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
 
8. In order to get something valuable, people here are willing to compromise their ethical 
values somewhat. 
[ Strongly Disagree       Disagree       Not Sure      Agree      Strongly Agree ] 
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APPENDIX S 
 
Survey Items for Collective Moral Character 
 
 
 
1. People around here are confident that they can do the right thing when faced with moral 
dilemmas. 
[ Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree] 
 
2. People I work with would feel they had to help a peer even if that person were not a very 
helpful person. 
[ Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree] 
 
3. People in my department feel it is better to assume responsibility for a mistake. 
[ Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree] 
 
4. No matter how much people around here are provoked, they are always responsible for 
whatever they do. 
[ Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree] 
 
5. Generally people in my department feel in control over the outcomes when making 
decisions that concern ethical issues. 
[ Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree] 
 
6. When necessary, people in my department take charge and do what is morally right. 
[ Strongly Agree   Agree   Neither Agree Nor Disagree   Disagree   Strongly Disagree] 
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